STATE OF OHIO, Plаintiff-Appellee vs. PHILLIP REED, Defendant-Appellant
No. 102364
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
February 25, 2016
[Cite as State v. Phillips, 2016-Ohio-689.]
BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., E.A. Gallagher, P.J., and Boyle, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED; Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case Nos. CR-14-585352-B, CR-14-586038-A, and CR-14-587733-B; RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 25, 2016
Carmen P. Naso
Milton A. Kramer Law Clinic
11075 East Boulevard
Cleveland, Ohio 44106
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Kelly N. Mason
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} Appellant, Phillip Reed, brings the instant appeal challenging the pleas he entered in three cases. He claims the trial court failed to comply with
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} Appellant, along with another, engaged in a series of thefts that occurred between June 12, 2013, and March 27, 2014. Appellant was indicted in three separate cases. In Cuyahоga C.P. No. CR-14-585352-B, appellant was charged with eight counts related to theft from a U-Haul location. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-14-586038-A, appellant was charged with three counts related to theft from New Creation Builders, L.L.C. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-14-587733-B, appellant was charged with eight counts related to theft from a Baker‘s Square location. According to the state‘s description, appellant and another stole U-Haul trucks and used them to transport metal items stolen from other businesses and then returned the trucks before anyone realized they were missing. Appellant also used fraudulent checks to pay New Creation Builders for the construction of a residential garage.
{¶3} On September 23, 2014, appellant agreed to change his рleas to guilty in accordance with a plea agreement offered by the state. In C.P. No. CR-14-585352-B, appellant pled guilty to three counts of grand theft, violations of
{¶4} On October 29, 2014, the court held a combined sentencing hearing. The court went through appellant‘s significant criminal history and heard from the state, appellant‘s counsel, and appellant. The court imposed a total prison sentence of 36 months.
{¶5} Appellant sought and was granted leave by this court to file a delayed appeal. Herein, he assigns one error for review:
I. The trial court failed to substantially comply with Criminal Rule 11 when it accepted Appellant Phillip Reed‘s guilty plea to the amended charges in Case Nos. CR-14-585352, CR-14-586038, and CR-14-587733.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Plea
{¶6} Appellant claims the court failed to ensure that appellant‘s pleas were made knowingly and intelligently because he misunderstood the consequences of his guilty pleas when he asserted during the plea colloquy that he would receive probation or be
{¶7} The process of accepting pleas of no contest and guilty is governed by
{¶8} A trial court must strictly comply with the requirements related to the waiver of constitutional rights under
{¶9} For nonconstitutional rights set forth in
{¶10}
{¶11} In response to a question posed by the court about any promises regarding possible sentences, appellant explainеd that it was his understanding that if he pled guilty that he would receive either probation or placement in a community-based correctional facility. Trial counsel then explained, “I never indicated to you what the Court would do. I indicated рossible probation, possible prison and there is CBCF available. But did I ever indicate to you at any time what the Judge would do or make any promise what the Judge would do?” Appellant responded, “No.”
{¶13} Next, appellant argues that the court was required to inquire further into appellant‘s mental state during the plea colloquy.
{¶14} A criminal defendant is presumed competent to stand trial, and by extension, enter a plea.
{¶15} Appellant‘s attorney never indicated his client was not competent to enter a plea. Counsel stated appellant had been diagnosed with “ADHD and bipolar” disorder for whiсh he was prescribed medication. Counsel further informed the court that
{¶16} Apart from this statеment, the record does not contain any indication that would lead the trial court to question appellant‘s ability to enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. The trial court personally addressed appellant and asked him several questions in compliance with
{¶17}
The court shall not find a defendant incompetent to stand trial solely because the defendant is receiving or has received treatment as a voluntary or involuntary mentally ill patient * * * or because the defendant is receiving or has received psychotropic drugs оr other medication, even if the defendant might become incompetent to stand trial without the drugs or medication.
{¶18} Appellant is presumed competent to enter a plea, and the record in this case does not contain any indication that appellant did not comprehend the colloquy that the court conducted. The record indicates that the trial court fully informed appellant of his constitutional rights and made sure appellant was making a knowing wаiver of those rights. This case stands in stark contrast to others where a defendant‘s ability to enter a
Thus, even with the repetitive coaxing and questioning, appellant was unable to sufficiently focus on and comprehend the nature and objectives of the proceedings. Many of appellant‘s answеrs were non-responsive, indicating that she clearly did not understand that under a no contest plea, she would likely be found guilty, or even why she had been charged with the offense.
Even the court itself expressed that it had difficulty discerning whether apрellant‘s inability to comprehend was due to lack of education or mental health issues. Nothing in the record indicates that appellant was “faking it,” nor did the trial court make such a finding. Instead, we conclude that appellant‘s ability tо understand or to become “educated” as to the legal issues involved was inextricably intertwined with her mental health and medication issues. Consequently, we conclude that the record shows that, due to her mental illness and somewhat limited cognitive abilities, appellant was unable to fully participate in her defense or to appreciate the ramifications of the no contest plea and subsequent conditions of sentencing.
State v. Nickell, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-07-015, 2008-Ohio-1571, ¶ 117-118.
{¶19} Where the record containеd no similar evidence of bewilderment, confusion, or an inability to understand the proceedings, the Second District found guilty pleas validly entered. State v. Smith, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24264 and 24265, 2011-Ohio-3288, ¶ 82, 86. Similar to Smith, there is no indication in the record before this court that appellant did not understand the plea colloquy.
{¶20} During the plea colloquy appellant gave appropriate responses to questions posed by the trial court and it does not otherwise appear that he was unable to understand the proceedings and intelligently enter a guilty plea. See State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-050112, 2006-Ohio-2339 ¶ 12-15; State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Washington No. 12CA11, 2013-Ohio-232, ¶ 16.
{¶21} While the court‘s colloquy could have been more thorough regarding appellant‘s present mental condition, the record is devoid of any indication that appеllant did not understand the plea colloquy and the rights he was giving up, and knowingly entered guilty pleas in this case.
III. Conclusion
{¶22} Appellant‘s pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily where the court properly explained appellant‘s constitutional and nonconstitutional rights, and there is no indication on the record that appellant‘s present mental condition meant he did not understand any portion of the colloquy.
{¶23} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into exeсution. The defendant‘s convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR