STATE OF OHIO v. KARRINGTON MOORE
C.A. CASE NO. 2013 CA 97
T.C. NO. 11CR85
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR CLARK COUNTY, OHIO
October 3, 2014
[Cite as State v. Moore, 2014-Ohio-4411.]
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JILL E. BEELER, Atty. Reg. No. 0069459, Assistant State Public Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
O P I N I O N
FROELICH, P.J.
{¶ 1} Karrington Moore appeals from a judgment of the Clark County Court of
I.
{¶ 2} On January 18, 2011, Moore, age 17, was charged in juvenile court with one count of burglary, in violation of
{¶ 3} On February 11, 2011, a bill of information was filed in the common pleas court against Moore for burglary. Three days later, Moore waived prosecution by indictment and pled guilty to burglary, a third-degree felony. On March 1, 2011, the trial court sentenced Moore to three years in prison. Moore did not timely appeal his conviction.
{¶ 4} On June 18, 2012, Moore filed a notice of appeal and a motion for delayed appeal from the March 1, 2011 judgment. The notice of appeal indicated that Moore had filed the notice because the issue of whether a juvenile can waive an amenability hearing in a juvenile bindover proceeding was pending before the Ohio Supreme Court. We denied
{¶ 5} On August 23, 2013, Moore filed in the trial court a “motion to file exhibits and transcript under seal” to support his “motion to vacate void judgment,” which was subsequently filed on September 13, 2013. The motion to vacate contended that Moore did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive the amenability hearing and, therefore, there was no proper transfer of jurisdiction from the juvenile court to the common pleas court. Moore argued that the trial court had inherent authority to vacate the void judgment of conviction. The motion to file exhibits and transcripts under seal concerned several juvenile court documents, including the transcript of the bindover hearing.
{¶ 6} The State opposed the motions, asserting that Moore‘s motion to vacate void judgment should be construed as a petition for post-conviction relief and that the petition was untimely. The State argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the untimely petition and that the doctrine of res judicata prohibited Moore from raising any issue that he could have raised on direct appeal.
{¶ 7} The trial court denied Moore‘s motions, reasoning:
The motion to vacate the judgment is not timely filed. There is no statutory provision under the facts of this case which would grant this Court jurisdiction to entertain the motion subsequent to the filing deadline specified in the statute. Further, this case has been argued before the Second District
Appellate Court wherein the defendant‘s conviction was affirmed. These issues could have been raised at that time. Therefore, the matter is res judicata. Since the motion to vacate the judgment is not properly before the Court, there is no basis for the motion to file exhibits and transcript under seal.
{¶ 8} Moore appeals from the trial court‘s judgment.
II.
{¶ 9} Moore‘s sole assignment of error states: “The Clark County Court of Common Pleas erred when it determined that it was without jurisdiction to rule on Karrington Moore‘s Motion to Vacate Void Judgment * * *.”
{¶ 10} The trial court treated Moore‘s motion to vacate void judgment as a petition for post-conviction relief. Petitions for post-conviction relief are governed by
{¶ 12} Moore argues that he did not need to comply with the time limitations in
{¶ 13} “Courts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12. A motion to vacate is properly characterized as a petition for post-conviction relief when it is filed subsequent to a direct
{¶ 14} The subject matter jurisdiction of Ohio courts of common pleas is defined by statute, pursuant to Section 4, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Neguse, 71 Ohio App.3d 596, 599, 594 N.E.2d 1116 (10th Dist.1991).
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that, “[a]bsent a proper bindover procedure pursuant to
{¶ 17} The trial court record contains the juvenile court‘s February 9, 2011 order relinquishing jurisdiction and ordering Moore‘s case to be transferred to the court of common pleas. In that order, the juvenile court found that there was probable cause to believe that Moore committed the delinquent act of burglary as alleged in the complaint, that Moore was 17 years old at the time he committed the offense, and that he, “with the advice and consent of counsel, further waived the bindover/amenability hearing and requested that he be transferred to the general division of this court for prosecution as an adult.” An amenability hearing may be waived. In re D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, syllabus. Accordingly, on its face, the juvenile court‘s order reflects that the
{¶ 18} Moore claims that he did not properly waive his amenability hearing, because his waiver was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Moore argues that this flaw in his bindover procedure rendered the transfer to the common pleas court erroneous and deprived the common pleas court of subject matter jurisdiction.
{¶ 19} The safeguard of an amenability hearing is “grounded in due process and other constitutional protections.” In re D.W. at ¶ 20. “Juv.R. 3 states that although a juvenile may not waive his right to be represented by counsel at a Juv.R. 30 hearing, ‘[o]ther rights of a child may be waived with permission of the court.‘” Id. at ¶ 23. The right to an amenability hearing is one of those waivable rights. In re D.W. at syllabus.
{¶ 20} Moore does not claim that the juvenile court failed to afford him the opportunity to avail himself of the protections of a bindover procedure. Compare In re D.W. at ¶ 48 (juvenile court failed to conduct an amenability hearing before transferring juvenile to common pleas court, based upon the mistaken belief that a prior bindover of the juvenile negated the need for an amenability hearing, and never asked the juvenile whether he was waiving the hearing); Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196 (juvenile charged and convicted in common pleas court on mistaken belief that he was an adult when offenses committed; no bindover proceeding was provided). Rather, he claims that his waiver of the bindover procedure was defective. In our view, Moore‘s claim that the juvenile court did not properly obtain a waiver of his amenability hearing raises a constitutional challenge to
{¶ 21} Because Moore has, in essence, raised a constitutional challenge to the juvenile court‘s bindover procedure, Moore‘s argument falls within the scope of the post-conviction relief statute and the requirements contained therein.
{¶ 22} It is undisputed that Moore‘s motion, if construed as a petition for post-conviction relief, was untimely. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Moore‘s motion to vacate a void judgment. Moreover, if he is alleging a statutory violation (as D.W. did), the trial court also did not err in concluding that his argument is barred by res judicata, because Moore could have raised the alleged deficiency in the bindover proceeding on direct appeal. Finally, because the trial court could not consider Moore‘s petition for post-conviction relief, it reasonably denied Moore‘s motion to file exhibits and transcript under seal.
{¶ 23} Moore‘s assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶ 24} The trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed.
DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Ryan A. Saunders
Jill E. Beeler
Hon. Richard J. O‘Neill