STATE v. RENE M. RODRIGUEZ
A-80-17 (081046)
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
May 21, 2019
234 N.J. 314
SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court.
Argued March 12, 2019
SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court‘s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
State v. Rene M. Rodriguez (A-80-17) (081046)
Argued March 12, 2019 -- Decided May 21, 2019
SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court.
In these consolidated appeals, defendants were convicted of fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for driving while intoxicated (DWI) under
All five defendants -- Rene Rodriguez, Elizabeth Colon, Eric Lowers, Stephen Nolan, and Courtney Swiderski -- appeared before the same judge and were sentenced to 180 days in the county jail, to be served intermittently. Rodriguez and Colon were ordered to serve their sentences four nights per week, while Lowers, Nolan, and Swiderski were ordered to serve their sentences on weekends.
In a consolidated opinion, the Appellate Division held that the sentencing court did not exceed its authority by imposing intermittent sentences. 454 N.J. Super. 214, 218 (App. Div. 2018). However, the panel held that defendants “must serve continuous twenty-four-hour periods [in jail] to satisfy each day of the 180-day mandated term.” Ibid. The panel reasoned that an intermittent sentence does not violate the parole ineligibility term or “reduce the total time of confinement.” Id. at 224-25. The panel also pointed out that
The Court granted the State‘s petition for certification. 234 N.J. 314 (2018).
HELD: An individual sentenced to a fixed minimum term of parole ineligibility under
- The Criminal Code allows imposition of a sentence of imprisonment to be served “at night or on weekends” unless the Criminal Code provides otherwise.
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(a) ,(b)(7) .N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 makes it a crime of the fourth degree to either: (a) operate a motor vehicle, for the second time, during a period of license suspension for a DWI; or (b) operate a motor vehicle with a suspended license for a second or subsequent DWI. It specifically provides that an individual convicted under either of those subsections shall be sentenced to a ”fixed minimum sentence of not less than 180 days during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.”N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) (emphases added). The issue is whether that provision counts as providing “otherwise” within the meaning ofN.J.S.A. 2C:43-2 . (pp. 12-14) - Sentencing requirements for those guilty of the most serious crimes are contained in three statutory provisions calling for mandatory periods of parole ineligibility:
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a) (for individuals convicted of certain violent offenses under the No Early Release Act (NERA));N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) and(d) (for those who arm themselves before going forth to commit crimes under the Graves Act); andN.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) (for those convicted of certain controlled dangerous substance (CDS) offenses). On the other hand, when the Legislature wishes to leave the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility to the discretion of the sentencing judge, it has generally done so by clearly indicating that the court may waive the parole disqualifier or by silence. (pp. 14-16) - Because mandatory fixed periods of parole ineligibility apply to the most dangerous offenders, the Legislature chose
N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 ‘s language -- which mirrors that of the NERA, Graves Act, and CDS-offense sentencing provisions cited above -- to serve as a bar to release, even intermittently, during the period of parole ineligibility. A finding to the contrary could allow offenders sentenced under NERA, the Graves Act, or for the most serious CDS offenses to serve their periods of parole ineligibility on nights or weekends. That is a result the Legislature could not have intended. What‘s more, the prohibition of parole necessarily dictates the prohibition of intermittent sentencing. The Court disagrees that the Legislature‘s omission of the term “consecutive days” inN.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) evinces a legislative intent to permit intermittent sentences. The Court does not address the Appellate Division‘s mandate that defendants serve their intermittent sentences in twenty-four-hour continuous periods and does not resort to extrinsic aids or consider the rule of lenity becauseN.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) ‘s language in this context is clear. (pp. 16-19)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the Court remands for resentencing as to Colon and remands with leave to file motions to vacate their guilty pleas as to Lowers, Nolan, and Swiderski.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON‘S opinion.
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rene M. Rodriguez,
Defendant.
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff,
v.
Elizabeth A. Colon,
Defendant.
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Eric L. Lowers,
Defendant-Respondent.
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Stephen E. Nolan,
Defendant-Respondent.
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Courtney D. Swiderski,
Defendant-Respondent.
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 454 N.J. Super. 214 (App. Div. 2018).
Argued March 12, 2019
Decided May 21, 2019
Jason Magid, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney; Jason Magid, of counsel and on the brief).
