State v. NealState v. Neal
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Patrick J. Lavelle and Kevin R. Filiatraut, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appеllee.
Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Appellant Christopher Neal appeals the sentences imposed by the trial court in Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-20-653274, CR-21-655903, and
{¶ 2} Appellant entered guilty pleаs to certain charges in the underlying cases on November 21, 2022, and the trial court held a sentencing hearing on January 11, 2023.
{¶ 3} In CR-21-655903, appellant was charged under a six-count indictment. The charges arose from an incident that occurred on or about August 30, 2020, while appellant was in the county jail. Appellant, who had smuggled drugs into the jail by concealing them in his rectum, provided fentanyl to his cellmate, who then died of an overdose. The victim was last seen alive prior to 5:55 p.m., and appellant did not call for help until 3:30 a.m., at which point the victim‘s body was cold. Appellant ultimately pleaded guilty to Count 1 for involuntary manslaughter, a felony of the first degree in violation of
{¶ 5} In CR-22-669330, appellant pleaded guilty to an amended charge of attempted assault of a corrections officer, a misdemeanor of the first degree in violation of
{¶ 6} Appellant timely filed this appeal.
{¶ 7} Under his first assignment of error, appellant challenges the trial court‘s imposition of consecutive sentеnces. Appellant argues that the trial court failed to make all the required statutory findings under
{¶ 8} Pursuant to
{¶ 9} In this matter, appellant asserts that the trial сourt did not find that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to “the danger the offender poses to the public” and that its findings were otherwise incomplete. Our review reflects otherwise.
{¶ 10} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court made the required statutory findings. The trial court found “[c]onsecutive sentences on this case is necessary to protect others from future crime” and noted that “[appellant] knew the Fentanyl was a deadly drug, and he gave it to his inmate, and then he also did not call for help for what looks to be about 10 years.” The trial court also found that “I don‘t believe this is disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct” and noted that “he caused a death.” Though the trial court did not state word for word that it did not find consecutive sentences disproportionate to the danger the offender poses to the public, the trial court had stated that consecutive sentences were “not disproportionate to the crimes that you have committed.” The trial court referenced “the Fentanyl being taken into the jail, which caused the death of [the victim]” and had discussed how appellant kept selling fentanyl despite knowing people were dying from the drug and how appellаnt had fentanyl even after the victim‘s death. The trial court further found that the offense was committed while appellant was under sanction and that appellant “was incarcerated at the time he committed the death.” Also, the trial court found that “the harm caused by both the Fentanyl,
{¶ 11} Upon our review, we can discern from the recоrd that the trial court engaged in the proper analysis and made all the consecutive-sentence findings required by
{¶ 12} Additionally, upon our review of the record, we do not clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the trial court‘s findings. Nevertheless, aрpellant challenges the trial court‘s consideration of the sentencing factors under
{¶ 13} Appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 14} Under the second assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in imposing a mandatory fine of $10,000 because the record establishes that he was indigent and the trial court had discretion to waive the fine. The mandatory fine was imposed in CR-20-653274 upon appellant‘s first-degrеe felony conviction for drug possession in violation of
{¶ 15} A trial court‘s decision with respect to the imposition of a mandatory fine where the offender has an affidavit alleging indigency is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Gipson, 80 Ohio St.3d 626, 635, 687 N.E.2d 750 (1998).
{¶ 16} Our review of the record demonstrates that the trial court was aware appellant filed an affidavit of indigency and that the trial court had reviewed the presentence-investigation report. The PSI report reflects that the appellant was 33 years old at the time and did not have any significant physical health problems. He reported doing seasonal work and odd jobs and stated he had been working for a landscaping company since 2014 and earning $480 weekly. In denying defense counsel‘s request to waive the fine, the trial court stated, “[H]e‘ll have enough time in prison to pay [the fine] through [prison] work” and indicated that “if they do not accept prison employment, [appellant could] file another motion.” The trial court
{¶ 17} Upon the record before us, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the mandatory fine. The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 18} Under the third assignment of error, appellant raises constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law аnd the trial court‘s imposition of an indefinite sentence. We summarily overrule this assignment of error on the authority of State v. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535.
{¶ 19} Judgment affirmed. Case remanded to the trial court solely to issue a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-655903 to correctly refleсt the indefinite term of 10 to 15 years that was imposed on Count 1.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a speсial mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court with instructions.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCURS;
ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY