State v. OrozcoState v. Orozco
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Canyon County. Christopher S. Nye, District Judge.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Ben P. McGreevy argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
This case asks us to consider the constitutionality of a statute requiring juvenile offenders to be tried as adults for certain violent offenses, including robbery.
Fifteen-year-old Lucas Orozco was charged with robbery and burglary, both felonies, for allegedly robbing a Caldwell convenience store. After a magistrate court determined there was probable cause to charge Orozco with the felonies, it waived juvenile jurisdiction and bound him over to district court as an adult pursuant to
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 2, 2018, three masked individuals carrying guns1 robbed a Jacksons
After a brief investigation, police conducted a traffic stop of a silver Hyundai Accent driven by a seventeen-year-old male. The officer observed evidence inside the vehicle that matched the employee‘s description of the robbery, and the driver was taken to the Caldwell Police Department for questioning. Eventually, the driver revealed the names of the other two accomplices, one of whom was fifteen-year-old Lucas Orozco. On November 4, 2018, police interviewed Orozco at the Caldwell police station after apprising him of his Miranda2 rights. Orozco confessed to taking part in the robbery and was arrested.
A criminal complaint charged Orozco with one count of robbery in violation of
As part of a conditional plea agreement, Orozco agreed to plead guilty to the burglary charge in exchange for a dismissal of the robbery charge. Additionally, the State agreed to recommend probation and not object to an order withholding judgment, so long as Orozco fully complied with the terms of his pretrial release until the date of sentencing. Conversely, if Orozco did not comply with the terms of his pretrial release, the State would proceed on both the robbery and burglary charges.
At the change of plea hearing, the district court inquired with Orozco‘s counsel regarding the status of the automatic waiver for the burglary charge.3 Counsel for Orozco clarified, “Your Honor, once he‘s been auto waived, he‘s always auto waived. So even though – even though with the dismissal of the robbery [charge], unless the State were to completely dismiss the charge and refile it in juvenile court, it stays here [in adult court].” During the plea hearing, Orozco reserved his right to appeal the district court‘s decision on the constitutionality of
Orozco was sentenced on June 26, 2019. At the hearing, the State acknowledged that Orozco had fully complied with the terms of his pretrial release. The State agreed to dismiss the robbery charge, recommend probation, and not object to a withheld judgment. The district court entered an order withholding judgment and placed Orozco on six years of probation.4 The district court also dismissed
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo.” State v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 689, 390 P.3d 412, 415 (2017) (italics in original). “For constitutional challenges, ‘every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of the statute, and the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statutory provision rests upon the challenger.‘” Zeyen v. Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch. Dist. No. 25, 165 Idaho 690, 694, 451 P.3d 25, 29 (2019) (quoting Osmunson v. State, 135 Idaho 292, 294, 17 P.3d 236, 238 (2000)).
III. ANALYSIS
The State initially charged Orozco with robbery and burglary, both felonies under
So generally... the party challenging the statute on a constitutional ground bears the burden of establishing the statute is unconstitutional. There‘s a presumption of validity in the statutes. The statute in question [has] been addressed in the past in the State [vs.] Jensen—that‘s the Court of Appeals 2016 case—and the Anderson case.7 That‘s an earlier case, 1985. Neither of those cases have been overruled. They‘re still good law. I‘m going to follow the findings in those cases and deny the motion.
On appeal, Orozco initially argues that Idaho‘s automatic waiver statute violates due process because a juvenile has a “liberty interest in the individualized treatment available in juvenile court.”8 Orozco next argues that because he has a liberty interest in being treated as a juvenile,
A. The district court did not err in upholding the constitutionality of Idaho Code section 20-509.
“It is fundamental to our legal system that the State shall not deprive ‘any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.‘” State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 740, 170 P.3d 881, 883 (2007) (citing
As for the first step, a liberty interest may arise “from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). “Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to which an individual will be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss.‘” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)). Regarding the second step, we have held that “[a]t a minimum, procedural due process is satisfied ‘when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.’ Due process is not to be applied rigidly. Rather, due process ‘is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the particular situation.‘” State v. Roth, 166 Idaho 281, 458 P.3d 150, 154 (2020) (quoting Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
Orozco argues that he has a protected liberty interest in his status as a juvenile due to the United States Supreme Court‘s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence recognizing cognitive and developmental characteristics unique to juveniles. Orozco points to several United States Supreme Court cases, including Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), which prescribe heightened constitutional protections for juveniles.
In Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court held that individuals under the age of eighteen at the time of their crime could not be subjected to the death penalty. 543 U.S. at 578. The Court based its decision on the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. In addition to prohibiting the death penalty for juvenile offenders, the Court also noted
three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults [that] demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders. First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young. . . .” The second area of difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. . . . The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.
Id. at 569 (second alteration in original).
In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that juveniles who commit non-homicide crimes cannot be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, once again relying on the Eighth Amendment and the unique characteristics possessed by juveniles. 560 U.S. at 82. In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court expanded its ruling in Graham, holding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for [all] juvenile offenders.” 567 U.S. at 479. Finally, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court applied Miller‘s “substantive rule of constitutional law” retroactively. 136 S.Ct. at 734.
The series of four U.S. Supreme Court cases Orozco cites focus solely on Eighth Amendment sentencing concerns. However, Orozco also points to J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011), to assert that the U.S. Supreme Court has relied on the principles of Roper and its progeny to expand other constitutional protections for juveniles. In J.D.B., the Supreme Court held that the age of a suspect “properly informs the Miranda
Orozco acknowledges that the Idaho Court of Appeals has upheld the constitutionality of
Any juvenile, age fourteen (14) years to age eighteen (18) years, who is alleged to have committed any of the following crimes or any person under age fourteen (14) years who is alleged to have committed any of the following crimes and, pursuant to
section 20-508, Idaho Code , has been ordered by the court to be held for adult criminal proceedings: . . .(b) Robbery; ...
shall be charged, arrested and proceeded against by complaint, indictment or information as an adult. All other felonies or misdemeanors charged in the complaint, indictment or information, which are based on the same act or transaction or on one (1) or more acts or transactions as the violent or controlled substances offense shall similarly be charged, arrested and proceeded against as an adult.
Subject to the prior jurisdiction of the United States, the court shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any juvenile and over any adult who was a juvenile at the time of any act, omission or status, in the county in which the juvenile resides, or in the county in which the act, omission or status allegedly took place, in the following cases:
(5) This chapter shall not apply to the juvenile offenders who are transferred for criminal prosecution as an adult, as provided in this chapter[.]”
Although the United States Supreme Court has never held that there is a protected liberty interest in being treated as a
While the Idaho Court of Appeals has ruled on the constitutionality of Idaho‘s automatic waiver provision, this Court has not yet decided the issue. In both Anderson and Jensen, the defendants unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of
More recently, in Jensen, a juvenile defendant urged the Court of Appeals to reconsider the constitutionality of
Likewise, we find the authority from neighboring jurisdictions that have considered the constitutionality of similar statutory schemes and reached the same conclusion to be persuasive. See, e.g., State v. Angilau, 245 P.3d 745, 750–51 (Utah 2011) (holding that Utah‘s automatic waiver was constitutional and did not create a liberty interest because the defendant “was never entitled to juvenile jurisdiction once he met the criteria in the automatic waiver statute.“); State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830, 834–36 (Wash. 2018) (distinguishing Kent by limiting its applicability to “circumstances where a juvenile court has statutory authority to hear a particular case,” and noting that Washington‘s statutory scheme “precludes our juvenile courts from presiding over a particular class of juveniles[,]” i.e., those charged with an enumerated offense); see also State v. B.T.D., 296 So. 3d 343, 354 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) (holding that “[a]bsent a statutory right to ‘exclusive’ juvenile court jurisdiction, a child does not have any recognized protectable liberty interest in a juvenile adjudication.“); State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 567 (Minn. 1997) (reasoning that “[p]rocedural due process... requires no such hearing for automatic certification because the juvenile court never had jurisdiction over the juvenile.“) (italics in original).
The language of
Likewise, the statutory scheme of the JCA never gave rise to an “expectation” that Orozco could be charged as a minor; by the same token, Orozco did not suffer a “grievous loss” in being charged as an adult.11 See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. Had Orozco committed any crime not enumerated in
possessed no protected liberty interest, the Fourteenth Amendment‘s due process concerns he raises are inapplicable to this case.
