STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RALPH B.*
(AC 35654)
Connecticut Appellate Court
Sheldon, Keller and Schaller, Js.
Argued September 21, 2015—officially released January 26, 2016
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Jeffrey C. Kestenband, for the appellant (defendant).
Brett R. Aiello, special deputy assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Matthew C. Gedansky, state‘s attorney, and Nicole I. Christie, assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
SCHALLER, J. The defendant, Ralph B., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On January 4, 2012, the defendant was married to L.B. They have one child, I.B., who was three years old on January 4, 2012. On that date, following an argument regarding a possible divorce, the defendant left the home in anger and L.B. put I.B. to bed. She then went to sleep in I.B.‘s room, in a bed across from his bed. The defendant returned home and entered I.B.‘s room. The defendant turned on a closet light and woke L.B. The defendant then attempted to strangle L.B. with a cord, in the process waking up I.B. L.B. attempted to call 911, but the defendant threw her cell phone into the hallway. They continued to struggle and L.B. pleaded with the defendant to stop, asking him why he was upset. He responded that he had sent her several text messages to which she had not replied. The defendant permitted her to get her cell phone but, as she attempted to show him that she had not received any messages, he came at her with the cord a second time. She dialed 911 and dropped the cell phone on the floor. The defendant continued to choke her; she fought back and, after hearing I.B. call out to her, was able to wrest the cord from the defendant. She took the cord and went to check on I.B. The defendant then again attempted to strangle her with his hands. L.B. escaped and attempted to calm the defendant. When she heard cars outside, she ran downstairs with the cord in her hands. Once she was outside, she saw the police. She threw the cord to the first police officer she saw and told the police that the defendant had tried to kill her with it. The police arrested the defendant, took a statement from L.B., and photographed her neck and face. She then went to a hospital. The defendant was arrested and charged with strangulation in the first degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, attempt to commit assault in the first degree, interfering with an emergency call, strangulation in the second degree, and risk of injury to a child.
Following the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, strangulation in the second degree, and risk of injury to a child. It acquitted him of strangulation in the first degree and interfering with an emergency call. The court, Kwak, J., sentenced the defendant to twenty years incarceration followed by five years of special parole. This appeal followed.
The defendant claims that his due process rights were violated when the court did not permit him to attend three hearings on pretrial motions. The defendant argues that these hearings were critical stages of the proceedings and that he was entitled to be present. He argues that his presence bore a reasonably substantial relationship to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charges and that the hearings were not fair and just in his absence. The state responds that the defendant did not make an adequate showing that his absence from the hearings adversely affected his opportunity
The following additional facts are necessary for our consideration of the defendant‘s claims. On January 4, 2013, the court, Solomon, J., held a hearing regarding the conditions of the defendant‘s bond. The defendant was not incarcerated; he was on house arrest with a global positioning system (GPS) monitor, which a probation officer monitored. At the conclusion of the hearing before Judge Solomon, the defendant requested a hearing on his motions regarding a bill of particulars, a request for essential facts, and a motion to dismiss regarding discovery issues. The court confirmed that, as these were discovery issues, they would take only a few minutes. The court then scheduled a hearing for January 7, 2013, before the trial court, Kwak, J. The defendant‘s attorney asked if the defendant could attend. The court ruled that the defendant did not need to be present, as the motions involved only legal issues pertaining to discovery, and denied the request.1
On January 7, 2013, the defendant‘s attorney filed a “motion for client to be present in court for all hearings and proceedings in connection with this case.” The defendant asserted that there were thirteen outstanding motions, including, in addition to those discussed before Judge Solomon, a motion in limine to exclude prior convictions, a motion to require notice of uncharged misconduct evidence, and a motion for in camera review of records of the complaining witness, L.B.2 The motion for the defendant to be present cited the applicable law, and claimed that some of the motions could require the defendant‘s testimony and the testimony of the defendant‘s expert witness. The defendant‘s attorney further claimed that communication between a client and counsel during the hearing was key to effective assistance of counsel and a working attorney-client relationship. Finally, the defendant‘s attorney asserted that the interests of transparency in the judicial process required the defendant to be present in the courtroom when thirteen substantive motions were decided.
