STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LAKYSHA SAGER, Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL NOS. C-180051, C-180052
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
January 18, 2019
[Cite as State v. Sager, 2019-Ohio-135.]
CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge.
TRIAL NOS. C-13CRB-9584A, C-13CRB-9584B; ΟΡΙΝΙΟ Ν.
Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 18, 2019
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald Springman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Krista Gieske, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
{1} Defendant-appellant Lakysha Sager appeals the decision of the Hamilton County Municipal Court denying her second application to seal records of her convictions for interference with custody, in violation of
I. Facts
{2} From the record properly before us, including the original papers filed in the criminal proceeding and the victim-impact statement prepared prior to sentencing, we glean that Sager and Dante Payne, now divorced, have two daughters. Payne was the residential parent with legal custody of the girls. Sager was afforded visitation every other weekend by court order. On Thursday, April 18, 2013, Sager took the girls from their school-bus stop without Payne‘s knowledge or permission. After the girls were reported missing from school, the police were notified and an Amber Alert was issued. Sager returned the girls to police authorities at 10 p.m., some 14 hours after taking them from the school-bus stop.
{3} A Hamilton County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment charging Sager with interference with custody. The indictment alleged that Sager had knowingly, without privilege to do so, or recklessly enticed, taken, kept, or harbored her two daughters, children under the age of 18, from their parent, guardian, or custodian. Each count named a separate daughter as the child taken in violation of the statute.
{4}
No person, knowing the person is without privilege to do so or being reckless in that regard, shall entice, take, keep, or harbor a person identified in division (A)(1), (2), or (3) of this section from the parent, guardian, or custodian of the person identified in division (A)(1), (2), or (3) of this section:
(1) A child under the age of eighteen, or a mentally or physically handicapped child under the age of twenty-one[.]
{5} Following trial in the Hamilton County Municipal Court, a jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts and continued the matter for a presentence investigation. The court ultimately denied Sager‘s motion for a new trial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct and insufficiency of the evidence, and sentenced Sager to a suspended 30-day jail term and a lengthy period of “probation.” Sager‘s several direct appeals from the trial court‘s judgments of conviction were dismissed.
{6} In June 2016, Sager filed an application to seal the records of her convictions. The state objected, arguing that since the victims of Sager‘s offenses were nine- and 11-year-old children, she was not eligible to have the records of her convictions sealed. The trial court denied Sager‘s application without identifying the basis of its decision. Sager appealed. This court affirmed the trial court‘s denial on other grounds and without reaching the issue of whether Sager‘s application to seal was properly denied on the basis of the age of the victims. See State v. Sager, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160664 (Nov. 11, 2017).
{7} In January 2018, Sager returned to municipal court and filed a motion to “find applicant eligible to seal criminal record[s],” which the trial court construed as a subsequent application to seal records. The state waived any procedural objections to the motion and renewed its contention that Sager was ineligible as a matter of law. After a hearing on the matter, the same trial court judge who had
II. Records of Certain Child-Victim Crimes May Not Be Sealed
{8} Here, in a single assignment of error, Sager challenges the trial court‘s determination that, as a matter of law, she was ineligible to have her records of conviction sealed. She maintains that she was eligible because the victim of her interference-with-custody offenses was Payne, the children‘s custodial parent, and not the minor children themselves.
{9} The sealing of records of conviction is an act of grace created by the General Assembly, and it can be granted only when all requirements for eligibility are met. See State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-Ohio-5590, 918 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 6. Generally, an appellate court will not disturb a trial court‘s decision to deny an application to seal records absent an abuse of discretion. But where, as here, the question of eligibility for sealing involves a purely legal question, we review the issue de novo. See State v. Blair, 2016-Ohio-5714, 62 N.E.3d 201, ¶ 4 (1st Dist.), citing Futrall at ¶ 6; see also State v. Hill, 2016-Ohio-1551, 63 N.E.3d 690, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.).
{10}
{11} But
III. Who Is a Victim of an R.C. 2919.23 Offense?
{12} The resolution of Sager‘s assignment of error depends on determining who is the victim of her interference-with-custody offenses for purposes of
{13} But the text of the interference-with-custody statute does not define who is the “victim” of the proscribed offense. Neither the parties nor this court has identified any legal authority in Ohio answering this question directly.
{14} Sager raises three arguments in support of her position. She first asserts that whoever has the right to custody of the minor children taken or harbored is the victim of the interference-with-custody offense. Since custody of a child is a right that belongs to the parent, Sager argues, any interference with that custody harms the parent and not the child.
{15} But it does not follow from this argument—equating “harm” with status as a “victim“—that only the parent is harmed when custody is interfered with. Under Sager‘s logic, the children could well be victims, too. Here, after determining the best interests of the children, a domestic relations court had ordered that Payne was to be the children‘s residential parent, and to have custody of them on school days. Any interference with custody and visitation could just as easily have harmed
{16} Sager also argues that the underlying facts of her criminal convictions reveal that the children were not harmed or put at risk and thus could not be victims of the offenses. See, e.g., State v. Jithoo, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-436, 2006-Ohio-4978, ¶ 10 (noting that a court should examine the underlying facts of the offense in assessing eligibility for expungement when the defendant ultimately pled guilty to a lesser offense than that he was indicted for).
{17} In support of her contention that she did not harm the children, Sager cites to the transcript of the May 2014 jury trial in the municipal court. While two volumes of the January 2018 proceedings before the trial court memorializing Sager‘s second application for expungement were filed with the trial court, the May 2014 transcript was not and, therefore, is not part of our record on appeal.
{18} The “record on appeal” consists of three categories of documents identified in
{19} When an appellant relies upon facts shown in a transcript of proceedings, the duty to provide that transcript necessarily falls upon the appellant. See Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980). Under
{20} An examination of the record transmitted for review reveals that the May 2014 transcript was never filed in the trial court under the cases numbered C-
{21} In her appellate brief, Sager states that the May 2014 transcript was filed in her earlier appeal numbered C-160664, and urges us to review its contents to resolve her assignment of error. Again, we note that transcript was never filed in the trial court in these matters and thus is not part of our record on appeal. See Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, ¶ 13 (declaring, as “a bedrock principle of appellate practice in Ohio[,] * * * that an appeals court is limited to the record of the proceedings” before the court below). A reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it and then decide the appeal on that basis. See State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978), syllabus. Therefore, we do not consider the May 2014 transcript in resolving the assignment of error. See State v. Tekulve, 188 Ohio App.3d 792, 2010-Ohio-3604, 936 N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 4 (1st Dist.). Moreover, the facts that Sager urges us to conclude from the May 2014 transcript are not the type of facts, “not subject to reasonable dispute” and “capable of accurate and ready determination,” cognizable by judicial notice. See
{22} Sager next argues that this court already, albeit indirectly, answered the question of who is the victim of an interference-with-custody offense when we referred to the father of a minor taken out of state by the defendant as “the victim” of the offense in State v. Robinson, 146 Ohio App.3d 344, 766 N.E.2d 186 (1st Dist.2001). Sager supports her contention by quoting a passage stating that a
{23} In Robinson, we did not determine whether the minor daughter or her father was the victim of the interference-with-custody offense. But other courts, while not answering our question directly, have referred to the minor children as victims of interfering-with-custody offenses.
{24} For example, in State v. Cornelius, the Second District Court of Appeals held that to prove a violation of
IV. Statutory Interpretation
{25} While the text of
{26} In interpreting a statute, a court‘s principal concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute. In order to determine that intent, a court must first look at the words of the statute itself. See Carnes v. Kemp, 104 Ohio St.3d 629, 2004-Ohio-7107, 821 N.E.2d 180, ¶ 16. Here, the text of
{27} Courts should construe statutory provisions together and read the Revised Code “as an interrelated body of law.” State v. Moaning, 76 Ohio St.3d 126, 128, 666 N.E.2d 1115 (1996). Statutes that relate to the same subject matter or refer to one another may be construed in pari materia, that is, they may be construed together so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on a similar topic. See State ex rel. Choices for South-Western City Schools v. Anthony, 108 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362, 840 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 46.
{28} At least three other provisions of the Revised Code relate to the same subject matter at issue—defining a child victim—and, referring to one another, may be construed together and read in pari materia.
{29}
{30}
{31} Finally, for purposes of the victim-rights provisions of the Revised Code,
{32} Moreover, in determining the intention of the legislature, a court may consider among other matters the “object sought to be attained,” and “laws upon the same or similar subjects.”
{33} Therefore, we hold that in a prosecution under
V. Conclusion
{34} Here, only Sager‘s two minor children were identified in the indictment. Their father, the custodial parent, was not. There is no factual dispute as to the age of the children taken. See Hill, 2016-Ohio-1551, 63 N.E.3d 690, at ¶ 11. They were both below the threshold ages identified in
{35} Since the only facts discernable from our record reveal that, following a jury trial, Sager was convicted of enticing, taking, keeping, or harboring her nine- and 11-year-old children, that the children were victims of the offenses, and that the offenses were punishable as first-degree misdemeanors,
{36} The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
ZAYAS and MYERS, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.