State v. SkaggsState v. Skaggs
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶ 1} This accelerated appeal is from a judgment issued by the Wood County Court of Common Pleas denying appellant‘s request to withdraw his guilty plea. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant‘s motion to withdraw his plea, we affirm.
{¶ 2} In July 2002, appellant, Ronald Skaggs, was indicted by the Wood County Grand Jury on six counts: three second degree felony counts of trafficking in cocaine, violations of
{¶ 3} In November 2003, Skaggs filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea which was denied by the trial court without a hearing. He now appeals from the denial of that motion. Skaggs argues in two assignments of error that the trial court erred when it denied his motions to conduct a hearing on and to withdraw his guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel and his request for a hearing on the motion.
{¶ 4} A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is governed by
{¶ 5} A manifest injustice has been defined as a “clear or openly unjust act,” State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, or “an extraordinary and fundamental flaw in the plea proceedings.” State v. Lintner (Sept. 21, 2001), 7th Dist. No. 732, citing Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d at 264. Under the manifest injustice standard, “a postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” Smith, supra, at 264; see e.g., State v. Desote, 3d Dist. Nos. 12-03-05, 12-03-09, 2003-Ohio-6311 (manifest injustice shown where trial court denied withdrawal of defendant‘s no contest plea to charge of failure to notify sheriff of his change of address, where defendant‘s duty to register as a sex offender was premised on a void court order).
{¶ 6} A motion made pursuant to
{¶ 7} An evidentiary hearing on a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea “is not required if the facts as alleged by the defendant, and accepted as true by the court, would not require that the guilty plea be withdrawn.” State v. Patterson, 5th Dist. No. 2003CA00135, 2004-Ohio-1569, at paragraph 19 citing State v. Blatnik (1984), 17 Ohio App.3d 201, 204. See also, State v. Reznickcheck, 6th Dist. No. L-04-1029 and L-04-1030, 2004-Ohio-4801 and State v. Cosavage (June 28, 1995), 9th Dist. Nos. 17074 and 17075. Generally, a self-serving affidavit or statement is insufficient to demonstrate manifest injustice. Patterson, supra, at paragraph 20; State v. Laster, 2nd Dist. No. 19387, 2003-Ohio-1564 at paragraph eight. “When a petitioner submits a claim that his * * * plea was involuntary, a `record reflecting compliance with
{¶ 8} App.3d 748, 749, 753 * * *.” State v. Saylor (1998), 125 Ohio App.3d 636, 641.1
{¶ 9} In this case, to establish a need for an evidentiary hearing on his motion, Skaggs needed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate a manifest injustice. Skaggs submitted only his own affidavit which merely states that he has knowledge of the facts referred to in his motion and that he is entitled to the withdrawal of his guilty plea. While he refers to actions that occurred during his plea hearing and sentencing, no transcripts of those proceedings were submitted for the trial court‘s review. We conclude, therefore, that Skaggs‘s affidavit was insufficient to require the court to conduct a hearing on his motion.
{¶ 10} We now turn to whether the record itself indicates any manifest injustice regarding the merits of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Skaggs essentially argues that his attorney represented to him that: 1) he could apply for judicial release after three years; 2) he could reduce his prison time by “good behavior;” and 3) after he was incarcerated, he would be able to visit with his wife, who had also pled and been convicted of charges related to the incidents involving Skaggs, but was given a nonprison sentence. Skaggs states that he relied on these statements which he later learned were erroneous, and would not have pled guilty had he known this. Once again, this information is presented by argument, not through averred statements in his affidavit.
{¶ 11} To the contrary, at the plea hearing, the record shows that the trial court followed
{¶ 12} The court then verbally discussed each part of the guilty plea stating, “Do you feel that you understand the charges and the maximum penalties?” Skaggs answered, “Yes, sir.” After this discussion, Skaggs answered yes when the court specifically asked, “And do you understand that the Court can impose any sentence permitted by law as long as — in spite of, I should say, any promises made by your attorney or any recommendations of the prosecutor; do you understand that?” In addition, the court repeated the effects of the plea and told Skaggs that because there were multiple felony counts, he could be sentenced to serve his prison sentences either concurrently or consecutively. The court also explained the meaning of those two terms.
{¶ 13} Since Skaggs’ affidavit does not include specific factual statements, it cannot be relied upon to provide a foundation for the arguments now made on appeal. Even if we presume that his attorney gave him erroneous information, Skaggs waived any such error since the trial court fully complied with
{¶ 14} The judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Court costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Knepper, J., Lanzinger, J., Singer, J., Concur.