In the hearing on January 7, 2013, before Judge Kwak, the defendant‘s attorney
The defendant‘s attorney then argued that the motion for an in camera review of records of L.B. would require the defendant‘s presence and possible testimony. The defendant‘s attorney asserted that there were other motions requiring the defendant‘s presence. The state also requested that the defendant‘s attorney confirm that he would not be relying on an alibi defense and did not intend to rely upon the defenses of mental disease or defect or extreme emotional disturbance. The court scheduled a subsequent hearing for January 15, 2013.
On January 9, 2013, the trial court denied the defendant‘s January 6, 2013 motion to be present. The court did not provide any reasons for its ruling at that time.4
On January 15, 2013, the court held the scheduled hearing in the absence of the defendant.5 The court first addressed the defendant‘s motion for an in camera review of the records of L.B. In support of this motion, the defendant‘s attorney elicited the testimony of Erin Nicole Haataja, a longtime acquaintance of the defendant and L.B. Haataja testified that in the past, L.B. had claimed that the defendant had
The court declined to rule on the defendant‘s motion to suppress until the time of trial, granted the defendant‘s motion to reserve the right to file supplemental motions, and ruled on the defendant‘s motion in limine to exclude prior convictions, stating that any felonies allowed by the rules of evidence would not be excluded. The state confirmed that the only prior convictions were from 2008 and 2006 and that it did not intend to introduce them into evidence unless the door was opened to their admission. The state had filed a notice of the uncharged misconduct evidence it intended to submit; the court ordered that the state would provide notice if it discovered anything else. The defendant‘s attorney asked that the court wait before considering the state‘s motion in limine and motion for uncharged misconduct so that he could file a brief in response.
At the start of the third hearing, on February 1, 2013, the defendant‘s attorney again objected to the defendant‘s not being present, asserting that the hearing was a critical stage of the defendant‘s criminal prosecution. The court responded: “Well, that matter‘s been already decided. Judge Solomon already denied that motion. I‘ve also denied it. It‘s not critical for him to be here today. It‘s a hearing. He‘s not going to be confronting any of his witnesses or anything like that. So, that‘s been ruled upon already . . . .” The court then considered the defendant‘s motion to suppress the testimony of Maggie Nardelli, a Department of Children and Families worker, regarding statements the defendant made to her during her investigation on behalf of the department. The court ruled that it would permit the defendant to question Nardelli outside the presence of the jury prior to her testimony so that the court could determine whether the defendant thought he was talking to a law enforcement officer and whether the defendant‘s statements to her were made voluntarily. The parties then argued whether the defendant could present evidence of L.B.‘s arrest for disorderly conduct, which he had witnessed, and whether the state could then offer evidence of the defendant‘s own involvement in the incident. The court ruled that evidence of both parties’ involvement could come in. The court also ruled that, on cross-examination of L.B., the defendant could question
The parties then addressed the motion pertaining to the admissibility of the defendant‘s prior uncharged misconduct. The court determined that one instance, when the defendant allegedly yelled a racial epithet at a worker who had come to fix his GPS monitor, should not be admitted. Regarding seven other alleged events of uncharged misconduct, the defendant‘s attorney argued that the events were too dissimilar to the crimes alleged and too remote in time to have significant probative value, and would be highly prejudicial. The state argued that the prior incidents of alleged violence directed against L.B. showed that the defendant engaged in a common scheme of using violence when L.B. disagreed with him. The court ruled that it would admit six uncharged misconduct incidents to show intent, motive, absence of mistake and to establish a common plan or scheme. It then turned to the state‘s request that it be permitted to introduce the testimony of Nicole Tremblay, the defendant‘s former girlfriend, that the defendant had abused her during their relationship. The court ruled that Tremblay‘s testimony was irrelevant and would be too prejudicial, but that if the defendant opened the door to its admission, “then we‘ll see where it goes from there.”7 The parties concluded with a preliminary discussion on the record of the jury instructions, including discussing the manner in which the judge would provide limiting instructions for the prior uncharged misconduct evidence.
After this appeal was filed, the defendant filed a motion for articulation, which the court granted. The motion for articulation asked: “When the trial court (Kwak, J.) ruled that the defendant would not be permitted to attend certain pretrial hearings, was the court adopting Judge Solomon‘s rationale at the hearing on January 4, 2013? If not, on what basis did the court go forward with the hearings in the defendant‘s absence?” The court ruled that it “adopted Judge Solomon‘s order and its rationale under the law of the case doctrine.” It further ruled: “This court was of the opinion that the issue was correctly decided by Judge Solomon. There was no new or overriding circumstance that warranted vacating, modifying or departing from Judge Solomon‘s ruling.”
The defendant claims that his due process rights were violated when Judges Kwak and Solomon did not permit him to be present during the three hearings on pretrial motions. The defendant claims that these hearings were critical stages of the proceedings, and that his presence would have contributed to the fairness of the procedure. The defendant contends that neither Judge Solomon nor Judge Kwak applied the correct legal test; specifically, the defendant asserts that even if the motions concerned legal matters only, his right to be present would apply to any critical stage in the proceedings that bore a reasonably substantial relationship to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charges. As two examples of how the defendant‘s presence could have affected his ability to defend against the charges, the defendant argues that he could have provided testimony in support of his motion for an in camera review of
The state responds that the defendant did not make an adequate showing that his absence from the hearings adversely affected his opportunity to defend against the charges. It argues that the defendant did not demonstrate what he could have added to the court‘s determination of whether to engage in an in camera review of L.B.‘s mental health records. It argues that the defendant should have made an offer of proof as to what his testimony would have been. It also asserts that the defendant‘s attorney could have relayed the judge‘s holding regarding Tremblay to the defendant, cautioning him to be wary of opening the door to the introduction of her testimony.
“It is undisputed that a defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the trial. . . . The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the [c]onfrontation [c]lause of the [s]ixth [a]mendment . . . but . . . [that] right is protected by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. . . . In judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant‘s prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant‘s] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the [fullness] of his opportunity to defend against the charge. . . . Thus, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1987).” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, supra, 318 Conn. 511–12; State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724, 732, 859 A.2d 898 (2004).
“Although some courts have held that a defendant has a right to be present even when questions of law are discussed . . . the better view would seem to be that there is no such absolute right . . . especially when, as in the present case, the question of law is argued prior to the selection of the jury and the commencement of trial. . . . The question should be whether the defendant‘s presence bears a relation, reasonably substantial, to his opportunity to defend.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Olds, 171 Conn. 395, 405–406, 370 A.2d 969 (1976). “[T]he exclusion of a defendant from a proceeding should be considered in light of the whole record.” State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 432, 546 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809, 548 A.2d 441 (1988).
Although there is no Connecticut case entirely on point with the present case, State v. Olds, supra, 171 Conn. 405–406, is the most factually similar. In that case, the trial court denied the defendant‘s request to be brought into court for a pretrial motions hearing, which included motions to quash, for production, for trial by a jury of twelve, and to reduce bond. Id., 405. The defendant‘s attorney did not advance a cogent reason why he had a right to be present. Id. Our Supreme Court ruled that, where a question of law is argued prior to the selection of the jury and the commencement of trial, “[t]he question should be whether the defendant‘s presence
In State v. Reyes, 19 Conn. App. 695, 564 A.2d 309, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 803, 567 A.2d 833 (1989), this court determined that the defendant should have been permitted, pursuant to then Practice Book §§ 967 and 968, to attend a hearing during the course of trial, even though the issues were entirely legal.8 This court determined that “the defendant‘s enforced absence bore a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to defend himself because he was precluded from hearing the court‘s remarks reflecting upon his counsel‘s preparation of his case.” Id., 700. It determined that the error was harmless because the issue of attorney competence was more appropriate for a habeas petition. Id., 701.
