THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SCOTT, APPELLANT.
No. 01-807
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
May 11, 2001
92 Ohio St.3d 1 | 2001-Ohio-148
Submitted May 10, 2001 — Decided May 11, 2001. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 79506.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jay D. Scott, was convicted of the aggravated murder of Vinnie M. Prince and sentenced to death. Scott appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Scott (June 3, 1985), Cuyahoga App. No. 48609, unreported, 1985 WL 9047. We also affirmed Scott‘s conviction and death sentence. State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92, 26 OBR 79, 497 N.E.2d 55.
{¶ 2} Scott‘s state postconviction proceedings concluded on January 12, 1994, when we refused to accept jurisdiction. State v. Scott (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 1426, 624 N.E.2d 1064, certiorari denied, Scott v. Ohio (1994), 512 U.S. 1213, 114 S.Ct. 2694, 129 L.Ed.2d 825.
{¶ 3} Finally, the federal court of appeals denied Scott‘s application for habeas relief in Scott v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2000), 209 F.3d 854, certiorari denied
{¶ 4} On April 10, 2001, Scott‘s attorneys filed a motion in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas claiming that Scott is incompetent to be executed under the standards set forth in
{¶ 5} On April 17, we stayed Scott‘s execution after the court of appeals requested that we do so. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court‘s dismissal on April 20, 2001. State v. Scott (Apr. 20, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 79506, unreported, 2001 WL 406583. Thereafter, we set a new execution date of May 15, 2001, 91 Ohio St.3d 1499, 746 N.E.2d 192.
{¶ 6} The cause is now before this court upon a discretionary appeal from the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the trial court‘s dismissal.
{¶ 7} Scott raises three issues in this appeal. First, Scott argues that the ban on cruel and unusual punishment in the United States Constitution‘s Eighth Amendment and Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution bars Ohio from executing any person with a biologically based severe mental illness such as schizophrenia. However, Scott cites no authority, and we are not aware of any authority, that supports Scott‘s claim that the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment and the Ohio Constitution preclude the execution of mentally ill persons who understand their crimes and the capital punishment that they face.
{¶ 8} Scott also argues that he should not be executed because the Supreme Court of the United States has recently granted certiorari to review whether mentally retarded persons can be executed. See McCarver v. North Carolina, certiorari granted (2001), 532 U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1401, 149 L.Ed.2d 132. However, that case has nothing to do with Scott‘s appeal, since Scott is not and does not claim to be mentally retarded. As the court of appeals stated, “While McCarver may deal with questions involving the baseline intelligence of mentally retarded individuals and whether they may be incapable of the understanding required under Ford, Scott‘s contention ignores his capacity to understand the reasons for and nature of the death penalty.” State v. Scott (Apr. 20, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 79506, unreported, at 11, 2001 WL 406583, citing Ford v. Wainwright (1986), 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335. Thus, this contention has no merit.
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} The trial court considered the briefs and other matters submitted by the parties and conducted a hearing to determine if probable cause existed to believe that the convict was insane. For future reference,
{¶ 11} In this case, even after a hearing, Scott had presented no medical or psychiatric testimony or expert testimony of any nature showing that he is insane, as defined, or that further proceedings are warranted to consider the issue. Indeed, the trial court made specific findings of fact on Scott‘s mental condition in determining that no probable cause existed to question whether Scott was
{¶ 12} Moreover, the trial court‘s detailed findings of facts support its determination that there was no probable cause to believe that Scott was incompetent to be executed. We find no evidence from the record of the proceedings that the trial court abused its discretion in making these findings. Therefore, Scott‘s first proposition has no merit.
{¶ 13} In his second issue, Scott argues that the test for determining competency to be executed as set forth in Ford v. Wainwright is no longer adequate in light of contemporary medical and psychiatric standards and should be replaced.
{¶ 14} Ohio‘s current law governing competency to be executed,
{¶ 15} Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed Justice Powell‘s competency standard in Ford. In Coe v. Bell
{¶ 16} The defense complains that Scott‘s schizophrenia and other forms of mental illness are not included in the trial court‘s consideration of a convict‘s competency to be executed. To the contrary, under the provisions of
{¶ 17} In his third proposition, Scott argues that
{¶ 18} Scott claims that the trial court arbitrarily assigned the burden of proof to the defense during the probable cause inquiry. However, sanity and competence are generally presumed. One who challenges either mental responsibility for crimes or competence to be tried must bear the burden of proof to challenge those presumptions. See State v. Austin (1905), 71 Ohio St. 317, 73 N.E. 218;
{¶ 19} Moreover,
{¶ 20} Finally, placing the burden of proof on Scott to prove probable cause or to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is incompetent to be executed does not violate Scott‘s constitutional protections.
