State v. RabeState v. Rabe
David L. Rabe, #A676-659, London Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 69, London, Ohio 43140, defendant-appellant, pro se
O P I N I O N
RINGLAND, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, David L. Rabe, appeals from the judgment of the Clermont County Common Pleas Court denying his motion to correct an unlawful sentence. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court‘s judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings.
{¶ 2} In 2010, appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the
{¶ 3} In 2012, appellant was again arrested and charged with OVI. As a result, the trial court revoked appellant‘s community control and sentenced him to 29 months in prison. Two months later, appellant filed a motion to correct an unlawful sentence, arguing that, under
{¶ 4} The trial court overruled appellant‘s motion to correct an unlawful sentence. The trial court determined that, while
{¶ 5} Rabe now appeals from the trial court‘s decision overruling his motion to correct an unlawful sentence and assigns the following as error:
{¶ 6} “A COMMON PLEAS COURT IS LIMITED TO A SENTENCE THAT IS
{¶ 7} Appellant argues that because he was a first-time felony OVI offender and the trial court already had sentenced him to a mandatory 60-day term of local incarceration under
{¶ 8} Initially, appellant did not file a direct appeal from the trial court‘s decision to resentence him to 29 months in prison for violating the terms of his community control, and the argument that he is raising on appeal is different from the one he raised in the trial court. Nevertheless, “[n]o court has the authority to impose a sentence that is contrary to law,” State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶ 23; a motion to correct an unlawful or illegal sentence is “an appropriate vehicle for raising the claim that a sentence is facially illegal at any time,” id. at ¶ 25; and application of the principles of res judicata and issue preclusion are disfavored with respect to sentences that do not comply with statutory mandates. Id. at ¶ 35.
{¶ 9}
(B)(1) If the conditions of a community control sanction are violated * * *, the sentencing court may impose upon the violator one or more of the following penalties:
* * *
(c) A prison term on the offender pursuant to section 2929.14 of the
Revised Code. (2) The prison term, if any, imposed upon a violator pursuant to this division shall be within the range of prison terms available for the offense for which the sanction that was violated was imposed and shall not exceed the prison term specified in the notice provided to the offender at the sentencing hearing pursuant to division (B)(2) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code.
{¶ 10} In this case, the “offense for which the sanction that was violated was imposed” was a fourth-degree felony OVI offense. Appellant acknowledges that the 29-month prison term that the trial court imposed on him for violating the terms of his community control does not exceed the prison term specified in the notice provided to him at his original sentencing hearing. The remaining issue before us, then, is whether the 29-month prison sentence is within the range of prison terms available for a fourth-degree felony OVI offense.
{¶ 11}
(A) Except as provided in division * * * (B)(4) * * *, if the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender pursuant to this chapter, the court shall impose a definite prison term that shall be one of the following:
* * *
(4) For a felony of the fourth degree, the prison term shall be six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen months.
{¶ 12}
If the offender is being sentenced for a * * * fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, the sentencing court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory prison term in accordance with that division. In addition to the mandatory prison term, if the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense, the court, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of this section, may sentence the offender to a definite prison term of not less than six months and not more than thirty months[.] * * *
If the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised
Code and the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, the court may impose a prison term as described in division (A)(1) of that section.
{¶ 13} The trial court initially determined that
{¶ 14} The language in the first paragraph of
{¶ 15} The second paragraph of
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17}
If the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, it may impose a jail term in addition to the sixty-day mandatory term, the cumulative total of the mandatory term and the jail term for the offense shall not exceed one year, and, except as provided in division (A)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, no prison term is authorized for the offense. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, it also may sentence the offender to a definite prison term that shall be not less than six months and not more than thirty months and the prison terms shall be imposed as described in division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term, in addition to the term or terms so imposed, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19}
(G) * * * [I]f an offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense * * *, the court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory term of local incarceration or a mandatory prison term in accordance with the following:
(1) If the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense * * *, the court may impose upon the offender a mandatory term of local incarceration of sixty days * * * as specified in division (G)(1)(d) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code. * * *
(2) * * * [I]f the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense and the court does not impose a mandatory term of local incarceration under division (G)(1) of this section, the court * * * shall impose upon the offender a mandatory prison term of sixty days * * * as specified in division (G)(1)(d) * * * of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code[.]
{¶ 20}
{¶ 21} In addition to these two general sentencing options,
{¶ 22} At the time of appellant‘s original sentencing, the trial court ordered appellant to serve 60 days in the Clermont County Jail, and thus sentenced him to a mandatory term of local incarceration under
{¶ 23}
{¶ 24} Additionally,
[i]f the offender is being sentenced for a * * * fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, the sentencing court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory prison term in accordance with that division. In addition to the mandatory prison term, if the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense, the court, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of this section, may sentence the offender to a definite prison term of not less than six months and not more than thirty months[.]
{¶ 25} As can be seen from the foregoing, the imposition of a definite prison term from six months to 30 months is dependent upon the imposition of a 60-day mandatory prison sentence. In this case, however, the trial court did not impose a 60-day mandatory prison sentence but, instead, imposed a 60-day period of local incarceration. Consequently, the definite prison term from six months to 30 months has no application in cases where the trial court has imposed a mandatory 60-day term of local incarceration rather than a mandatory 60-day prison term. Therefore the trial court erred in finding that it was authorized under
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} Accordingly, appellant‘s assignment of error is sustained to the extent indicated.
{¶ 28} The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for resentencing consistent with this Opinion.
PIPER and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.