The issue presented in Olds is remarkably similar to the issue presented to Judge Solomon on January 4, 2013. At the hearing before Judge Solomon, the defendant stated that the motions to be argued at the January 7, 2013 hearing were a bill of particulars, a request for essential facts, and a motion to dismiss regarding discovery issues. The defendant‘s attorney did not explain why the defendant should be permitted to attend, aside from stating that he liked to be in court. Judge Solomon ruled that because only legal issues would be argued, the defendant had no right to attend. Although the court should have determined expressly whether the hearing was critical and whether the defendant‘s presence bore a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to defend himself, we conclude that the hearing was not critical and did not bear a reasonably substantial relationship to his opportunity to defend himself. See State v. Olds, supra, 171 Conn. 405–406.
When the issue again was raised before Judge Kwak on January 7, 2013, however, the defendant‘s attorney had asserted in his memorandum of law that he intended to argue several additional motions, and the defendant provided justification for his presence. These motions dealt with factual issues within the defendant‘s knowledge, such as his own prior uncharged misconduct, the criminal record of L.B. concerning conduct that he had witnessed, and his observations regarding L.B.‘s mental state. In addition, the prosecutor acknowledged that some of the motions were in fact critical and conceded that she did not object to the defendant‘s being present, subject to whatever monitoring was appropriate.9
Judge Kwak
We now turn to Judge Kwak‘s decision that the defendant did not have a right to be present at the two subsequent hearings, on January 15, 2013, and February 1, 2013. At the January 15, 2013 hearing, the defendant argued his motion for in camera review of L.B.‘s mental health records. The defendant asserts that he could have provided additional testimony regarding L.B.‘s mental health that could have affected the court‘s determination regarding whether in camera review was warranted. The defendant had stated in his motion to be present that some of the motions might require his testimony, but his attorney did not state at the hearing that this was a motion that required testimony, nor did he make a proffer of what the defendant‘s testimony would have been.
This hearing was a critical stage in the proceedings. The case amounted to a credibility contest between the defendant and L.B. They were the only two witnesses to the altercation who testified. Whether L.B. had any mental health issues impacting her ability to recall events or to be truthful was a key concern.
In addition, the defendant could have made a meaningful contribution to the proceedings. He knew the witness who did testify, Haataja, and, therefore, may have aided his attorney‘s questioning of her. In addition, he may have been asked to provide additional testimony regarding incidents wherein L.B. exhibited a tendency to fabricate untruths or to harm herself. The state contends that, without a proffer of the defendant‘s testimony, we cannot determine whether he would have contributed meaningfully to his own defense.10
Although we cannot determine the precise nature of the defendant‘s contribution, the considerations previously discussed demonstrate that his presence bore a reasonably substantial relationship to his opportunity to defend himself. See id. We therefore find that the defendant‘s due process right to be present at the January 15, 2013 hearing was violated.
We next turn to the hearing on February 1, 2013. At the start of this hearing, the defendant‘s attorney reiterated his request that the defendant be present. This hearing concerned a number of substantive motions, including
The importance of the evidence discussed at this hearing demonstrates that it was a critical stage of the case. The content of Nardelli‘s anticipated testimony was not discussed at the hearing or in the motion to suppress, but the suppression of statements made by the defendant is often an important consideration.11
More importantly, the admission of the defendant‘s uncharged misconduct, consisting of violence and threats of violence directed against L.B., potentially would have a significant effect on the jury‘s view of him. Finally, Tremblay‘s testimony regarding prior abuse by the defendant directed against her could provide strong corroboration for the state‘s case. This hearing was critical to the defendant‘s defense.
Although the defendant has not claimed that he would have testified in support of any of the motions argued on February 1, 2013, many concerned his own actions and statements. He could have aided in his defense by suggesting arguments to his attorney or disputing the characterization of his actions by the state. The key issue regarding his uncharged misconduct was how similar it was to the conduct in the present case. He could have helped his attorney to formulate arguments regarding how the various incidents of misconduct were different, or to correct mischaracterizations by the state. See People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656, 595 N.E.2d 836, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1992).12 Finally, had the defendant been present at the hearing, he may have better understood the importance
Having determined that the defendant‘s right to due process was violated, we now turn to whether the defendant‘s absence should be considered an instance of structural error or whether it is subject to a harmless error analysis. The defendant asserts, citing State v. Lopez, supra, 271 Conn. 726, that when the defendant is denied his right to be present, the error is structural in nature and not subject to harmless error analysis. In the alternative, the defendant contends that the court‘s error clearly was not harmless. The state responds that Lopez is distinguishable on its facts, and that any error was harmless because the defendant failed to demonstrate what he could have done differently had he been present at the hearings. We agree that Lopez is distinguishable, but conclude that the error was not harmless.
