State v. RobinsonState v. Robinson
Atty. Christopher P. Lacich, Roth, Blair, for Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
{¶1} Appellant, Cody S. Robinson, appeals from the December 11, 2025 judgment of the Noble County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to a tоtal indefinite term of five years (minimum) to seven and one-half years (maximum) in prison for pandering obscenity involving a minor or impaired person, attempted pandering obscenity involving a minor or impaired person, and falsification and labeling him a Tier II sex offender following a guilty plea. On appeal, Appellant takes issue with his indefinite sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} On June 10, 2025, Aрpellant was indicted by the Noble County Grand Jury on ten counts: count one, pandering obscenity involving a minor or impaired person, a felony of the second degree in violation of
{¶3} The foregoing charges stem from an investigation conducted by the Noble County Sheriff‘s Department after it was made aware of a case from the Cuyahoga County branch of Internet Crimes Against Children. Specifically, the Sheriff‘s Department
{¶4} Therеafter, a subsequent investigation was conducted. It revealed that Appellant, a preacher for a local Baptist church, had downloaded and disseminated a video of a pubescent female juvenile wearing a bikini. The pubescent female juvenile had recorded herself in a bathroom performing sexually explicit actions, including playing with her breasts, exposing her vagina and anus, and inserting her fingers into her vaginal and anal cavities. It was further revealed that Appellant was in possession of, and attempted to disseminate to multiple locations, a video file of a pre-pubescent female juvenile wearing a training bra and underwear. The pre-pubescent female juvenile had removed her underwear, exposed her vagina, аnd performed a sexual act on herself by inserting an object into her vagina. The content was linked to Appellant‘s email address and Dropbox account. The content was managed through an IP address for the bible camp that Appellant managed as part of his duties for the church.
{¶5} On June 12, 2025, Appellant was appointed counsel, pled not guilty at his arraignment, and waived his right to а speedy trial.
{¶6} Appellant subsequently entered into plea negotiations with Appellee, the State of Ohio. A change of plea hearing was held on October 29, 2025. Appellant withdrew his former not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to all counts and specifications as contained in the indictment. The trial court accepted Appellant‘s guilty plea after finding it was made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner pursuant to
{¶7} A sentencing hearing was held on December 10, 2025. The parties were heard as to their respective positions regarding sentencing and a psychosexual evaluation report was provided to the trial court. Appellant was given an opportunity to speak on his own behalf and also called his mother to testify for purposes of allocution. The parties agreed that counts four through nine all merge with counts one through three. The parties further agreed that counts one, two, three, and ten do not merge. With respect to the merged offenses, the State elected to proceed with sentencing on counts one, two, and three. The court considered the record, the oral statement, NCIC аnd criminal history reports, the purposes and principles of sentencing under
{¶8} On December 11, 2025, the trial court sentenced Appellant as follows: on count one, five years (minimum) to seven and one-half years (maximum) in prison; on count two, 30 months in prison; on count three, 30 months in prison; and on count ten, court costs only. Appellant‘s sentence was ordered to be served concurrently for a total indefinite prison term of five years (minimum) to seven and one-half years (maximum) in prison. The court designated Appellant as a Tier II sex offender. Appellant was given 208 days of jail-time credit. The court notified Appellant that upon completion of his prison term, he may be subjеct to a further period of supervision while under post-release control for a period of five years.
{¶9} Appellant filed this appeal and raises a single assignment of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND IMPOSED A SENTENCE CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY CONTRARY TO LAW, BY ISSUING AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE IN THE AGGREGATE OF A MINIMUM OF 5 YEARS AND A MAXIMUM OF 7 AND 1/2 YEARS, POST-RELEASE CONTROL, PLUS FINES AND COSTS.
{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in issuing an indefinite sentence of five years (minimum) to seven and one-half years (maximum) in prison. Appellant essentially believes the court erred in finding that he had not overcome the presumption in favor of prison at his sentencing hearing. Appellant stresses he “had no prior convictions or adjudications, strong family support, and was at average risk of recidivism.” (2/26/2026 Appellant‘s Brief, p. 7).
{¶11} Am. Sub. S.B. No. 201, 2018 Ohio Laws 157, known as the “Reagan Tokes Law,” significantly altered the sentencing structure for many of Ohio‘s most serious felonies by implemеnting an indefinite sentencing system for those non-life felonies of the first and second degree, committed on or after March 22, 2019.
{¶13}
(2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court‘s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the rеcord does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶14} Although trial courts have full discretion to impose any term of imprisonment within the statutory range, they must consider the sentencing purposes in
{¶15}
{¶16}
R.C. 2929.11 does not require the trial court to make any specific findings as to the purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31. Similarly,R.C. 2929.12 does not require the trial court to “use spеcific language or make specific findings on the record in order to evince the requisite consideration of the applicable seriousness and recidivism factors.” State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000).
