State v. PeelmanState v. Peelman
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ron Springman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Timothy J. McKenna, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: This case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
{¶1} After committing a robbery at a convenience store, defendant-appellant Aaron Peelman was indicted for aggravated robbery1 and felonious assault.2 Peelman waived his right to a jury trial, and following a bench trial in the common pleas court, Peelman was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to an aggregate term of ten years’ incarceration. In this appeal, Peelman alleges that the trial court erred in denying his acquittal motion, that the convictions were against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, that his trial counsel was ineffective, and that his sentence was unlawful. Peelman‘s assignments of error are overruled, and the trial court‘s judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} Around noon on November 14, 2008, Juma Akel was working at Price Hill Mart when Peelman came in and asked about batteries. Akel knew Peelman because he had come to the store often. As Akel was walking into a rear storage room, he was hit in the back of the head repeatedly, and he fell to the floor. As he lay on his back on the floor, Akel recognized Peelman as the assailant. While Akel was on the ground, Peelman continued to choke and beat him. Peelman then took about $2,000 from Akel‘s right pocket and fled. During the robbery, Peelman broke Akel‘s eye socket and cheek bone as well as several of his teeth.
{¶3} Officer Michael Roth received a tip that Peelman had committed the robbery, and he then assembled a photographic lineup for Akel to review. Akel identified Peelman as the robber. Roth then interrogated Peelman, and after signing a Miranda3 waiver, Peelman confessed that he had acted as a lookout for a person
{¶4} On cross-examination, Officer Roth testified that handprints taken from the scene did not match Peelman‘s, and that the security videos of the store robbery did not show Peelman. But Roth also testified that the store‘s video system was very poor, produced black and white images, and was fuzzy, that the tape used was very old, and that because of the inadequate system, the images from the tape were not useful.
{¶5} Despite Peelman‘s confession, his alibi at trial was that he had been at Good Samaritan Hospital when the robbery had taken place. The security manager at the hospital testified that video cameras had showed Peelman in the maternity unit at 11:30 a.m., and again at 1:01 p.m. Peelman also testified that he had been high on drugs and scared when he confessed. At the close of the state‘s case, Peelman moved for an acquittal, and the trial court denied his motion.
{¶6} In his first two assignments of error, Peelman contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for an acquittal and that his convictions were against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. We consider these assignments of error together.
{¶7} The standard of review for a sufficiency claim and for the denial of a Crim.R. 29 motion for an acquittal is identical. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we must examine the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the state. We must then determine whether that evidence could have convinced a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of
{¶8} We conclude that Peelman‘s convictions were against neither the weight nor the sufficiency of the evidence, and that the trial court did not err in denying his motion for an acquittal. Peelman‘s alibi and his claim of mistaken identity were rebutted by Akel‘s testimony that he had known Peelman for years, and that he was on a first-name basis with him. Akel identified Peelman as the robber, and he picked him out of a photographic lineup. In fact, as Akel reviewed the photographic lineup, he noted that in Peelman‘s photograph he had not been wearing a hat, but that he had been wearing a hat on the day of the robbery and assault. Also, Peelman‘s alibi that he had been at Good Samaritan Hospital proved nothing because there had been ample time for Peelman to commit the robbery—security photographs showed Peelman at the hospital around 11:30 a.m. and 1:01 p.m., but the robbery occurred around noon. We are convinced that Akel‘s recollection of the robbery and assault was sound, and that his identification of Peelman as the perpetrator was damning to Peelman‘s defense. In fact, Akel‘s testimony was sufficient to convict Peelman apart from his confession, and the first two assignments of error are overruled.
{¶10} Peelman‘s next assignment of error contends that his sentences were excessive and unlawful. Not so. We review claims of excessive sentencing under a two-part analysis: we first must decide whether the sentences were contrary to law; and if they were not, we must then decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentences.9 Peelman‘s sentences were not contrary to law, as they were within the applicable statutory ranges.
{¶11} We now decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Peelman. The court noted that it had considered the sentencing guidelines, and our review of the record convinces us that the gravity of Peelman‘s offenses warranted the sentences that he received. Peelman bludgeoned and assaulted Akel far beyond what was necessary to commit the robbery. We overrule this assignment of error.
{¶12} Finally, Peelman argues that the trial court erred in failing to merge his convictions for robbery and felonious assault because the two offenses were allied offenses of similar import.
{¶14} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CUNNINGHAM, P.J., and HENDON, J., concur.
Please Note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this decision.