State v. PurvisState v. Purvis
BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant the State of Ohio appeals from the entry granting Defendant-Appellee Cody Purvis’ motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
{¶2} After an encounter with police on March 24, 2013, Mr. Purvis was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and underage consumption of alcohol. Ultimately, Mr. Purvis was charged with violations of
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PURVIS‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS ON THE BASIS THAT PURVIS‘S CONTACT WITH OFFICER LASKOWSKI WAS NOT A CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER.
{¶3} The State asserts in its sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in granting Mr. Purvis’ motion to suppress because the encounter with Officer Laskowski was consensual. We do not agree.
{¶4} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that
[a]ppellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.
(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.
{¶5} The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. “Searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to well-delineated exceptions.” State v. Robinson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26741, 2014-Ohio-579, ¶ 13, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Nonetheless, “‘not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves “seizures” of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a “seizure” has occurred’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Goodloe, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-141, 2013-Ohio-4934, ¶ 6, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968), fn. 16.
{¶7} The sole issue placed before the trial court was whether the encounter between Mr. Purvis and the police was consensual. There was no argument made by the State that police possessed reasonable articulable suspicion to initially stop Mr. Purvis.
{¶8} Officer Laskowski, who, at the time, was a police officer with the City of Wooster for two years, testified about his encounter with Mr. Purvis on March 24, 2013, during the early morning hours. Prior to the encounter, Officer Laskowski had been part of a police response to
{¶9} Around 1:50 a.m., Officer Laskowski observed Mr. Purvis exit the house involved in the house party, get into a vehicle and travel east on Cedar. The vehicle then pulled into the driveway of 1566 Cedar Lane. Officer Laskowski then moved his vehicle up to the driveway of 1566. Officer Laskowski saw Mr. Purvis exit the vehicle and called out to ask him if he had just left from the house a few doors down. Officer Laskowski denied telling Mr. Purvis to stop. Mr. Purvis told the officer that he was and was picking up his girlfriend. Officer Laskowski then asked if Mr. Purvis was aware of the prior police activity at that house, to which Mr. Purvis replied that that was why he was picking up his girlfriend. At this point Officer Laskowski noticed that Mr. Purvis’ eyes were watery and glassy, which indicated to Officer Laskowski that Mr. Purvis had possibly been consuming alcohol. According to Officer Laskowski, he never drew his weapon, told Mr. Purvis that he could not leave, or commanded him to do anything. On cross examination, Officer Laskowski was asked if he called out to Mr. Purvis and pointed his flashlight at him. Officer Laskowski did not mention the flashlight in response and instead testified that he asked Mr. Purvis if he had come from the house a few doors down. Officer Laskowski was 100% certain that he did not tell Mr. Purvis to stop.
{¶10} Mr. Purvis also testified at the suppression hearing and characterized the events that evening differently. Mr. Purvis indicated that he had been at the house where the party was. Approximately 45 minutes after the party broke up, Mr. Purvis was outside talking on the phone to his girlfriend. His girlfriend asked him to drive her car back to her aunt‘s house at 1566 Cedar Lane. After arriving at 1566 Cedar Lane, he exited the vehicle and proceeded to go towards the
{¶11} The trial court found that the encounter was not consensual and appeared to credit Mr. Purvis’ testimony over that of the officer. The trial court stated that it “[didn‘t] think there was any consent here [and] * * * [Mr. Purvis‘] testimony [that] the flashlight was shined in his eyes is further evidence of that. No one consents upon greeting someone or meeting someone in a voluntary manner to have a flashlight shine in your face at night.” While the trial court‘s factual findings are limited, it is clear from the above that the trial court found Mr. Purvis more credible than Officer Laskowski. Officer Laskowski never testified to shining a flashlight on Mr. Purvis and, in fact, did not mention a flashlight at all.
{¶12} As noted above, the trial court, as the trier of fact, was in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8. It appears that the trial court found Mr. Purvis’ testimony credible. Taking Mr. Purvis’ testimony as true, as it appears the trial court did, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. The State‘s main argument appears to be that the trial court only considered whether Mr. Purvis felt free to leave, not whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances. See Rackow, 2008-Ohio-507, at ¶ 10. However, immediately prior to rendering a decision in open court, the State reminded the
{¶13} Additionally, the State contends that even if the trial court did consider the correct standard, the encounter was consensual. In doing so, the State relies on State v. Patterson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23135, 2006-Ohio-5424. Patterson involved a police-citizen encounter in which police noticed a vehicle running in a parking spot at the back of a Denny‘s parking lot around 3 a.m. Id. at ¶ 5. The vehicle‘s windows were fogged up, and the parking lights were on. Id. Police turned on their red and blue flashers, pulled in front of the vehicle, and exited the cruiser. Id. At that time, the person inside the running car, turned the car off, exited the vehicle, and began to walk away from it. Id. The two officers then began to converse with the defendant. Id.
{¶14} This Court concluded that that portion of the encounter was not a seizure and was consensual. Id. at ¶ 18. In doing so, we concluded that police did not “use any language or tone to compel [the defendant‘s] responses, or otherwise indicate that [defendant‘s] compliance with [the officer‘s] request for information was compelled.” Id. The facts of this matter are distinguishable. It is clear that the trial court believed that Officer Laskowski told Mr. Purvis to stop, shined a flashlight in his eyes, and commanded Mr. Purvis to go to Officer Laskowski‘s
III.
{¶16} In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the Wayne County Municipal Court.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wayne County Municipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
MOORE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
DANIEL R. LUTZ, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATHAN R. SHAKER, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant.
DAVID C. KNOWLTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.