Marissa J. Costello argued the cause for respondents Eric L. Lowers and Stephen E. Nolan (Costello & Whitmore, attorneys, Marissa J. Costello, on the letter brief).
Mark V. Oddo argued the cause for respondent Courtney D. Swiderski (DuBois, Sheehan, Hamilton, Levin & Weissman, attorneys; Mark V. Oddo, on the letter brief).
Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Carol M. Henderson, of counsel and on the brief).
Michele E. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Public Defender of New Jersey (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Michele E. Friedman, of counsel and on the brief).
In these consolidated appeals, defendants were convicted of fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for driving while intoxicated (DWI) under
The issue presented in this appeal is whether
I.
The appellate record reveals that, in five cases, Rene Rodriguez, Elizabeth Colon, Eric Lowers, Stephen Nolan, and Courtney Swiderski (collectively, defendants) pleaded guilty to fourth-degree driving for a second time with a license suspended for DWI under
Initially, three defendants -- Rodriguez, Lowers, and Swiderski -- were sentenced to 180 days in a treatment program or home detention. The Appellate Division reversed their sentences and remanded for resentencing based on State v. Harris, 439 N.J. Super. 150, 160 (App. Div. 2015), and State v. French, 437 N.J. Super. 333, 334 (App. Div. 2014) -- opinions that declared illegal sentences that replace some or all of the mandatory 180-day term of imprisonment with an alternate program.
On remand, all five defendants appeared before the same judge and were sentenced to 180 days in the county jail, to be served intermittently. Rodriguez and Colon were ordered to serve their sentences four nights per week, while Lowers, Nolan, and Swiderski were ordered to serve their sentences on weekends.
The sentencing judge, in a written decision, reasoned that
The sentencing judge also highlighted the Appellate Division‘s holding in State v. Toussaint, 440 N.J. Super. 526, 528 (App. Div. 2015) -- that, under the rule of lenity, a judge‘s discretion to impose alternative sentences should be upheld unless explicitly limited by the Legislature. Because
On appeal, the Camden County Prosecutor‘s Office contended that
The Appellate Division heard the five cases back-to-back on appeal and, in a consolidated opinion, held that the sentencing court did not exceed its authority by imposing intermittent sentences. State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.J. Super. 214, 218 (App. Div. 2018). However, the panel held that defendants “must serve continuous twenty-four-hour periods [in jail] to satisfy each day of the 180-day mandated term.” Ibid.
The Appellate Division adopted the following reasoning. First, that “periodic release under an intermittent sentence is not parole,” and therefore an intermittent sentence under
The panel next rejected the State‘s contention that implicit in the mandate of a 180-day sentence is the requirement that the days be served consecutively. Id. at 226. Referring to other statutes where the Legislature expressly included the term “consecutive days,” the panel pointed out that
Although the Appellate Division found no statutory ambiguity, it nevertheless considered legislative history. Id. at 230-31. The panel recognized that the Legislature clearly “intended to stiffen the punishment for certain repeat offenders,” which is why “[t]he statute tars offenders with criminal records, and imposes significant terms of incarceration, whether intermittent or not.” Id. at 231. Still, the panel found no evidence in the legislative history that the Legislature intended to take a driver off the road for 180 continuous as opposed to intermittent days. Ibid. Instead, the panel believed that intermittent sentences, by “repeatedly remind[ing the offender] of his or her crime and its punishment,” would have a greater deterrent effect. Ibid.
Finally, the Appellate Division concluded that because extrinsic evidence does not address the issue, the rule of lenity compelled adoption of defendants’ interpretation. Id. at 232.
We granted the State‘s petition for certification.2 234 N.J. 314 (2018). The
II.
The parties’ arguments here mirror those raised in the Appellate Division. Additionally, the State and Attorney General explain that “not eligible for parole” encompasses not only the length of the sentence, but also the intent that the person shall remain in custody until the expiration of the mandatory term. In support, the State cites State v. Webster, 383 N.J. Super. 432, 437 (App. Div. 2006), and Meyer v. State Parole Board, 345 N.J. Super. 424, 430 (App. Div. 2001), which require periods of parole disqualification to be served before any release from custody for offenses subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA),
According to defendants and the Public Defender, the Legislature included the word “consecutive” in other sentencing statutes when it intended for the term of imprisonment to be served continuously. In that same vein, defendants and the Public Defender agree with the Appellate Division that Harris and French are distinguishable because those cases addressed the availability of alternatives to imprisonment that would have reduced the actual period of incarceration. They argue alternatively that if the Court disagrees,
III.
A.
This appeal requires that we interpret sentencing provisions of our Criminal Code. “Questions related to statutory interpretation are legal ones.” State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017). Thus, “[w]e review such decisions de novo, ‘unconstrained by deference to the decisions of the trial court or the appellate panel.‘” Ibid. (quoting State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329 (2015)).
Our de novo review requires that we “give effect to the Legislature‘s intent as evidenced by the ‘language of [the] statute, the policy behind it, concepts of reasonableness and legislative history.‘” State v. Carrigan, 428 N.J. Super. 609, 618 (App. Div. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson Mach. Co. v. Manville Sales Corp., 248 N.J. Super. 285, 304 (App. Div. 1991)); see also State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 604 (2014) (“The objective of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.“).
We begin with the statute‘s plain language, which is the “best indicator” of legislative intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). A statute‘s plain language must be construed “in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.” Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 515 (2018) (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 570 (2017)). “Unless it is ‘inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature,’ or ‘another or different meaning is expressly
“If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretative process is over.” Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016) (quoting Richardson v. PFRS, 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007)). However, “if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, ‘including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.‘” DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-93 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004)). “We may also resort to extrinsic evidence if a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language.” Id. at 493. Only when “a statutory ambiguity cannot be resolved by analysis of the relevant text and the use of extrinsic aids” does the rule of lenity require, in a criminal case, “that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant.” State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 451 (2011).
B.
We begin our application of the canons of statutory construction with the Criminal Code‘s provision governing, generally, the imposition of sentences. That provision of the Criminal Code,
a. Except as otherwise provided by this code, all persons convicted of an offense or offenses shall be sentenced in accordance with this chapter.
b. Except as provided in subsection a. of this section and subject to the applicable provisions of the code, the court may suspend the imposition of sentence on a person who has been convicted of an offense, or may sentence him as follows:
. . .
(7) To imprisonment at night or on weekends with liberty to work or to participate in training or educational programs.
Thus, our task is to determine whether the Criminal Code requires that a sentence under
To ascertain whether
Sentencing requirements for those guilty of the most serious crimes are contained in three statutory provisions calling for mandatory periods of parole ineligibility. First, NERA applies to sentences for individuals convicted of certain violent offenses, such as murder and aggravated sexual assault.
Indeed, the Graves Act states in pertinent part that the sentencing court shall impose a ”minimum term . . . during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.”
On the other hand, when the Legislature wishes to leave the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility to the discretion of the sentencing judge, it has generally done so in one of two ways. Under the first way, the Legislature clearly indicates that the court may waive the parole disqualifier set forth in the statute. See, e.g.,
We agree with the State that, because mandatory fixed periods of parole ineligibility apply to the most dangerous offenders, the Legislature chose this language -- “fixed minimum sentence . . . during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole” -- to serve as a bar to release, even intermittently, during the period of parole ineligibility. See Carrigan, 428 N.J. Super. at 614 (“The strengthened penalty [of
Said another way,
Therefore, construing
A finding to the contrary could allow offenders sentenced under NERA, the Graves Act, or for the most serious CDS offenses to serve their periods of parole ineligibility on nights or weekends. The parties agree that allowing the most dangerous offenders -- those guilty of crimes the Legislature has found are the most serious -- to serve their sentences on nights or weekends is illogical. It is a result the Legislature could not have intended.
What‘s more, although -- as the Appellate Division concluded -- parole and intermittent sentencing are distinct concepts, the prohibition of parole necessarily dictates the prohibition of intermittent sentencing. To find otherwise would create an “absurd result.” When the Legislature proscribes parole, the offender cannot be released from custody. See
Likewise, we reject the view advanced by defendants, the Public Defender, and the Appellate Division that the Legislature‘s omission of the term “consecutive days” in
Accordingly, we overrule the sentencing court‘s determination, affirmed by the Appellate
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand for resentencing as to Colon. As to Lowers, Nolan, and Swiderski, we remand with leave to file motions to vacate their guilty pleas.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON‘S opinion.