{¶ 21} In Medina v. California (1992), 505 U.S. 437, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353, the Supreme Court held that a state may presume that the defendant is competent to be tried and require him to shoulder the burden of proving his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. In so ruling, the court held that a state‘s procedure regarding the burden of proof in the criminal context will not be prohibited unless “‘it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.‘” Id. at 445, 112 S.Ct. at 2577, 120 L.Ed.2d at 363, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674, 677. After examining the historical and modern treatment of the burden of proof in competency proceedings and the requirements of fundamental fairness, the court concluded that placing this burden on a criminal defendant satisfies due process. Id. at 446-449, 112 S.Ct. at 2577-2579, 120 L.Ed.2d at 363-366.
{¶ 22} In Ford, Justice Powell stated that a convict in proceedings to determine competency to be executed does not make his claim of insanity against a “neutral background.” On the contrary, “in order to have been convicted and sentenced, petitioner must have been judged competent to stand trial, or his competency must have been sufficiently clear as not to raise a serious question for the trial court. The State therefore may properly presume that petitioner remains sane at the time sentence is to be carried out, and may require a substantial threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger a hearing process.” (Footnote omitted.) Ford, 477 U.S. at 425-426, 106 S.Ct. at 2610, 91 L.Ed.2d at 356-357 (Powell, J., concurring).
{¶ 23} Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has ruled that Tennessee‘s statute on competency to be executed properly placed the burden of proof on the convict to prove his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d at 827-828. In so ruling, the court concluded that in light of Medina, it saw “no reason why a prisoner‘s competency to be executed should be treated more strictly than a criminal defendant‘s competency to stand trial for the purpose of due process.” Id. at 828. We therefore find that the trial court properly interpreted
{¶ 24} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
COOK, J., concurs separately.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
COOK, J., concurring.
{¶ 25} Though I agree with the majority‘s disposition of this case, I write separately to explain my reasons for doing so and to register my disagreement with portions of the majority‘s analysis.
Propositions of Law I and II
{¶ 26} Scott‘s first two propositions of law address the constitutionality of executing a convict diagnosed with a mental illness such as schizophrenia. Scott contends that “evolving standards of decency” now preclude the execution of a severely mentally ill person. The majority addresses Scott‘s constitutional claims on the merits and rejects them. I agree that Scott‘s constitutional claims lack merit.
{¶ 27} On April 10, 2001, Scott filed in the trial court an
{¶ 28} But construing the dual nature of Scott‘s filing in a light most favorable to him, his alternative motion to declare unconstitutional the Ohio death penalty scheme as applied to severely mentally ill individuals is in truth a petition for postconviction relief. This court has previously held, “Where a criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a motion seeking vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her constitutional rights have been violated, such a motion is a petition for postconviction relief as defined in
“(a) The petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief.
“(b) Subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner‘s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.”
{¶ 30} Additionally, Scott must also satisfy
{¶ 31} Scott has failed to satisfy
{¶ 32} In his jurisdictional memorandum, Scott arguably tried to overcome the (A)(2) procedural hurdle by arguing that evidence of his mental illness was not presented to the jury, thereby “cast[ing] a dark shadow over the death sentence that was imposed.” Scott thus implied that the jury might not have sentenced him to
{¶ 33} Even assuming arguendo that Scott‘s successive postconviction relief petition satisfies
{¶ 34} For the foregoing reasons, it is unnecessary to determine the actual merits of the constitutional arguments raised in Scott‘s first two propositions of law.
Proposition of Law III
{¶ 35} In his third proposition of law, Scott asserts that (1) the lower court improperly placed the burden of establishing probable cause on him, (2) the court of appeals denied him due process by requiring that he satisfy an unreasonably high standard of probable cause, and (3) he was not afforded a full-fledged statutory inquiry on his competency. Scott also attacks
{¶ 36} Scott fails to recognize that “probable cause” is a term of art. As early as 1813, the United States Supreme Court noted that “the term ‘probable cause’ * * * has a fixed and well known meaning.” Locke v. United States (1813), 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348, 3 L.Ed. 364, 367. A finding of probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion of guilt but less evidence than that required to sustain a conviction. See Brinegar v. United States (1949), 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890. See, also, Melanowski v. Judy (1921), 102 Ohio St. 153, 156, 131 N.E. 360, 361, citing Ash v. Marlow (1851), 20 Ohio 119, 1851 WL 16, paragraph one of the syllabus (defining probable cause as “[a] reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged“). More recently, we stated that probable cause is “a term that has been defined as ’ “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” ’ ” State v. Moore (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 734 N.E.2d 804, 807, quoting Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132, 161, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543, 555.
{¶ 37} In rejecting Scott‘s arguments concerning the burdens under
{¶ 38} But this conclusion ignores both the scope of the statute and the nature of a probable cause determination. By its own terms,
{¶ 39} The majority‘s interpretation is logically inconsistent, because
{¶ 40} The majority‘s interpretation is flawed because
{¶ 41} Scott never satisfied the
{¶ 42} With the foregoing reservations, I concur in the judgment of affirmance.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 43} When the Constitution of the United States was ratified, slavery was legal and women could not vote. At various times in our country‘s past, states tortured prisoners and performed barbaric executions, including flogging,
{¶ 44} The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that “[t]he basic concept underlying the [the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the] Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” Trop v. Dulles (1958), 356 U.S. 86, 100, 78 S.Ct. 590, 597-598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id. at 101, 78 S.Ct. at 598, 2 L.Ed.2d at 642.
{¶ 45} The Eighth Amendment prohibits torture and barbaric executions because they do not comport with human dignity. Furman, 408 U.S. at 270, 92 S.Ct. at 2742, 33 L.Ed.2d at 367 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments. The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is ‘cruel and unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.“). See, also, id., 408 U.S. at 345, 92 S.Ct. at 2780, 33 L.Ed.2d at 410 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves.“).
{¶ 47} When the Supreme Court of the United States sets constitutional standards, it does so for the entire country and therefore considers the ethos of the entire country. Our Constitution is not the product of the deeply conservative South or of the liberal Northeast. The Ohio Constitution is the product of Ohio, an enlightened, progressive state. When Ohioans consider the countries that still practice slavery, we call them uncivilized; when Ohioans consider the countries that do not permit women to vote, we call them repressive; when Ohioans consider the countries that commit state-sponsored torture, we call them barbaric.
{¶ 48} This court has a chance to take a step toward being a more civilized and humane society. This court could declare that in the interests of protecting human dignity, Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the execution of a convict with a severe mental illness. I believe that the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of” Ohio call for such a judicial declaration.
{¶ 49} Jay D. Scott is in no other way a sympathetic man. He is a twice-convicted murderer who does not appear to express remorse for his crimes. But I cannot get past one simple irrefutable fact: he has chronic, undifferentiated schizophrenia, a severe mental illness. Mental illness is a medical disease. Every year we learn more about it and the way it manifests itself in the mind of the sufferer. At this time, we do not and cannot know what is going on in the mind of a person with mental illness. As a society, we have always treated those with
{¶ 50} Executing Jay D. Scott says more about our society than it says about him. Executing him will be another assertion of our country‘s place in the world with China, Congo, Iran, and Saudi Arabia as the five countries that year after year perform the most state-sanctioned executions. Executing him will be another assertion that taking the life of a person with mental illness is no different than taking the life of someone without mental illness. Executing him will be an assertion that taking the life of a person with mental illness serves a purpose that keeping him securely in prison for the rest of his life does not. Executing him will be an assertion that only some life is precious or sacred. I believe Ohioans are better than that.
{¶ 51} Section 9, Article I prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. I believe that executing a convict with a severe mental illness is a cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, I take up the torch initially lit by former Justice J. Craig Wright, who stated: “I cannot sanction the penalty of death for a person who appears to be mentally ill.” State v. Berry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 367, 650 N.E.2d 433, 444 (Wright, J., dissenting). In this case, there is no doubt about the mental illness; the trial court found that Jay D. Scott has schizophrenia, a severe mental illness. I cannot sanction his execution. I dissent.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and L. Christopher Frey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, David M. Gormley, State Solicitor, and James V. Canepa, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Gold, Schwartz & Co., L.P.A., and John S. Pyle; Law Office of Timothy Farrell Sweeney and Timothy F. Sweeney, for appellant.