STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES DUANE ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2014-12-256
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BUTLER COUNTY
11/9/2015
2015-Ohio-4649
RINGLAND, J.
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CR2014-10-1523
John T. Willard, P.O. Box 35, Hamilton, Ohio 45012, for defendant-appellant
RINGLAND, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Charles Duane Robinson, appeals a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of multiple weapons-related offenses. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} In the early morning hours of September 25, 2014, Officer Mark Specht of the Middletown Police Department was dispatched to a local United Dairy Farmers (“UDF“) to investigate a disturbance. When the officer arrived, he positioned his cruiser behind a white
{¶ 3} According to his testimony, Officer Specht addressed appellant through the open driver‘s side window. Appellant was leaning forward and moving his right hand back and forth in between the seat and the passenger door. Wary of appellant‘s movements, Officer Specht told him to step out of the car. Appellаnt sternly refused at first. He eventually complied, reaching over with his left hand to open the passenger side door.
{¶ 4} A pat down yielded no weapons on appellant. When Officer Specht opened the passenger door, he found a Hi-Point .45-caliber handgun on the floor in between the passenger seat and the car door. The gun held three live rounds of ammunition. After securing the firearm, the officer placed appellant under arrest.
{¶ 5} Appellant was indicted on one count of carrying concealed weapons, one count of having weapons while under disability, and one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced appellant to 12 months imprisonment for carrying a concealed weapon and 36 months imprisonment for having a weapon while under disability to be served conseсutive to the 12-month term. The court merged appellant‘s conviction for improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, finding it to be an allied offense of similar import. Appellant timely appeals, raising four assignments of error.
{¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 7} THE STATUTES UNDER WHICH THE APPELLANT WAS CHARGED (
{¶ 8} Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the statutes upon which his convictions were predicated, claiming they violate his right to keep and bear arms under the
{¶ 9} Initially, we observe that appellant failed to raise any objections at trial regarding the constitutionality of the statutes in question. As a result, appellant has forfeited all but plain error. State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 16; Crim.R. 52(B). Plain error exists where there is an obvious deviation from a legal rule which affected the defendant‘s substantial rights, or influenced the outcome of the proceeding. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 2002-Ohio-68. Notice of plain error is taken with thе utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 10} We begin by noting that legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutional validity. State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 269 (1991). In order to be declared unconstitutional, the legislation in controversy must be clearly incompatible with a specific constitutional provision. State v. Carswell, 117 Ohio St.3d 210, 2007-Ohio-3723, ¶ 7. The existence of a conflict must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt, аnd the
{¶ 11} The right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right enshrined in federal and state constitutional law. The United States Supreme Court held that the
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. * * * Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 626-27.
{¶ 12} Similarly, the right to keep and bear arms is not absolute under the
{¶ 13} Although Klein preceded Heller and its progeny, the underlying rationale of Klein remains valid. Accordingly, we reaffirm that
{¶ 14} Ohio‘s statutory prohibition against having weapons while under disability has also bеen declared constitutional by several appellate jurisdictions in Ohio, including this one. State v. Winkelman, 2 Ohio App.3d 465 (12th Dist.1981), paragraph one of the syllabus, overruled in part, State v. Frederick, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA88-07-111 and CA88-07-118, 1989 WL 80493, at *2-4 (July 17, 1989) (reversing Winkelman only insofar as it held that notice of disability flowing from a pending indictment is a prerequisite to conviction under
{¶ 15} While the fundamental right to bear arms demands reverence, it is well-established that this right is surrendered when one engages in violent felony activity. Cf.
{¶ 16} Contrary to appellant‘s assertions, the General Assembly provided a mechanism for relief from weapons disability. Appellant contends that
{¶ 17} Finally, appellant submits that the ability to defend oneself while travelling by vehicle is inhibited by
{¶ 18} As recently observed by the Ninth District Court of Appeals, “[t]he precise scope of the Second Amendment guarantee remains in question.” State v. Glover, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27307, 2015-Ohio-2751, ¶ 5, citing Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d 332, 348 (1st Cir.2015). We shall assume, for the sake of discussion, that the right to bear arms extends to motor vehicles. Similar to the concealed carry statute,
{¶ 19} We conclude that the constitutional challenges advanced by appellant do not satisfy the plain error standard. Appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 21} THE JUDGMENT AND THE CONVICTION IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 22} Though worded in terms of manifest weight, the substance of appellant‘s argument contests his convictions solely on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Aрpellant claims that the record is devoid of evidence indicating he owned the firearm in question, such as fingerprints or DNA. Further, appellant submits that there was no evidence he owned the vehicle in which the firearm was found, nor that he knew the weapon was present.
{¶ 23} Whether a conviction is supported by evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52. When addressing a sufficiency claim, a reviewing court examines the evidence аdmitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
{¶ 24} Appellant was convicted оf carrying a concealed weapon in violation of
{¶ 25} Appellant was also convicted of having a weapon while under disability in violation of
{¶ 26} Finally, appellant was convicted of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of
{¶ 27} Appellant stipulated to being under disability and to the operability of the gun. Furthermore, the concealed nature of the gun is clear from the record. Officer Specht testified that he could not see the gun while addressing appellant through the open driver‘s side window, and was only able to see it after he opened the passenger door. Hence, the elements at issue are appellant‘s knowlеdge, possession, and active concealment of the firearm.
{¶ 28} To act “knowingly” means that a person is aware his conduct will probably cause a certain result, or that certain circumstances probably exist.
{¶ 29} Possession entails having control over an object.
{¶ 30} After thoroughly reviewing the record, we find sufficient evidence to show that appellant knowingly possessed and concealed the firearm in the vehicle on the night in question. Possession may not be inferred solely from mere access to an object or to the locale in which it was found. See
{¶ 31} As stated, Officer Specht observed appellant making furtive arm movements while sitting in the passenger seat. The officer‘s testimony described appellant leaning forward and putting his right hand down in between the seat and the passenger door. Appellant initially refused to exit the vehicle, presumably stalling for time to conceal the firearm next to his seat. When appellant finally exited the vehicle, he reached across his body and opened the passenger door with his left hand. Thе officer inferred that appellant‘s right hand was still occupied with the firearm, a .45-caliber weapon too large and unwieldy to slide under the passenger seat in a Hyundai Sonata.
{¶ 32} All three men went into the UDF convenience store. The surveillance video did
{¶ 33} Appellant argues that there was no evidence the gun belonged to him. But the pieces оf the evidentiary puzzle, including Officer Specht‘s testimony and UDF surveillance videos inside and outside the store, support appellant‘s convictions. See State v. Campbell, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2004CA00176, 2005-Ohio-795, ¶ 29 (furtive movements, defendant‘s occupation of seat, and location of firearm next to defendant‘s seat were among evidence that supported conviction for carrying a concealed weapon).
{¶ 34} Because the record contains sufficient evidence to establish that appellant knowingly possessed and concealed the loaded firearm in the vehicle, appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 35} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 36} IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FAIL TO MERGE THE CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPON CHARGE (
{¶ 37} According to appellant, the trial court erred in sentencing him on his convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and having a weapon while under disability because these offenses are allied offenses of similar import under
{¶ 38} Typically, a reviewing court cоnducts a de novo review of a trial court‘s
{¶ 39}
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendаnt‘s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
{¶ 40} The Ohio Supreme Court clarified the tripartite test for deciphering allied offenses within the meaning of
[W]hen determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import within the meaning of
R.C. 2941.25 , courts must ask three questions when the defendant‘s conduct supports multiple offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with separate animus or motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separateconvictions.
{¶ 41} In a case subsequent to Ruff, the Tеnth District Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant‘s convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and having a weapon while under disability were allied offenses of similar import. State v. Hobbs, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-225, 2015-Ohio-2419, ¶ 35. The court cited a line of cases predating Ruff, all of which had concluded that carrying a concealed weapon and having a weapon while under disability are committed with separate animus, thus obviating merger. Id., citing State v. Rice, 69 Ohio St.2d 422, 427 (1982); State v. Willis, 2013-Ohio-2391 at ¶ 41-43; State v. Young, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23642, 2011-Ohio-747, ¶ 46-49; State v. Ryan, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10-MA-173, 2012-Ohio-1265, ¶ 53. Thereafter, the appeals court held that ”Ruff does not change the rationale or validity of those cases because Ruff still prohibits merger if offenses are committed with separate animus.” Hobbs at ¶ 35. We agree.