State v. Shaw, 2017-Ohio-1259, ¶ 36 (7th Dist.).
{¶17} “‘The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.’ State v. King, 2013-Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.).” State v. Burkhart, 2019-Ohio-2711, ¶ 16 (7th Dist.).
{¶18} In State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, the Supreme Court of Ohio indicated that the language in Marcum is dicta. Id. at ¶ 27 (“The statements in Marcum at ¶ 23 suggesting that it would be ‘fully consistent’ with
{¶19} Pursuant to Jones, when reviewing felony sеntences that are imposed solely after considering the factors in
A sentence is considered to be contrary to law if it falls outside of the statutory range for the particular degree of offense; if the trial court failed to properly consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing as enumerated in
R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth inR.C. 2929.12 ; or if the trial court orders consecutive sentences and does not make the necessary consecutive sentence finding.
Burkhart, 2019-Ohio-2711, at ¶ 12 (7th Dist.).
{¶20} In this case, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in finding that he had not overcome the presumption in favor of prison at his sentencing hearing. We disagree.
{¶21} Under
(a) A community control sanction or a combination of community control sanctions would adequately punish the offender and protect the public from future crime, because the applicable factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating a greater likelihood of recidivism.
(b) A community control sanction or a combination of community control sanctions would not demean the seriousness of the offense, because one or more factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code that indicate that the offender‘s conduct was less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense are applicable, and they outweigh the applicable factors under that section that indicate that the offender‘s conduct was more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.
{¶22} Appellant fails both prongs necessary to rebut the presumption of prison under
So, the court finds or court has considered all the factors set forth in 2929.11, 2929.12, 2929.13, 2929.14, 2929.15, and all other matters pertinent to sentencing.
The court finds that a prison sеntence is the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing. A prison sentence is reasonably necessary to punish the defendant, deter, rehabilitate, and
incapacitate the defendant, and to protect the public from future crime, and it would not place an unnecessary burden on governmental resources.
Court finds the defendant is not presently amenable to community control sanctions or a combination thereof, and that community control sanctions would in fact demean the seriousness of these offenses.
Also, the court finds that community control would not adequately protect the public from future crime by the defendant for all the reasons stated.
(12/10/2025 Sentencing Hearing Tr., p. 36-37).
{¶23} The trial court made a similar pronouncement in its sentencing entry, specifically stating:
The defendant was afforded all rights pursuant to Criminal Rule 32. The Court has considered the record, the record of proceedings, the oral statement at the sentencing hearing, NCIC and criminal history reports, and the purposes and principles of sentencing under
R.C. 292[9].11 , the seriousness and recidivism factors relevant to the offense and the offender, pursuant toR.C. 2929.12 , and the need for deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restitution.. . .
[T]he Court finds that certain factors apply to the defendant as follows:
- The defendant has not previously been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile or been convicted in adult court
- The defendant shows genuine remorse and a desire to change his behavior
- The offender‘s occupation obliged the offender to prevent the offense or to bring those committing it to justice
- The offender‘s occupation is likely to influence others’ conduct
- The injury is exacerbated by the age of the victim
- The victim suffered serious psychological harm
A prison sentence is the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles because a prison sentence is reasonably necessary to punish the defendant, to deter, rehabilitate, and incapacitate the defendant in order to protect the public from future crimes, and would not place an unnecessary burden on governmental resources;
The defendant is not presently amenable to community control sanctions, or a combination, such sanctions would demean the seriousness of the offense, and would not adequately protect the public from future crimes by the defendant;
The Court finds that community control sanctions or a combination of them would not adequately punish the offender and protect the public from future crime and the imposition of community control sanctions would demean the seriousness of the offense;
. . .
The Court finds that a prison term is appropriate.
(12/11/2025 Sentencing Entry, p. 1-4).
{¶24} The record in this case does not reflect that the trial court erred in sentencing Appеllant to a prison term as he fails both prongs of the analysis to rebut the presumption of prison as contained in
{¶25} In addition, following a merger analysis, Appellant was convicted of and received a concurrent sentence for one felony of the second degree, two felonies of the third degree, and one misdemeanor of the first degree. The trial court imposed an indefinite five year (minimum) to seven and one-half years (maximum) sentence on count one, pandering obscenity involving a minor or impaired person, a felony of the second degree in violation of
{¶26} Accordingly, because Appellant did nоt overcome the presumption in favor of a prison term, the trial court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing under
{¶27} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant‘s sole assignment of error is not well-taken. The December 11, 2025 judgment of the Noble County Court of Common Pleas sentencing Appellant to a total indefinite term of five years (minimum) to seven and one-half years (maximum) in prison for pandering obscenity involving a minor or impaired person, attempted pandering obscenity involving a minor or impaired person, and falsification and labeling him a Tier II sex offender following a guilty plea is affirmed.
Robb, J., concurs.
Hanni, J., concurs.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.