State v. MorganState v. Morgan
Opinion Number:
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender
MJ Edge, Assistant Public Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Petitioner
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Charles J. Gutierrez, Senior Solicitor General
for Respondent
VIGIL, Justice.
{1} This case requires us to determine whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant James Morgan. The district court ruled that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and ordered suppression of the evidence of Defendant‘s crimes committed “subsequеnt to the unlawful seizure.” The Court of Appeals “decline[d] to address whether the [officer] had reasonable suspicion” and then held, under the new crime exception, that evidence of Defendant‘s subsequent crimes was admissible. State v. Morgan, 2024-NMCA-057, ¶¶ 1, 6, 553 P.3d 501. We vacate the Court of Appeals opinion and hold that the officer had reasonable suspicion Defendаnt had committed or was committing a crime. Therefore, it is not necessary to address the parties’ arguments regarding the new crime exception.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
{2} Around midnight on July 19, 2020, dispatch called out Sergeant Carlos Railey of the Rio Rancho Police Department to a reported fight at Pine Court, a small cul-de-sac in Rio Rancho, New Mexico. As he drove to Pine Court, dispatch notified him that the caller said the fighting had stopped. The caller also reported that there had been a party going on all day at the house at the end of the cul-de-sac and that
{3} When Sergeant Railey reached Pine Court, he parked his marked patrol car around the corner from the cul-de-sac. He did not use his lights or sirens. He testified, “As I exited my vehicle I hear a loud argument between what appears to be a male and female; the male voice is noticeably louder and I could hear it from my location, which is around the corner.” When Sergeant Railey came around the corner he saw four people in the cul-de-sac, later identified as Defendant, Jennifer Morgan, Defendant‘s friend Jose Gurrola, and a fourth individual who was never identified. Sergeant Railey testified there was sufficient light to clearly see Defendant from some distance. Sergeant Railey was concerned because “there was a male yelling very loudly at a female; there was a friend near him that appeared to be kind of holding on to him. I wasn‘t sure if he was trying to restrain this male or not, but my concern was that there was a domestic dispute going on and that may have resulted
{4} Sergeant Railey approached the group without announcing that he was a police officer because he wanted to hear what the argument was abоut. He was wearing a black Covid mask and his navy police uniform with a metallic badge of office, metallic gold name plate, blue and yellow shoulder patch, and yellow shoulder stripes. As Sergeant Railey approached the group, he made eye contact with Gurrola who said, “Hey can I help you?” Sergeant Railey replied, “yeah.” Dеfendant said to Sergeant Railey, “I‘ll leave, I‘ll leave, I‘ll leave,” but Sergeant Railey told him, “Hang out, sit on the ground.” Gurrola pulled Defendant away from Sergeant Railey, then both turned and ran. Sergeant Railey testified he chased after them, yelled “stop” multiple times, and then grabbed Defendant by the right wrist. When Sergeant Railey grabbed Defendant, Defendant fell. Sergeant Railey lost hold of
{5} While being taken to the ground, Sergeant Railey yelled “police” or “police department” multiple times and managed to radio for back-up. Gurrola sat on Sergeant Railey‘s chest and held down the Sergeant‘s right arm to prevent him from reaching his sidearm. Defendant in turn held down Sergeant Railey‘s left arm. Sergeant Railey testified that Jennifer Morgan ripped Sergeant Railey‘s badge from his uniform, grabbed his radio from his hand, and yelled “you better hope your backup comes.” Defendant and Gurrola held down Sergeant Railey for about a minute and a half until backup arrived and Defendant was arrested.
B. Procedural History
{6} Defendant was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated battery upon a peace officer, false imprisonment, criminal damage to property (over $1000), and criminal damage to property (under $1000). Jose Gurrola and Jennifer Morgan were also charged with the same four crimes. In district court, Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence of crimes committed after Sergeant Railey seized Defendant by grabbing his wrist. Defendant argued that Sergeant Railey lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him because “Sergeant Railey did not identify himself, was wearing a dark uniform and a mask, did not ask any questions or undertake any
{7} After hearing Sergeant Railey‘s testimony and argument from the parties, the district court orally found there was no reasonable suspiсion because the street was dark and Sergeant Railey did not announce himself. The district court‘s written order granting Defendant‘s motion to suppress states that (1) Sergeant Railey did not have reasonable suspicion, (2) Defendant was unlawfully seized, and (3) “all evidence subsequent to the unlawful seizure is suppressed.” In accordance, after granting the motion tо suppress, the district court then dismissed the case.