“A determination that the defendant‘s absence from a critical stage of the proceedings violated his constitutional rights does not end the inquiry that a reviewing court must conduct in deciding whether to order a new trial.” Id., 732. “Although the United States Supreme Court has noted that most constitutional errors are subject to a harmless error analysis . . . the Supreme Court has recognized . . . that, when the consequences of the deprivation of the defendant‘s constitutional right are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, [the deprivation of that right] unquestionably qualifies as structural error.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 737–38. “Structural [error] cases defy analysis by harmless error standards because the entire conduct of the trial, from beginning to end, is obviously affected . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 733. “A structural error creates a defect in the trial mechanism such that, while it is virtually impossible to pinpoint the exact harm, it remains abundantly clear that the trial process was flawed significantly. For this reason, [e]rrors of this magnitude are per se prejudicial and require that the underlying conviction be vacated.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 739. Our Supreme Court “has found error to be structural only when the error renders a trial fundamentally unfair and is not susceptible to a harmless error analysis . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 279 Conn. 493, 509–10, 903 A.2d 169 (2006).
Our Supreme Court in Lopez held that where a criminal defendant is denied knowledge of a potential conflict of interest of his attorney, it is impossible to say how the subsequent proceedings have been affected. State v. Lopez, supra, 271 Conn. 736. “[T]he potential conflict centered around the pivotal witness against the defendant—the victim—and the critical issue at trial—the victim‘s credibility. It is impossible to know, had the defendant been present, whether he would have initiated further inquiry into the
The defendant argues that, in general, his absence compromised his ability to defend against the charges. The defendant again focuses on his inability to testify in support of his motion for in camera review of L.B.‘s mental health records, and his inability to hear the court‘s orders regarding Tremblay‘s testimony and the opening the door doctrine. He also contends that the interest in transparency of court proceedings and the intangible assistance the defendant could have provided to his attorney demonstrate that the error was not harmless. The state responds that the defendant has not provided evidence of what his testimony would have been if he had been present to testify in support of his motion for in camera review.13 It further argues that the defendant‘s attorney should have discussed the opening the door doctrine with him, and that, therefore, his rights were protected.
“[T]he United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, supra, 279 Conn. 504. “The state bears the burden of proving that the constitutional impropriety was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 511. In evaluating whether a denial of presence is harmless, “[w]e first determine whether the defendant‘s presence . . . would have contributed to his ability to defend against the charges. . . . We then consider the evidence presented at trial.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Zapata, 119 Conn. App. 660, 685, 989 A.2d 626, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 906, 992 A.2d 1136 (2010), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Dixon, 318 Conn. 495, 509 n.4, 122 A.3d 542 (2015).14
Although the state asserts that any error was harmless because the defendant‘s counsel did not proffer the defendant‘s testimony in support of his motion for in camera review, we note that the state bears the burden of proving harmlessness. On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that the state has not proven that the absence of the defendant was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The lack of L.B.‘s mental health records, the admission of the defendant‘s prior misconduct, and the lack of an opportunity for the defendant to hear the discussion regarding Tremblay‘s testimony all could have affected the outcome of this case.15
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the defendant‘s full name or to identify the minor victim or others through whom the victim‘s identity may be ascertained. See
Notes
“The Court: Is she going to be here? Oh. You—why does he need to be here? It‘s a discovery motion.
“[The Defendant‘s Attorney]: Well, I mean, I like—he likes to be in court to hear what—
“The Court: I‘m sure he‘d rather be anywhere than at home. No, you can‘t be here on Monday. It‘s—
“[The Defendant‘s Attorney]: Okay.
“The Court: —a legal matter only.”