STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ROLAND A. MOTE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 10-15-05
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MERCER COUNTY
September 14, 2015
[Cite as State v. Mote, 2015-Ohio-3715.]
Appeal from Mercer County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 14-CRM-002 Judgment Affirmed
Joseph A. Benavidez for Appellant
Matthew K. Fox and Joshua A. Muhlenkamp for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Roland A. Mote (“Mote“), appeals the February 4, 2015 judgment entry of sentence of the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On January 23, 2014, the Mercer County Grand Jury indicted Mote on six counts in case No. 14-CRM-002: Count One of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of
{¶3} On January 29, 2014, Mote appeared for arraignment and entered pleas of not guilty. (Doc. No. 22).
{¶4} On March 4, 2014, Mote filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 28). Mote filed a memorandum in support of his motion to suppress on March 7, 2014. (Doc. No. 31). In support of his motion to suppress, Mote argued, in part, that he was unlawfully detained and arrested on January 4, 2014 following a traffic stop of a vehicle of which Mote was a passenger and that any evidence seized as part of his arrest should be excluded. (Id.); (May 1, 2014 Tr. at 6). On
{¶5} After a hearing on May 1, 2014, the trial court overruled Mote‘s motion to suppress on June 17, 2014. (Doc. No. 126).
{¶6} A jury trial was held on January 27-30, 2015. (Jan. 27, 2015 Tr. at 1). The jury found Mote guilty of Counts One, Four, Five, and Six. (Doc. Nos. 212, 216, 217, 218, 219). On February 3, 2015, the State filed a motion to dismiss Counts Two and Three of the indictment, which the trial court approved. (Doc. No. 223). On February 3, 2015, the trial court sentenced Mote to seven years in prison as to Count One, 12 months in prison as to Count Four, 12 months in prison as to Count Five, and 12 months in prison as to Count Six and ordered that Mote serve the terms consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 10 years. (Doc. No. 225). The trial court filed its sentencing entry on February 4, 2015. (Id.).
{¶7} Mote filed his notice of appeal on February 9, 2015. (Doc. No. 236). He raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Court Erred in Dismissing Appellant‘s Motion to Suppress.
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Mote argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, Mote argues that he was unlawfully detained because he did “not reasonably believe he could end the
{¶9} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, deference is given to the trial court‘s findings of fact so long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court‘s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo; therefore, we must decide whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶10} At the May 1, 2014 suppression hearing, Chief Thomas Wale2 (“Chief Wale“) of the Celina Police Department testified that he conducted a traffic stop on January 4, 2014 of a vehicle of which Mote was a passenger. (May
{¶11} Chief Wale confirmed on cross-examination that he had not yet issued the traffic citation to Miller before Patrolman Harting and the K-9 arrived at the scene. (Id. at 31-32, 33).
{¶13} As part of Mote‘s defense, Miller testified on Mote‘s behalf. (Id. at 87). Miller testified that Patrolman Harting and the K-9 had not yet arrived at the scene when he was issued the traffic citation by Chief Wale and that Chief Wale
{¶14} The
{¶15} “At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the
{¶16} “‘A traffic stop constitutes a seizure and implicates the protections of the
{¶17} “In addition, a lawfully detained vehicle may be subjected to a canine sniff of the vehicle‘s exterior even without the presence of a reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity.” Id. at ¶ 22, citing State v. Rusnak, 120 Ohio App.3d 24, 28 (6th Dist.1997). “Both Ohio courts and the Supreme Court of the United States have determined that ‘the exterior sniff by a trained narcotics dog to detect the odor of drugs is not a search within the meaning of the
{¶18} “‘The well-established automobile exception allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence that is subject to seizure, and exigent circumstances necessitate a search or seizure.” Id., quoting State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 367 (1992), citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). “‘The mobility of automobiles often creates exigent circumstances, and is the traditional justification for this exception to the
{¶19} Mote does not contest the legality of the traffic stop. As such, we will not address it in this opinion. Instead, although it is unclear from his brief, it appears that Mote is challenging only the duration of the traffic stop and the search of Miller‘s vehicle and argues that he did not voluntarily consent to any search. Accordingly, we will address only those issues.
{¶20} The trial court‘s factual findings regarding the duration of the traffic stop, that the traffic stop was not yet completed at the time of the dog sniff, and that the K-9 alerted to the odor of illegal substances in the vehicle, are supported by competent credible evidence. Those facts support that the law enforcement officers had probable cause to search Miller‘s vehicle.
{¶21} Mote was not detained longer than the original purpose of the traffic stop. Chief Wale stopped Miller for committing a traffic violation at 1:25:56 a.m. and the narcotics K-9 arrived at the scene at 1:29:58 a.m. (May 1, 2014 Tr. at 27). According to Chief Wale, Patrolman Harting walked the K-9 up to Miller‘s vehicle at the time Patrolman Harting and the K-9 arrived at the scene, while Chief Wale was writing the traffic citation. (Id. at 14). Patrolman Harting‘s testimony corroborated that Chief Wale was writing Miller‘s traffic citation when he arrived at the scene and walked his K-9 around Miller‘s car. (Id. at 43). That Miller
{¶22} Therefore, we conclude that the law enforcement officers had probable cause to search Miller‘s vehicle. Patrolman Harting testified that his K-9 alerted to the presence or scent of illegal substances in the vehicle. (May 1, 2014 Tr. at 14). Because the K-9 altered to the odor of drugs from a lawfully detained vehicle, the law enforcement officers had probable cause to search Miller‘s vehicle for contraband. Cahill, 2002-Ohio-4459, at ¶ 22. As such, also meritless is Mote‘s argument regarding whether he voluntarily consented to the search. See State v. Payne, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA98-12-244, 1999 WL 441776, *2 (June 1, 1999) (“Because we find that probable cause for the search was established, the consent determination is not dispositive.“). See also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 (concluding that a valid consent to a search obviates the need for a warrant or probable cause to conduct a search); State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1989) (recognizing the six exceptions to a search warrant as “(a) A search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine;
{¶23} Therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling Mote‘s motion to suppress evidence.
{¶24} Mote‘s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
/jlr