We are unpersuaded by Orozco‘s argument that the U.S. Supreme Court‘s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence creates an all-encompassing and protectable liberty interest in one‘s status as a juvenile. Roper, Graham,
Additionally, Orozco‘s reliance on J.D.B. is misplaced in the context of his challenge to
B. By treating Orozco crime as a felony, he was held properly accountable for his egregious acts.
The dissent makes a persuasive case for why Orozco, the youngest of the three juveniles involved in the robbery, is deserving of leniency; however, it goes on to decry the “grievous” consequences he will suffer as a minor having a felony record. More specifically, the dissent suggests that “[a]utomatically stripping Orozco of his status as a juvenile at fifteen years old, without providing him a hearing to determine if he should be waived into adult court, in my opinion, constitutes a ‘grievous loss.‘” See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. We respectfully disagree.
First, the record suggests that the consequences Orozco will suffer are not nearly as grievous as they could have been. It should be remembered that the plea agreement generously allowed Orozco to plead guilty to burglary, not robbery—a crime carrying a maximum punishment of life imprisonment. Nevertheless, the burglary charge was predicated on Orozco entering the store with the intent to commit a felony, and it cannot be disputed that the intended felony was robbery. We acknowledge that Orozco‘s age relative to the co-defendants, lack of a criminal record, and the fact that he was carrying an “air soft gun” were all appropriate factors considered in mitigation at sentencing. Given that the crime of burglary carries a ten-year maximum sentence, the district court clearly recognized these mitigating factors—including Orozco‘s youth—when it imposed a blended sentence pursuant to
While the mitigating factors mentioned here provided a basis for the considerable leniency shown by the district court at sentencing, they simply provide no justification for converting the crime charged from a felony to a juvenile matter by ruling that
In sum, the district court did not err when it denied Orozco‘s motion seeking to declare
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court‘s decision to deny Orozco‘s motion seeking a declaration that
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BURDICK and BRODY CONCUR.
STEGNER, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s conclusion that
At the outset, I note that the Idaho Legislature has set forth its stated purposes for the Juvenile Corrections Act (JCA) in
the primary purpose of this act is to provide a continuum of programs which emphasize the juvenile offender‘s accountability for his actions while assisting him in the development of skills necessary to function effectively and positively in the community in a manner consistent with public safety. These services and programs will individualize treatment and control of the juvenile offender for the benefit of the juvenile offender for the protection of society.
In addition to the individualized treatment and rehabilitative services afforded to juvenile offenders in Idaho, the United States Supreme Court has also explicitly acknowledged the difference in culpability and character between juvenile and adult offenders. In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court set forth three distinct traits attributable to juveniles that sets them apart from adult offenders. 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). First, “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). The second difference noted by the Court was “that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” Id. Finally, the “third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.” Id.
In discussing these differences, the Court found that “it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor‘s character deficiencies will be reformed.” Id. Although Roper stands for the proposition
Following Roper, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded constitutional protections for juveniles. In Graham v. Florida, the Court considered a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender who had not committed a homicide, ultimately finding such a sentence unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The Court explained “this sentence ‘means denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the juvenile], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.‘” Id. at 70 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989) (alteration added)).
Next, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court further developed its holdings in Roper and Graham by concluding that a juvenile convicted of any crime may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). Miller concerned a sentencing scheme which mandated life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders convicted of certain offenses. Id. at 468. The Court criticized the impact of the mandatory sentencing scheme as contravening the basic principles set forth in Roper and Graham: “youth matters.” Id. at 482. The mandatory nature of sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without parole essentially renders a juvenile irredeemable while also subjecting him to a longer sentence than adult offenders who may have committed similar crimes. See id. at 474-75.
Although it is not the province of this Court to second guess legislative decisions regarding statutory enactments, it is the fundamental duty of this Court to interpret the Constitution and the protections it affords individuals. See Nate v. Denney, 166 Idaho 801, 810, 464 P.3d 287, 296 (2017) (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 640, 778 P.2d 757, 762 (1989)) (“[I]t is ‘this Court‘s duty to faithfully interpret our constitution.‘“). In the context of due process, the majority notes that “[a]t a minimum, procedural due process is satisfied ‘when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.‘” State v. Roth, 166 Idaho 281, 285, 458 P.3d 150, 154 (2020) (quoting Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999) (internal citations omitted). The familiar two-step analysis first asks whether a liberty or property interest is implicated; if so, then “the Court ‘determines what process is due.‘” Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 939, 318 P.3d 918, 929 (2014) (quoting Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72–73, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015–16 (2001)).
The United States Supreme Court, as well as this Court, have found liberty interests both in protecting one‘s reputation and avoiding the social stigma resulting from being convicted of a crime. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980). The Court determined that an inmate subject to an involuntary transfer to a mental hospital possessed a liberty interest protected by due process. Id. The Court explained that “the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections.” Id. at 494.
In Smith v. State, this Court held that before an individual may be classified as a “violent sexual predator,” (VSP) he must be afforded procedural due process protections. 146 Idaho 822, 840, 203 P.3d 1221, 1239 (2009). In Smith, the Sexual Offender Classification Board classified Smith as a VSP without affording him the opportunity to be heard prior to the Board‘s determination. Id. at 825, 203 P.3d at 1224. The Court concluded
“Where a person‘s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 510, 27 L.Ed.2d 515, 519 (1971). “[C]ertainly where the State attaches ‘a badge of infamy’ to the citizen, due process comes into play.” Id. [] We take it as a given that the label of “violent sexual predator” is a “badge of infamy” that necessitates due process protections.
Finally, this Court noted that a label which renders someone “dangerous,” “changes his legal status, depriving him of a protected liberty interest in reputation.” Id. at 828, 203 P.3d at 1227 (quoting State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935 (Utah 2008)). These liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court and this Court are analogous to one‘s status as a juvenile because they implicate both an offender‘s reputation and attach “stigmatizing consequences.” See Vitek, 445 U.S. 494. Orozco undoubtedly has a liberty interest in his status as a juvenile, for losing this status creates a lifetime of stigma—a “badge of infamy“—which deprives him of the treatment and rehabilitation services afforded juvenile offenders, and permanently labels him a convicted felon.
The majority also notes that in the first step procedural due process protections hinge on whether “an individual will be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss.‘” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)). Automatically stripping Orozco of his status as a juvenile at fifteen years old, without providing him a hearing to determine if he should be waived into adult court, in my opinion, constitutes a “grievous loss.”
Criminal punishments—and the purposes behind them—differ for adults and juveniles. For example, the Idaho Legislature‘s stated purpose for the JCA is to ensure that juvenile offenders can reintegrate into their communities and become productive members of society; the act offers the juvenile services for rehabilitation and to prevent future crime. See
Classifying Orozco as an adult strips him of his right as a juvenile to rehabilitative treatment and services that would help him reintegrate into his community. See
hollow victory.2 This is in no way to suggest Orozco should be given a free pass for his behavior.
As discussed by the majority, Orozco was just fifteen years old at the time of the robbery, acting at the direction of two older juveniles.3 It should be noted that this was Orozco‘s first brush with the legal system. He was a good student who participated on his high school‘s football and wrestling teams. Without downplaying the severity of committing an armed robbery,4 Orozco should not be faced with being labeled a convicted felon for the rest of his life5 without first being afforded the opportunity to present these mitigating factors to the juvenile court in an effort to be treated as the juvenile he so obviously is. It should also be noted that the charge Orozco pleaded guilty to, burglary in violation of
without so much as a hearing relegates him to a legal system that makes it much more difficult for him to rehabilitate himself. This runs afoul of the United States Supreme Court‘s pronouncement that “youth matters” and that juveniles are inherently more likely to reform their behavior with age. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Graham, 560 U.S. at 91–92; Miller, 567 U.S. at 473.
The majority suggests that this dissent makes a persuasive case for Orozco to be treated with leniency. In this respect, the majority misperceive my point. The purpose of this dissent is not to argue that Orozco should be given leniency, but rather that Orozco should not have been deprived of the process he was due before his case was waived into district court. If a disinterested magistrate had determined that Orozco‘s case should have been waived into district and he should have been treated as an adult, there would be no need for this dissent. However, that is not what happened. Neuroscience demonstrates—and jurisprudence recognizes—that “youth matters.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012). The crux of this realization is that minors should be treated differently than adults. However, Idaho‘s legislative scheme determines that minors charged with certain crimes should be treated as adults irrespective of the facts surrounding their crime. It is in this regard that the Legislature has exceeded its power and overstepped the Constitution, effectively determining that youth does not matter. This is
In order to prevent this “grievous loss,” it is my opinion that the process due Orozco should include a “full investigation and hearing” in front of a disinterested magistrate judge before a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction may occur. See