{¶ 42} In the context of Ohio‘s multiple-count statute, “animus” refers to purpose or, more precisely, immediate motive. State v. Lewis, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2008-10-045, 2012-Ohio-885, ¶ 13. Animus for multiple offenses is identical where a defendant acted with the same purpose, intent, or motive in committing the offenses. Id. Often, animus must be inferred from surrounding circumstances. State v. Lung, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-03-004, 2012-Ohio-5352, ¶ 12.
{¶ 43} After reviewing the record in the case sub judice, we find that appellant‘s animus in carrying a concealed weapon was distinct from his animus in having a weapon while under disability. The purpose or immediate motive behind carrying a concealed weapon is to unlawfully hide a weapon from plain view. The purpose or immediate motive behind having a weapon while under disability is to possess said weapon despite being legally prohibited from doing so. These animi are clearly distinct. Someone can purposefully
{¶ 44} Because the trial court did not plainly err in declining to merge the aforementioned convictions, appellant‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 45} Assignment of Error No. 4:
{¶ 46} THE APPELLANTS [sic] TRIAL IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS TAINTED BY THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL AND THE MATTER SHOULD BE REVERSED ON THE GROUNDS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
{¶ 47} Appellant contends that defense counsel‘s performance was deficient in failing to seek suppression of the fireаrm and in failing to call numerous witnesses at trial.
{¶ 48} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that counsel‘s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that appellant was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Prejudice exists where there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Id. at 694. The proponent of an ineffective assistancе claim must establish both elements to warrant relief. State v. Knowlton, 4th Dist. Washington No. 10CA31, 2012-Ohio-2350, ¶ 35. Failure to satisfy one prong of the ineffective assistance test renders review of the other prong unnecessary. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143 (1989), quoting Strickland at 697; State v. Napier, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2014-06-039 and CA2014-06-046, 2015-Ohio-1413, ¶ 12.
{¶ 49} In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the failure to file a motion to suppress, the defendant must advance a viable legal basis for suppression of the evidence in question. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, ¶ 35; State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2014-05-013, 2015-Ohio-1094, ¶ 44. Even so, sound trial strаtegy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Conway,
{¶ 50} After reviewing the record, we find that trial counsel‘s decision to forego a motion to suppress was not objectively unreasonable. Despite appellant‘s arguments to the contrary, Officer Specht was legally justified in searching the vehicle. According to the officer‘s testimony, appellant‘s furtive arm movements while seated in the vehicle prompted the officer‘s suspicion of danger. Appellant‘s initial, stern refusal to exit the vehicle only fostered the officer‘s apprehensions. The officer testified that he believed appellant was trying to stall for time for whatever he was doing beside the passenger seat. Appellant‘s reaching across his body to open the car door with his left hand furthered this suspicion. In the wake of these observations, a protective search of the vehicle was warranted. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (1983). Officer Specht was justified in checking for weapons prior to allowing appellant to return to the car. See id. Because a motion to suppress the results of the search would have been futile, trial counsel was not ineffective for electing to forego the motion. Brown, 2002-Ohio-5455 at ¶ 11.
{¶ 51} Regarding proposed trial witnеsses, appellant specifically attacks trial counsel‘s failure to call “the driver of the vehicle.” Though unnamed in appellant‘s brief, we assume appellant was referring to Brandon Davis. A decision regarding whether or not to call witnesses falls within the ambit of trial strategy. State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 222; State v. McMullen, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2005-09-414, CA2005-10-427, and CA2005-10-429, 2006-Ohio-4557, ¶ 53. As stated, we afford trial counsel‘s strategic decisions considerable deference. Moreover, appellant offers only speculation as to what Davis may have testified. Mere speculation regarding witness testimony is insufficient to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. McMullen at ¶ 53. Despite appellant‘s
{¶ 52} In addition, pursuant to Officer Specht‘s testimony, Davis appeared to be so intoxicated that he was leaning against the car unconscious when the officer arrived. The surveillancе video depicted Davis repeatedly laying his head down and struggling to remain conscious inside the UDF convenience store. Undoubtedly, testimony by a witness in such a state would not have been afforded much weight at trial. We conclude that defense counsel‘s decision not to present testimony from Davis and other unnamed witnesses at trial was not objectively unreasonable.
{¶ 53} Because appellant has failed to establish that defense counsel‘s decisions were unreasonable, his ineffective assistance claim is without merit. Appellant‘s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 54} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.