STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK GIBSON NATONI, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 30,597
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
March 30, 2012
2012-NMCA-062
Certiorari Denied, May 16, 2012, No. 33,593. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY, Lisa C. Schultz, District Judge.
Santa Fe, NM
M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Jacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender
Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
OPINION
CASTILLO, Chief Judge.
{1} The issue before us is whether the district court was correct in imposing the penalty for Defendant‘s offense of driving an off-road vehicle while intoxicated (DWI) under
BACKGROUND
{2} While driving his 2006 Polaris All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV) on a public road at 6:30 a.m., Defendant crashed into a telephone pole. He walked away from the accident and into a nearby house, leaving behind his passenger, who was injured in the collision. A police officer responded to the accident and looked for the driver but found only the injured passenger on the ground. Having information that Defendant was the driver and was in the nearby house, the officer located him there in a bathroom cleaning himself. The officer discovered that Defendant was the driver of the ATV and that he had been drinking since 9:00 p.m. the previous night. The officer asked Defendant to perform field sobriety tests, and Defendant failed them. The officer arrested Defendant and asked him to submit breath samples. Defendant agreed, and his breath samples resulted in blood alcohol level readings of 0.17 and 0.18.
{3} Defendant was charged with six violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, including aggravated DWI. The parties agreed that the ATV constituted an off-highway motor vehicle and that Defendant violated the OHMVA,
DISCUSSION
{4} On appeal, Defendant argues that, because he violated a specific provision of the OHMVA and it contains a comprehensive penalty scheme, he should be sentenced under its catch-all penalty provision. Defendant also argues that because the Legislature did not give clear guidance as to his punishment, we should apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in his favor.
{5} Whether Defendant should have been sentenced under the OHMVA or the DWI statute presents an issue of statutory construction for which our review is de novo. See State v. Tafoya, 2010-NMSC-019, ¶ 9, 148 N.M. 391, 237 P.3d 693 (recognizing that where a
The Penalty Scheme in the OHMVA Does Not Apply to This Case
{6} Defendant argues that the New Mexico Legislature recently created a comprehensive penalty scheme specifically for violations of the provisions of the OHMVA. See
{7} We disagree with this reading of the OHMVA. Subsection E of the penalty provision of the OHMVA clearly excludes those violations that have “caused or contributed to the cause of an accident resulting in injury or death to a person.”
The Penalty for DWI Under the OHMVA Is the Same as for DWI
{8} Defendant‘s next argument is based on a recognition that his offense is not a “penalty assessment misdemeanor” under the OHMVA because his actions caused an injury. He observes that there is no direction in the OHMVA “guiding an appropriate punishment for incidents involving off-highway motor vehicles that result in injury.” Defendant maintains that because the Legislature did not provide for a punishment in such a situation there is an ambiguity, and that this ambiguity requires clarification not from the courts but from the Legislature. Defendant asks us to apply the rule of lenity in his case, resolve the ambiguity in his favor, and direct the district court to reverse his sentence by assigning him a penalty under the OHMVA and not under the DWI statute.
{9} The rule of lenity applies when, despite application of other principles of statutory construction, an “insurmountable ambiguity persists regarding the intended scope of a criminal statute” and legislative intent. State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶¶ 13-14, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. As we have stated, the plain language of
{10} We begin our analysis by applying principles of statutory construction.
{11} Defendant, on the other hand, contends that by prohibiting the operation of an off-highway motor vehicle while intoxicated and using the language “as provided by Section 66-8-102,” the Legislature intended only to guide readers to the DWI statute to provide the applicable definitions of “under the influence” of alcohol or drugs, not to provide penalties.
{12} We agree with the State that Defendant‘s narrow reading of the language “as provided by Section 66-8-102” is not supported by the plain terms of the OHMVA and would lead to a result clearly not intended by the Legislature.
{13} We therefore conclude that our interpretation of the OHMVA, not Defendant‘s, leads to the result intended by the Legislature. See Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 14 (stating that where there is a lack of clarity in a statute, we consider the policy implications of alternative interpretations). A review of recent legislative acts shows that the Legislature has enhanced the penalties for DWI and has created stricter laws related to DWI in various contexts, evincing a profound legislative interest in “protect[ing] the public from the risk of harm posed by intoxicated drivers.” State v. Sims, 2010-NMSC-027, ¶ 29, 148 N.M. 330, 236 P.3d 642 (stating the legislative purpose of the DWI statute) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); compare
{14} We also observe that the Legislature has broadly worded the application of the DWI statute and that nothing therein precludes either its application to the current case or our reading of the OHMVA. See Ogden, 118 N.M. at 243, 880 P.2d at 854 (“Statutes on the same general subject should be construed by reference to each other the theory being that the court can discern legislative intent behind an unclear statute by reference to similar statutes where legislative intent is more clear.” (citation omitted)). By its language,
{15} For these reasons, we are satisfied that the Legislature intended the application of the DWI statute to punish the offense of driving an off-highway motor vehicle while intoxicated.
CONCLUSION
{16} Based on the foregoing, we affirm Defendant‘s sentence.
{17} IT IS SO ORDERED.
CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge
WE CONCUR:
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
APPEAL AND ERROR
Standard of Review
CRIMINAL LAW
Driving While Intoxicated
Motor Vehicle Violations
STATUTES
Interpretation
Legislative Intent
Rules of Construction