State v. SextonState v. Sexton
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Scott Sexton pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault under
{¶2} In his sole assignment of error, Sexton contends that the trial court erred in ordering restitution without proper substantiation. He argues that the $3,600 of restitution that the court ordered was not supported by competent, credible evidence. We find no merit in this argument.
{¶3}
{¶4} The victim impact statement stated that Lang had been working as a host at a restaurant earning $225 per week. He was unable to work for four months after Sexton had punched him and shattered his jaw. Since he lost 16 weeks of work, the total of lost wages came to $3,600. The victim later confirmed that amount at a hearing on the issue of restitution.
{¶6} But we find issues in the record that we raise sua sponte.
{¶7} The trial court stated at the hearing that it would order restitution in the amount of $3,600, which we would have affirmed had the court actually ordered it. But the final judgment entry in this case stated that “[t]he defendant is to make restitution for lost wages to the victim, Joshua Lang.” It did not specify an amount. A court speaks only through its journal. State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶6; Purnell, supra, at ¶13.
{¶8} This court has also held that where the court‘s order imposed restitution as part of the sentence but did not determine the amount of the restitution, the order did not fully determine the action. Therefore, it was not a final appealable order within the meaning of
{¶9} In State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 N.E.2d 164, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the argument that the failure to specify the amount of court costs the defendant had to pay rendered the court‘s judgment interlocutory. It stated, “A judgment that leaves issues unresolved and contemplates that further action must be taken is not a final appealable order. * * * However, when the remaining issue ‘is mechanical and unlikely to produce a second appeal because only a ministerial task similar to assessing costs remains,’ then the order is final and appealable.” Id. at ¶20, quoting State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 79 Ohio St.3d 543, 546, 1997-Ohio-366, 684 N.E.2d 72. (Emphasis omitted.)
{¶10} Certainly, determining restitution differs significantly from assessing costs, which simply requires the calculation of those costs and the creation of a bill. Threatt, supra, at ¶21; Wyant, supra, at ¶12-13. Calculating restitution “entails a substantive legal decision or judgment and is not merely a mechanical part of a judgment.” Thompson, supra, at ¶9, quoting State v. Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-5705, 940 N.E.2d 924, ¶16.
{¶11} The facts of this case fall somewhere between those in Holmes and Threatt. The court had already made the substantive legal decision of determining that restitution in the amount of $3,600 for lost wages was appropriate, but it had omitted that amount from the judgment entry. Nevertheless, the entry did not merely order Sexton to pay restitution as did the entries in Holmes and similar cases. It specified that Sexton was ordered to pay restitution to Lang for lost wages.
{¶12} Thus, we determine that the facts in this case are more like those in Threatt, even though Threatt is not directly on point. All that remains to be done in
{¶13} We hold that the trial court erred in failing to include in its judgment entry the specific amount of $3,600 in restitution. We remand the case to the trial court to rectify that error. We affirm the trial court‘s judgment in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
HILDEBRANDT and SUNDERMANN, JJ., concur.
Please Note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.