STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MAKAYLA MOUSSEAUX, Defendant and Appellee.
#28941-r-JMK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
OPINION FILED 06/17/20
2020 S.D. 35
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA. THE HONORABLE MATTHEW M. BROWN, Judge. CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS NOVEMER 4, 2019.
JASON R. RAVNSBORG, Attorney General
ARMAN ZELJKOVIC, Pennington County Deputy State‘s Attorney, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.
JEFFREY J. FRANSEN of Pennington County Public Defender‘s Office, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellee.
[¶1.] Makayla Mousseaux was charged with possession of methamphetamine in violation of
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] For purposes of this appeal, the following facts are undisputed. In the early morning of May 22, 2017, Rapid City Police Officer Bethany Coats and her training officer, Garrett Loen, were on duty when they received a report from dispatch directing units to 45 Neptune Drive to respond to a possible fight in progress. The dispatch was based on an unidentified 911 caller who reported seeing people at this address, likely in a vehicle, involved in the altercation.
[¶3.] Officers Coats and Loen immediately responded to the scene, arriving in less than five minutes from receipt of the report. Upon arrival, they looked around for signs of a disturbance. Officer Coats observed two women standing next to a vehicle at the address provided by the reporting party. The individuals were not fighting, nor did they appear distressed or injured.
[¶4.] Officer Coats exited her patrol car to investigate further. When she approached the suspects to visit with them, one of the women, later identified as Makayla Mousseaux (Mousseaux), stated that she wanted to put her black duffle bag inside her trailer, which was located directly next to the vehicle. Officer Coats directed Mousseaux to wait outside the trailer while they investigated the reported fight. Mousseaux ignored the instruction and began walking toward the trailer with the bag in hand.
[¶5.] Officer Coats, with the help of Officer Loen, attempted to prevent Mousseaux from entering the trailer by blocking the door. When Mousseaux started to enter the trailer anyway, Officer Coats grabbed her by the arm. After holding Mousseaux back, Officer Coats requested that she provide her name. Mousseaux identified herself
[¶6.] The officers requested that dispatch run a records check. When no records were found under that name, Officer Coats put Mousseaux in handcuffs because she believed that Mousseaux had falsely identified herself. Shortly thereafter, another officer identified that Mousseaux‘s first name was actually Makayla, rather than Lucille, by using a search based on name similarities and a prior booking photo of Mousseaux on file. When dispatch ran the name “Makayla Mousseaux” through the database, they discovered that she had an outstanding, unrelated traffic warrant. Accordingly, Officer Coats placed Mousseaux under arrest.
[¶7.] During the search incident to her arrest, officers found small jeweler‘s bags and a scale inside Mousseaux‘s black bag. Residue on the scale tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. Mousseaux was charged with possession of a controlled substance under
[¶8.] Prior to trial, Mousseaux moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of her interaction with police on the grounds that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her. The State, in its responsive brief, refuted Mousseaux‘s claim, arguing the stop was constitutional. Alternatively, it argued that even if the stop was improper, the discovery of a valid arrest warrant precluded suppression of the evidence pursuant to the “attenuation doctrine,” an exception to the exclusionary rule under the
[¶9.] The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion to suppress the evidence seized, concluding that Officer Coats lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Mousseaux. Despite the State‘s alternative argument and motion for reconsideration asking the court to address this issue, the circuit court did not analyze the applicability of the attenuation doctrine in either its oral holdings or in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Although the State raises two issues for our review, we resolve this appeal solely upon the application of the attenuation doctrine.
Standard of Review
[¶10.] Our standard of review for suppression motions is well established. State v. Haar, 2009 S.D. 79, ¶ 12, 772 N.W.2d 157, 162. When examining a circuit court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress based on an alleged constitutional violation, we review de novo the circuit‘s decision to grant or deny the motion. Id. We review a circuit court‘s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, giving “no deference to its conclusions of law [when] apply[ing] the de novo standard.” State v. Condon, 2007 S.D. 124, ¶ 15, 752 N.W.2d 861, 866.
Analysis and Decision
[¶11.] Although the circuit court concluded that Officer Coats‘s initial contact with Mousseaux did not amount to a
[¶13.] But “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006). Therefore, even in cases where a stop violates the
[¶14.] Of the legal doctrines used to assess the casual link between an officer‘s misconduct and the discovery of evidence, the State has placed only the attenuation doctrine at issue here.1 The attenuation doctrine applies “when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence[.]‘” Strieff, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2061 (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593, 126 S. Ct. at 2164). Because our case law with respect to attenuation is undeveloped, we look first to the United States Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Utah v. Strieff, a case which bears similarities to the one before us. Id.
[¶15.] In that case, an anonymous tip led a narcotics detective to conduct intermittent surveillance outside a particular residence. Id. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2059. After watching the house for almost a week, the detective noticed an unusually high amount of foot traffic coming and going from the residence, leading him to suspect its inhabitants
[¶16.] At one point during the surveillance, the detective watched Edward Strieff leave the house and walk over to a convenience store nearby. He followed Strieff and detained him so that he could learn why he was in the residence. Id. Strieff produced a Utah identification card. Dispatch ran Strieff‘s name, uncovering a valid, preexisting arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Id. The detective placed Strieff under arrest and during the search that followed, found a baggie of methamphetamine in Strieff‘s possession. The State charged Strieff with possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, and Strieff challenged the constitutionality of the stop. Id. At a subsequent hearing, the State conceded that the detective did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff, instead arguing the existence of the warrant saved the evidence from suppression. Id. The trial court ruled in favor of the State. Id. Strieff appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed. Id. The case proceeded to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
[¶17.] In resolving the parties’ competing views of the exclusionary rule, the Court held that when an officer‘s initial stop is the product of a good faith error, the defendant‘s preexisting arrest warrant is “sufficiently attenuated” from the unlawful stop, saving the evidence from exclusion. Id. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2062. As the Supreme Court explained, determining whether the attenuation doctrine applies requires weighing three factors:
First, we look to the temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search. Second, we consider the presence of intervening circumstances. Third, and particularly significant, we examine the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
Id. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Because no single factor controls, we discuss each factor in turn. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261–62, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975).
i. Temporal proximity
[¶18.] Historically, the Supreme Court, in reviewing temporal proximity, has declined to find “attenuation unless substantial time elapses between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained.” Strieff, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2062. In Strieff, mere minutes passed between Strieff‘s detention and the search incident to his arrest, leading the Court to conclude that the “short time interval counsel[ed] in favor of suppression.” Id.
[¶19.] Here, the State concedes that a short time transpired between Mousseaux‘s detention and the evidence the police discovered during the search of her bag. We see no meaningful distinction between the time that elapsed in Strieff and the interval in Mousseaux‘s case. As in Strieff, only a few minutes separated Mousseaux‘s detention and the discovery of the illegal drugs. Therefore, we conclude that the first factor weighs in favor of suppression.
ii. Intervening circumstances
[¶20.] Regarding the second factor, the presence of intervening circumstances, the State argues that the discovery of Mousseaux‘s preexisting warrant weighs against suppression. See United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 495 (8th Cir. 2006). We agree.
[¶21.] As the Supreme Court noted in Strieff, when an officer discovers an
[¶22.] Mousseaux does not attempt to challenge the validity of the warrant discovered by law enforcement. Nor does she argue that our state Constitution provides additional
iii. Flagrancy of police misconduct
[¶23.] Despite the existence of a valid warrant, suppression may nevertheless be warranted if the police engage in “a suspicionless fishing expedition ‘in the hope that something w[ill] turn up.‘” Strieff, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691, 102 S. Ct. 2664, 2667, 73 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1982)). ”Strieff did not announce a per se rule that the discovery of a warrant would always vitiate subsequent searches.” United States v. Lowry, 935 F.3d 638, 644 (8th Cir. 2019). Instead, with regard to the purposefulness/flagrancy factor, we review the circumstances of the stop for evidence of flagrant police misconduct. Id. at 643-44. “The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct is ‘the most important factor because it is directly tied to the purpose of the exclusionary rule—deterring police misconduct.‘” United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1105, 1110 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Simpson, 439 F.3d at 496) (considering misconduct as it related to an arrest rather than with respect to an investigatory detention, as is the case here). In assessing this factor, we consider whether: “(1) the impropriety of the official‘s misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, that his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless; and (2) the misconduct was investigatory in design and purpose and executed ‘in the hope that something might turn up.’” Simpson, 439 F.3d at 496 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S. Ct. at 2262) (emphasis added).
[¶24.] To support her argument on appeal that this factor weighs in favor of suppression, Mousseaux emphasizes the differences between her case and the factual scenario the Supreme Court considered in Strieff. In particular, she highlights that the detective in Strieff staked out the residence for nearly a week before stopping Strieff to ask him about his purpose at the house. Strieff, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2059. In contrast, Officer Coats spent, at most, a few minutes assessing the surroundings before approaching Mousseaux.
[¶25.] Mousseaux, however, fails to account for the reason Officer Coats arrived at the scene. The circuit court specifically found that Officer Coats was responding
[¶26.] Similar to the Court‘s conclusion in Strieff, we consider Officer Coats‘s decision to pursue Mousseaux and detain her at the trailer door as “at most negligent.” Strieff, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2063. “For the violation to be flagrant, more severe police misconduct is required than the mere absence of proper cause for the seizure.” Id. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2064. Because this record lacks any evidence that Officer Coats engaged in a “suspicionless fishing expedition,” this factor weighs in favor of the State. See id.
[¶27.] In reviewing the attenuation factors in their totality, we conclude they weigh in favor of the State. The circuit court erred when it refused to consider the application of the attenuation doctrine and suppressed evidence obtained as a result of Mousseaux‘s arrest. Because the connection between Mousseaux‘s detention and the subsequent search incident to her arrest was interrupted by the existence of a valid, preexisting warrant unrelated to this case, “the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has [allegedly] been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence[.]” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593, 126 S. Ct. at 2164. We reverse.
[¶28.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and JENSEN, SALTER, and DEVANEY, Justices, concur.