{8} The State appealed. In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court. Morgan, 2024-NMCA-057, ¶ 24. The majority reasoned that under the new crime exception, Sergeant Railey‘s identification as law enforcement was an intervening circumstance which sufficiently attenuated the sеizure of Defendant
{9} We granted certiorari to determine whether the new crime exception applies in this case.
II. DISCUSSION
{10} As a preliminary matter, we address the Court of Appeals decision to reach analysis of the new crimes exception without determining the existence of reasonable suspicion, stating “in this case, the result is the same.” Morgan, 2024-NMCA-057, ¶ 6. This decision was error.
{11} At the outset of its discussion, the Court of Appeals correctly framed the issues as, first, whether Sergeant Railey had reasonable suspicion regarding Defendant and, second, “if the sergeant lacked reasonable suspicion, whether Defendant‘s actions following the seizure amounted to ‘new сrimes.‘” Id. Under this framing, it necessarily follows that the new crime exception would only apply in the absence of
A. Standard of Review
{12} A suppression ruling presents a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 9, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032. We first review factual determinations for substantial evidence, “viewing the facts in the manner most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. We then rеview questions of reasonable suspicion “de novo by looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detention was justified.” State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 5, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “All reasonable inferences in support of the district court‘s decision will be indulged in,
B. Investigatory Stop
{13} Defendant claims that under the
{14} The
{15} Evidence “obtained in a manner that runs afoul of the
{16} The district court excluded evidence of Defendant‘s crimes subsequent to his seizure because it believed, based on the fact that the cul-de-sac was dark and Sergeant Railey did not announce himself, that Sergeant Railey lacked reasonable suspicion. However, this was legal error. Under the law, to have reasonable suspicion an officer must be “aware of specific articulable facts” which would
{17} Defendant provides a number of arguments as to why Sergeant Railey did not have reasonable suspicion. He asserts that Sergeant Railey‘s testimony was contradictory; the district court did not believe the Sergeant‘s testimony; Sergeant Railey did not witness a crime or was mistaken as to law or fact; and Sergeant Railey was not aware of enough specific articulable facts to justify his detention of Dеfendant.
{18} We reject Defendant‘s arguments. Sergeant Railey consistently testified during direct and cross-examination that based on information from dispatch and his own observations, he believed he had reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed an assault or was exhibiting disorderly conduct and violating the unreasonable noise municipal ordinance. His uncontradicted testimony was that dispatch reported a fight took place in the small cul-de-sac, and that someone was
{19} Accordingly, we hold that Sergeant Railey had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop. See State v. Wing, 2022-NMCA-016, ¶ 15, 505 P.3d 905 (holding that the defendant‘s рroximity to the area known for certain crimes, late at night, in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances, provided the officer with reasonable suspicion).
C. Seizure of the Defendant
{20} Defendant argues his seizure was unreasonable in violation of the
{21} In this case, when Sergeant Railey approached Defendant and Gurrola he told them to stay and “hang out.” Instead, they turned and ran. Thus, they were not seized when the Sergeant first tried to detain them using his words because they did not submit to the Sergeant Railey‘s authority. See id. Not until Sergeant Railey grabbed Defendant‘s wrist was Defendant seized for purposes of the
{22} When Sergeant Railey seized Defendant by grabbing Defendant‘s wrist, he had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant. He was aware of facts reported in the assault and noise complaint which, when combined with his observations of a verbal fight, disorderly conduct, and unreasonable noise, gave him reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed or had been committed. When Sergeant Railey аpproached Defendant, Defendant fled, furthering the Sergeant‘s reasonable suspicion. See Harbison, 2007-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 16-20 (holding that flight may be considered in determining reasonable suspicion where the officer did not unlawfully provoke the flight and following Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (applying the
III. CONCLUSION
{23} We hold that Sergeant Railey had reasonable suspicion when he seized Defendant and that Defendant‘s motion to suppress should be denied; consequently, we do not address the parties’ arguments regarding the new crime exception. We therefоre vacate the Courts of Appeals opinion and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice
WE CONCUR:
JULIE J. VARGAS, Chief Justice
C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice