State v. ParishState v. Parish
J. Gerald Ingram, 7330 Market Street, Youngstown, OH 44512-5610 (For Defendant-Appellant).
O P I N I O N
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Tamira Parish, appeals the judgment of the Warren Municipal Court denying her post-sentence motion to withdraw her no contest plea. For the following rеasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶3} After sentencing, Parish filed a motion to withdraw her plea. The trial court held a hearing and, subsequently, denied her motion. Pаrish now appeals and raises the following issues for review:
{¶4} “[1.] The trial court erred when it denied the Appellant‘s motion to withdraw [her] plea because the court failed to comply with
{¶5} “[2.] The trial court erred when Magistrate/‘Acting Judge’ Dan Gerin denied the Appellant‘s motion to withdraw [her] plea because under
{¶6} Undеr her first assignment of error, Parish contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her no contest plea, as the trial court failed to inform her of the consequences of pleading no contest. Parish claims that although she did not object to the trial court‘s failure to follow
{¶7} Parish entered а plea of no contest to one count of falsification, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of
{¶8} In State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, the Supreme Court of Ohio was asked to “clarify the trial judge‘s duties under
{¶9} For purposes of the instant appeal, the trial court was required to inform Parish that “[t]he plea of no contest is not an admission of defendаnt‘s guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, information, or complaint, and the plea or admission shall not be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.”
{¶10} Although the trial court failed to comply with
{¶11} In Jones, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted thаt while the trial court failed to comply with
{¶13} Next, this court must determine whether the trial court erred in denying her post-sentence mоtion to withdraw her no contest plea.
{¶14} “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentencе may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”
{¶15} In order for the trial court to grant Parish‘s post-sentence motion, she was required to demonstrate a manifest injustice. Manifest injustice has been defined as a “‘clear or openly unjust act‘” and, further, a manifest injustice has occurred where there is “‘some fundamental flaw in the proceedings which result[s] in a miscarriage of justice оr is inconsistent with the demands of due process.‘” State v. Griffith, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-94, 2010-Ohio-5556, at ¶15, discretionary appeal not allowed by State v. Griffith, 128 Ohio St.3d 1428, 2011-Ohio-1049. (Citations omitted).
{¶17} Parish claims that she will no longer be able to work at the United States Parcel Service (“USPS“) due to her criminal rеcord. In Parish‘s motion to withdraw her plea, she argued that at the time of entering her plea of no contest, she was not aware “that by entering [the] plea and subsequently being found guilty, [that] it would disqualify her from any workers’ compensation awards that she had been litigating for some time.” (Emphasis added.) It is clear, therefore, that Parish understood she was going to be found guilty. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw her plea, Parish‘s counsel informed the trial court that аt the time of submitting the motion, he was under the impression that her workers’ compensation benefits would lapse; however, her workers’ compensation benefits had not been affected by her plea. In fact, Pаrish stated that following her plea, USPS had offered to send her to school for retraining purposes. Therefore, there is no evidence before us that Parish‘s employment or workers’ compensation benefits have been affected by her plea. However, even if her benefits had been affected, this is not something the trial court would have been obligated to review with Parish prior to taking her plea and, therefоre, her failure to comprehend this consequence cannot form the basis for withdrawing her plea.
{¶18} On appeal, Parish now claims for the first time that a manifest injustice occurred when she did not understand the cоnsequences of pleading no contest. Since
{¶19} We therefore fail to find the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Parish‘s motion to withdraw her no contest plea.
{¶20} Parish‘s first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶21} In her second assignment of error, Parish maintains that because the instant offense is a misdemeanor of the first degree for which imprisonment is a possible penаlty, the trial court was required to obtain the unanimous consent of the parties before authorizing a magistrate to decide a post-judgment motion. Parish asserts that at no time during her hearing on the motion to withdraw did the mаgistrate obtain her consent, either verbal or written.
{¶22}
{¶23} “A magistrate is authorized to hear and decide the following motions:
{¶24} “***
{¶25} “(ii) Upon the unanimous consent of the parties in writing or on the record in open court, any рretrial or post-judgment motion in any misdemeanor case for which imprisonment is a possibility.”
{¶26} First, we note that appellant did not raise this argument below. Further, we find
{¶27} Consequently, Parish‘s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶28} Based on the opinion of this court, the judgment of the Warren Municipal Court is hereby affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.