STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, - vs - PHILLIP PLATT, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2013-12-116
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY
8/11/2014
[Cite as State v. Platt, 2014-Ohio-3450.]
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 13CR29347
Madden & Oswall Co., LPA, William F. Oswall, Jr., 810 Sycamore Street, 5th Floor, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Phillip Platt, appeals a decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶ 2} Appellant is an inmate at the Lebanon Correctional Institution (LCI) serving a
{¶ 3} A criminal investigation was also conducted regarding appellant‘s possession of the shanks. On June 11, 2013, an Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper went to LCI to interview appellant. Before the interview began, appellant again admitted the shanks belonged to him. Thereafter, the Trooper advised him of his Miranda rights. Appellant then asked for an attorney and the interview concluded.
{¶ 4} On July 29, 2013, appellant was indicted for possession of a deadly weapon while under detention, in violation of
{¶ 5} At the suppression hearing, LCI Sergeant Keith Boothe testified that on May 8, 2013, he presided over the administrative hearing regarding appellant‘s alleged rule violation. Appellant was placed in handcuffs, a “belly band,” and ankle restraints and escorted to an office where the hearing was conducted.2 Boothe explained that appellant had been in
{¶ 6} Boothe testified that the only people present during the hearing were himself and appellant. Once inside the room, Boothe informed appellant of the charge against him and asked him how he wished to plead to the charge. Appellant replied that he would plead “guilty.” Boothe then asked appellant “if he wished to make a statement” to which appellant stated that his “cellie knew nothing about the shanks and that [the shanks] were his.” Boothe explained that appellant had been charged with rule violations before and had been through the hearing and sanctions process. Appellant was not advised of his Miranda rights at any time during the hearing. Boothe also stated that appellant was not free to go back to his cell until he was finished with the hearing. Boothe then referred appellant‘s violation to the RIB for further proceedings.
{¶ 7} LCI Lieutenant Jacob Elerick also testified at the suppression hearing that on May 13, 2013, a hearing before the RIB was held regarding appellant‘s rule violation. Elerick was present during the hearing and explained that appellant was called in, asked to identify himself, read his basic institutional rights, and then asked to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty. Along with Elerick, two other RIB members were present. Appellant was not informed of his Miranda rights. Appellant pled guilty to the rule infraction. Elerick testified that he asked appellant if he wanted to make a statement to which appellant replied that “both weapons that were found in his cell were in fact his and that his cellmate at the time had no knowledge of the weapons.” A recording of the hearing which was admitted into evidence shows, that the entire hearing lasted three minutes.
{¶ 8} Elerick testified that because appellant was in isolation, he was restrained in leg
{¶ 9} Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Chad Smith testified that on June 11, 2013, he interviewed appellant regarding his alleged possession of a weapon while in prison. As appellant remained in isolation, he was escorted to the interview by a correctional officer and was in ankle restraints, handcuffs, and a belly band. The interview was conducted inside the LCI “attorney visit room.” Smith and appellant were the only people present in the room, and a small table divided the room where Smith sat on one side and appellant on the other. Once appellant entered the room and sat down, Smith introduced himself and asked appellant if he understood why he was there. Smith explained that he introduced himself because he was not wearing a uniform that identified him as law enforcement and was unsure if he needed to explain the allegations to appellant before the questioning began. Smith stated that appellant replied to his question “as one continuous response, * * * yes, it‘s for the knives that were found in my cell, and [appellant] continued and went on and said that my cellie didn‘t know about it, those were mine.” Smith then explained appellant‘s constitutional rights. After hearing these rights, appellant requested an attorney, and Smith terminated the interview.
{¶ 10} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant‘s motion to suppress reasoning that Miranda warnings were not required because appellant was never interrogated with respect to the rule violations and the interview with Smith was not coercive. Immediately, after the suppression hearing, a trial commenced where appellant was found guilty of possession of a deadly weapon while under detention in violation of
{¶ 11} Appellant now appeals, asserting a sole assignment of error:
{¶ 12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHEN IT OVERRULED HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
{¶ 13} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made on: 1) May 8, 2013, to Boothe; 2) May 13, 2013, to Elerick; and 3) June 11, 2013, to Smith. Appellant maintains that due to his incarceration, the physical restraints, and other factors, he was in custody for purposes of Miranda. Appellant also asserts that in each instance he was interrogated. Therefore, because appellant was not given Miranda warnings, these statements should have been suppressed.
{¶ 14} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Gray, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-176, 2012-Ohio-4769, ¶ 15, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence in order to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Johnson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-11-235, 2013-Ohio-4865, ¶ 14. In turn, when reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court is bound to accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Durham, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-03-023, 2013-Ohio-4764, ¶ 14. An appellate court, however, independently reviews the trial court‘s legal conclusions based on those facts and determines, without deference to the trial court‘s decision, whether as a matter of law, the facts satisfy the appropriate legal standard. Id.
{¶ 15} “When a suspect is questioned in a custodial setting, the Fifth Amendment requires that he receive Miranda warnings to protect against compelled self-incrimination.”
{¶ 16} “Custody” is a “term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). The initial step in determining whether someone is in custody “is to ascertain whether, in light of ‘the objective circumstances of the interrogation,’ a ‘reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.‘” Id., quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-323, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (1994) (per curiam) and Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995). In determining whether an individual was in custody, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. State v. Durham, 2013-Ohio-4764 at ¶ 17.
{¶ 17} The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda when that individual is incarcerated. Howes. In Howes, the court stated that “imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda.” Id. at 1190. In so holding, the court cautioned that “[n]ot all restraints of freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda” as the court has “‘decline[d] to accord talismanic power’ to the freedom-of-movement inquiry.” Id. at 1189, quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984). Instead the focus should be “whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. at 1190.
{¶ 18} In Howes, the Supreme Court reviewed the Sixth Circuit‘s decision which held that an interrogation where an individual is imprisoned, questioned in private, and questioned
{¶ 19} Ultimately, in Howes the court found that the inmate was not in custody when he was questioned in a conference room by two sheriff‘s deputies about criminal activity he had allegedly engaged in before coming to prison. Id. at 1186. The Howes court observed that the following facts weighed in favor of custody: 1) the inmate was summoned to the interview; 2) the interview was lengthy, lasting five to seven hours and was conducted late at night; 3) the sheriff‘s deputies were armed; 4) one of the deputies used a “very sharp tone;” and 5) the inmate was not advised that he was free to decline to speak with the officers. Id. at 1192-1193. However, the court further observed that these circumstances were offset by others, including: 1) the inmate was told that he could leave and go back to his cell; 2) the inmate was not physically restrained or threatened; 3) the interview took place in a well-lit, average-sized conference room; 4) the inmate was offered food and water; and 5) the door to the room was sometimes left open. Id. at 1193.
{¶ 20} Within the factual context of Howes, the court noted that the “most important” factor * * * was that the defendant “was told at the outset of the interrogation, and reminded
{¶ 21} Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that appellant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda during the administrative hearings conducted on May 8 and May 13, 2013 or during the June 11, 2013 interview. Appellant has failed to show how the administrative hearings and the interview with Trooper Smith presented the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.
{¶ 22} Unlike Howes, where the interview lasted five to seven hours and interrupted the inmate‘s sleep schedule, the hearings and the interview were of extremely short duration. The May 8th hearing consisted of Boothe informing appellant of the charge against him, taking appellant‘s guilty plea, and then a brief statement in which appellant claimed possession of the shanks. The same details were discussed in the May 13th hearing and a tape recording admitted into evidence shows that the entire hearing lasted three minutes. The June 11th interview with Smith was exceedingly brief as it only lasted for the duration of Smith asking appellant if he understood why he was there, appellant‘s statements, and a recitation of appellant‘s constitutional rights.
{¶ 23} While appellant was escorted to the hearings and interview by a correctional officer and physically restrained, appellant was escorted and restrained in accordance with institutional policy. Appellant would have therefore been escorted and restrained regardless of the purpose of the removal from his cell. See People v. Cortez, 299 Mich. App. 679, 699-700 (2013), citing Howes. At the time of the hearings and interview, appellant had been in isolation for six months and was certainly accustomed to such restraints. Moreover,
{¶ 24} Although Boothe testified that appellant was not free to leave the May 8th hearing and appellant was never informed of his freedom to leave the May 13th hearing, other coercive aspects of the interactions in Howes are absent. Both administrative hearings were conducted to merely inform appellant of the charges against him and take his plea. The administrative hearing with Boothe, the RIB hearing and the interview with Smith were all of short duration. The testimony established that appellant was familiar with the procedure regarding institutional rule violations as he had previously violated rules and had appeared before a hearing officer and the RIB. Based upon these factors we do not believe, in a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, that it was of critical importance that appellant was not advised that he was free to leave during any of these sessions, as was the defendant in Howes. Accordingly, the environment surrounding the questioning of appellant and the lack of coercive pressure, establish that appellant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda during the hearings. See People v. Elliot, 494 Mich. 292, 309 (2013).
{¶ 25} Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying appellant‘s motion to suppress the statements he made on May 8, 2013, May 13, 2013, and June 11, 2013 on the basis that his Miranda rights were violated. Appellant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda during the May 8 and May 10, 2013 hearings or the June 11, 2013 interview. Because appellant was not in custody, we do not need to determine whether the hearings or the interview constituted an “interrogation.”
{¶ 26} Appellant‘s sole assignment of error is overruled.
S. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.