State v. MillerState v. Miller
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-521701
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 16, 2010
Thomas A. Rein Leader Building, Suite 940 526 Superior Avenue Cleveland, OH 44114
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason Cuyahoga County Prosecutor BY: Steven N. Szelagiewicz Lisa Reitz Williamson Assistant County Prosecutors The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor Cleveland, OH 44113
MELODY J. STEWART, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael Miller, appeals from a judgment of conviction that found him guilty of harassment by an inmate for spitting on a correctional officer at the Cuyahoga Hills Juvenile Correctional Facility. He complains that the court’s guilty finding was supported by neither the sufficiency nor the weight of the evidence, and that the indictment was defective because it failed to state the culpable mental element.
I
{¶ 2} Because it is potentially dispositive, we first consider Miller’s third assignment — that the indictment returned by the grand jury failed to
{¶ 3}
{¶ 4} The statute requires an “intent” to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm. In the context of culpable mental states, “intent” and “purpose” are synonymous. See White v. Maxwell (1962), 174 Ohio St. 186, 188, 187 N.E.2d 878. Miller’s indictment tracked the language of
{¶ 5} The first and second assignments of error raise issues relating to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.
A
{¶ 6} When reviewing a claim that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 7} As earlier stated, the offense of harassment by an inmate requires the state to prove: (1) a person confined in a detention facility; (2) who caused or attempted to cause another person to come into contact with blood, semen, urine, feces, or another bodily substance; (3) by throwing the bodily substance at the other person; or (4) in any other manner; (5) with intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm the other person.
{¶ 8} The evidence, viewed most favorably to the state, shows that the victim was a correctional officer at a youth detention facility in which Miller had been confined. Miller had been out of compliance with the facility’s shower routine, so the victim wrote a “youth behavioral incident report” to document Miller’s noncompliance. The victim asked Miller to sign the
{¶ 9} This evidence, in reference to the elements of
B
{¶ 10} Miller argues that his conviction for harassment by an inmate is against the manifest weight of the evidence because there were no witnesses to corroborate the victim’s testimony.
{¶ 11} When considering whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence in a trial to the court, we will not reverse a conviction
{¶ 12} Miller’s argument on the absence of corroborating evidence is misplaced. While it is true that no other witness saw Miller spit on the victim, another correctional officer saw Miller and the victim “engaged in a verbal confrontation” and learned from the victim that Miller spat on the victim and said he would “do it again.” The victim’s reaction from being spat on was such that the correctional officer had to remove the victim from the unit. A state trooper called in to investigate the incident interviewed Miller. Miller told the trooper that he had been wrongly disciplined by the victim
{¶ 13} In State v. Lundy, 8th Dist. No. 90229, 2008-Ohio-3359, we considered a similar claim that a conviction for harassment by an inmate was against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was no corroborating physical evidence that the victims had been spat on — the two police officer victims had cleaned the saliva. We stated that the absence of physical evidence showing that Lundy spat on the officers did not lead to the conclusion that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, finding that “[p]hysical evidence merely would have bolstered the direct testimony of the state’s witnesses.” Id. at ¶ 12 (citation omitted).
{¶ 14} The court could rationally have concluded that the state’s evidence convincingly established that Miller not only spat on the victim, but that he threatened to do so again. The victim’s immediate and forceful reaction to the event was confirmed not only by the state’s witnesses, but by Miller himself. By stating to the state trooper that some of his saliva landed on the victim, Miller essentially corroborated the victim’s testimony that he had been spat on. The court was free to infer Miller’s intent to spit from the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the incident report.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J., and CHRISTINE T. McMONAGLE, J., CONCUR