634 A.2d 305 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1993
The principal issues in this proceeding, in which the state claims that the defendant violated the terms of her probation, are whether the sentencing judge imposed treatment for alcohol abuse as a condition of the defendant's probation and, if not, whether the defendant's probation officer could and did do so. This court concludes that (1) no condition of probation was imposed by the sentencing judge, (2) the condition *575
of alcohol abuse evaluation and treatment was imposed by the defendant's probation officer, (3) such a condition constitutes medical treatment within the ambit of General Statutes §
The certified transcript of the proceedings before the court reflects that the state recommended a sentence of three months imprisonment for threatening and one *576 year imprisonment for reckless endangerment, to run concurrently, and that the sentences be suspended. The state also recommended, as a condition of probation, "[a]lcohol screening [and] treatment as deemed necessary, by [the office of adult] probation." The defendant's attorney asked the court "to accept the recommendation," adding that "the suspended sentence is a fair disposition to her."
The state claims that the defendant violated the terms of her probation by refusing treatment for alcohol abuse.
The docket sheet is not a judgment file. "There is a distinction between the judgment of the court, such notations as in the present case appear . . . in the docket of the court, and the judgment-file. The judgment is the determination or sentence of the law speaking through the court, pronounced or made known in some appropriate way, orally or in writing or partly in each. The notations . . . in the docket are the entries made when a judgment is rendered in order to *577
preserve accurately and put upon immediate public record the acts of the court. The judgment-file consists of the writing out of the judgment for record, giving a history of the various steps in the action leading up to it, and it is prepared and signed at a time subsequent to the rendition of the judgment. Bulkeley's Appeal,
While there is not time within which a judgment file must be prepared: State v. Lindsay, supra, 243; it does not appear that the state ever caused or requested such a document to be prepared as it could have done. *578
Practice Book § 944.4 A judgment file was not offered in evidence, and the court takes judicial notice that no such document is in the court's file. See State v. Lenihan,
The docket sheet and docket entries are admissible evidence of the judgment rendered. Buckley v. Spirt, supra, 733-34; Smith v. Brockett,
"The final judgment in a criminal case ordinarily is the imposition of sentence." State v. Herring,
Since the docket sheet and the transcript are deemed prima facie correct, and since those two documents are conflicting, the court must make a principled choice between them. "Sentences in criminal cases should reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious misapprehensions by those who must execute them." United States v. Daugherty,
This is not a case where there is an ambiguity between the oral pronouncement of the sentence and the docket papers. In such a circumstance it may be proper to look to the clerk's writing and the entire record to resolve the ambiguity. See United States v. Moyles,
ADDENDUM TO PART II
The state cites Skidmore v. Glenn,
The facts pertinent to this issue may be briefly stated. Later on the same day on which she was sentenced by the court, the defendant met with a probation officer. Both the defendant and the probation officer signed a document entitled "Conditions of Probation" which provided in pertinent part:
"NOTICE TO DEFENDANT
"In accordance with the authority conferred by the State of Connecticut and in keeping with the requirements of the Connecticut General Statutes you, as of the above date, have been placed on probation by the Superior Court for the period specified above.
"You are hereby advised that the court may at any time during the period of probation, modify or enlarge the conditions of your probation, any may extend the period of probation, as authorized by the General Statutes. The court may also issue a warrant for your arrest, revoke your probation and require you to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence for a violation of any of the conditions of your probation.
"DURING THE PERIOD OF PROBATION YOU SHALL ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
"1. Do not violate any criminal law of the United States, this state or any other state. *585
"2. Report as a Probation Officer directs and permit the officer to visit you as circumstances require.
"3. Keep the officer informed of your whereabouts and give immediate notice of any change in address or employment.
"4. Do not leave the State of Connecticut without permission.
"5. Agree to waive extradition from any state or territory.
"6. Court Ordered-Special Conditions:
"Alcohol evaluation and treatment as deemed necessary.
"I have read and the officer has reviewed the conditions of probation with me. I understand them and I shall abide by them."
On March 26, 1991, when the defendant met with the probation officer to whom her case had been assigned, she again signed the "Conditions of Probation" document, as did that officer. The probation officers imposed the condition of "alcohol evaluation and treatment as deemed necessary" because they mistakenly believed that such a condition had been imposed by the sentencing judge. Their motivation in imposing the condition, however, is irrelevant. Cf. Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
Preliminarily, this court holds that only the defendant's claim that she is being denied notice and procedural *587
due process is properly before the court. Practice Book § 877 provides: "In trials to the court, if counsel intends to raise any question of law which may be the subject of an appeal, he must state that question distinctly to the judicial authority on the record before his argument is closed and within sufficient time to give the opposing counsel an opportunity to discuss the question, and he must request the judicial authority to take note of the question. If he fails to do this, the judicial authority will be under no obligation to decide the question." "Argument" may be either oral or written. Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.). Briefs certainly are a form of legal argument. Id.; W. Maltbie, Connecticut Appellate Procedure (2d Ed. 1957) § 327 and pp. 463, 482-90. When briefs are submitted in a trial to the court, the trial is not completed and argument is not closed until such briefs are timely filed. Frank v. Streeter,
With respect to the defendant's claim that she has been denied procedural due process by the state's reliance on §
"The pleadings of a motion to revoke probation need not meet the requirements of an indictment. It is enough that the pleadings give the defendant fair notice of the allegations against him so that he may prepare a defense." Mueller v. State,
Here, however, there is no claim of lack of specificity. Rather, the defendant claims that her probation may not be revoked where the arrest warrant asserts that the condition that she allegedly violated was imposed by the sentencing judge and the evidence is that the condition was imposed by her probation officer. No case on point, from any jurisdiction, has been cited by counsel or located by this court. Because a proceeding; State v. Wright, supra; and because in such a proceeding the defendant is entitled to only minimum procedural safeguards, this court holds that the state's *590
misidentification of the authority imposing the condition of probation is not a denial of the defendant's right to due process. Cf In re Steven G.,
Moreover, while this is not a criminal proceeding in which the defendant is entitled to all of the exacting requirements of criminal procedural due process; State v. Durkin, supra; State v. Baxter, supra; our Appellate Court has stated in just such a context: "In order for a defendant who is convicted on the basis of an imprecise information to prevail on appeal, he must establish `a clear and specific showing of prejudice to the defense. . . .' State v. Hauck, [
Accordingly, the defendant's claim that she is denied procedural due process by the state's reliance on the authority conferred by General Statutes §
Citing the rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed in favor of the defendant, the defendant claims that the procedural requirements of subsection (c) of General Statutes §
Finally, it is noteworthy that the comment to §
"When a statutory classification impinges upon an inherently suspect class or affects a fundamental personal right, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny and is justified only by a compelling state interest." Keogh v. Bridgeport,
The General Assembly may well have concluded that a probationer's probation officer would be more familiar *597
with the circumstances of an individual probationer, owing to an ongoing professional relationship between the probation officer and the probationer. General Statutes §
This court concludes that the condition that the defendant undergo "alcohol treatment," which the court construes to be treatment for alcohol abuse, constitutes "medical treatment" within the ambit of General Statutes §