State v. MiddletonState v. Middleton
Scott N. Blauvelt, 246 High Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
RINGLAND, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Brenda J. Middleton, appeals from her conviction in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for one count of rape and one count of gross sexual imposition. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶2} Appellant and her husband, William M. Bayless Jr., were each indicted by the Butler County Grand Jury for four counts of rape in violation of
{¶3} Appellant now appeals from her conviction, raising one assignment of error for review.
{¶4} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF [APPELLANT] WHEN IT ACCEPTED A GUILTY PLEA THAT WAS NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY.”
{¶5} In her sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by accepting her guilty plea for it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. We disagree.
{¶6} A criminal defendant‘s choice to enter a guilty plea is a serious decision because, by agreeing to plead guilty, the defendant is giving up several constitutional rights. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶25; State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107; Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709. In turn, because the “exchange of certainty for some of the most fundamental protections in the criminal justice system will not be permitted unless the defendant is fully informed of the consequences of his or her plea,” when a defendant enters a guilty plea in a criminal case, the plea must be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. State v. Eberle, Clermont App. No. CA2009-10-065, 2009-Ohio-6163, ¶6, quoting Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748 at ¶26; State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179. The failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. State v. Douglass, Butler App. Nos. CA2008-07-168, CA2008-08-199, 2009-Ohio-3826, ¶9.
{¶7} Initially, appellant argues that the trial court erred by accepting her guilty plea because “she did not understand that her plea constituted a complete admission of guilt to rape, as amended.” In support of this argument, appellant claims that because she, “through counsel, expressly denied the use or threat of force,” an essential element to rape in violation of
{¶8} Pursuant to
{¶9} In this case, after reaching a plea agreement, appellant, her attorney, and the prosecution all signed a written “Plea of Guilty and Jury Waiver” form. This form explicitly
{¶10} Thereafter, at the joint plea hearing, and upon explaining to appellant and her husband that they would be pleading to an amended rape charge in violation of
{¶11} “THE COURT: Statement of facts, please?
{¶12} “* * *
{¶13} “[THE STATE]: As to [appellant], Your Honor, Count Nine, rape, on a specific instance on an unspecified date occurring between January 1st, 2010, through February 26th, 2010, [appellant] did engage in sexual conduct with another through the use of force, or compulsion of the threat of force constituting the offense of rape, a felony of the first degree in violation of 2907.02 Subsection (A)(2).
{¶14} “* * *
{¶15} “THE COURT: All right. [Appellant‘s trial counsel], anything with respect to the alleged facts on behalf of [appellant]?
{¶16} “[APPELLANT‘S TRIAL COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor. His Honor understands – with regard to us asking to incorporate what‘s been discussed in chambers with the prosecutor * * * and myself with regard to factually what transpired, and obviously we‘ve had to make an amendment to the rape charge to say there was force, but his Honor understands based on the discussions with all the counsel that wasn‘t necessarily the case, but we just want that to be clear for the record. (Emphasis added.)
{¶18} Following this discussion, the trial court engaged appellant in a colloquy stating, in pertinent part, the following:
{¶19} “THE COURT: Do you understand the difference between a guilty plea and not guilty plea, ma‘am?
{¶20} “[APPELLANT]: Yes, I do.”
{¶21} The trial court then stated:
{¶22} “THE COURT: Now, [appellant], do you understand that a guilty plea is a complete admission of your guilt and by pleading guilty you are forever waiving your right to a trial and all of your constitutionally guaranteed trial rights?
{¶23} “[APPELLANT]: I do, Your Honor.”
{¶24} In addition, when asked by the trial court if she “understood all of the rights” explained to her and if she “wish[ed] to give up or waive all of those rights by pleading guilty,” appellant responded affirmatively. The trial court then asked appellant if she had “any questions regarding [her] plea or the consequences of [her] plea,” to which she responded “No, Your Honor.” The transcript of the plea hearing also indicates that appellant discussed the nature of the charges with her husband and with her attorney prior to entering her guilty plea.
{¶25} After a thorough review of the record, we find it clear that the trial court properly informed appellant of the effect of her guilty plea as a complete admission of her guilt to the amended charge of rape and that she fully understood the ramifications of making such a plea. See Dotson at ¶26; State v. Sanders (Mar. 10, 1997), Madison App. No. CA96-01-002, at 3-4; see, also, State v. Taylor, Cuyahoga App. No. 94569, 2010-Ohio-5607, ¶4. While appellant now claims that she “expressly denied the use or threat of force,” thereby requiring
{¶26} Next, appellant argues that the trial court erred by accepting her guilty plea because it “did not personally address [her] to determine her understanding regarding the mandatory term of post-release [sic] control supervision[.]” We disagree.
{¶27} Pursuant to
{¶28} In this case, and contrary to appellant‘s claim that the trial court “did not personally address [her],” at the joint plea hearing the trial court explicitly stated:
{¶29} “THE COURT: Do you understand, each of you understand that upon your
{¶30} After a thorough review of the record, we find it clear that the trial court did personally address appellant in an effort to determine if she understood her postrelease control obligations. Furthermore, while only appellant‘s husband responded to the trial court‘s question, the record is devoid of any evidence indicating appellant failed to comprehend her postrelease control obligations or that she was somehow prejudiced as a result. See State v. Ericson, Mahoning App. No. 09 MA 109, 2010-Ohio-4315, ¶14, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶15; see, e.g., State v. Benson, Cuyahoga App. No. 83178, 2004-Ohio-1677, ¶13; State v. Fisher, Montgomery App. No. 23992, 2011-Ohio-629, ¶33 (defendant‘s failure to make an oral response at plea hearing was not a basis to conclude that he failed to understand the right the court had explained to him). In fact, not only did appellant respond affirmatively when asked if she understood the nature of the charges and sentencing requirements, the “Plea of Guilty and Jury Waiver” form, a form which appellant signed after consulting with her attorney, specifically stated that by pleading guilty to rape she understood that she would be subject to a mandatory five-year postrelease control term upon her release from prison. State v. Taylor, Madison App. No. CA2007-12-037, 2009-Ohio-924, ¶58; see, also, State v. O‘Connor, Butler App. No. CA2001-08-195, 2002-Ohio-4122, ¶38. Therefore, because the trial court, at minimum, substantially complied, and in this case meticulously complied, with the requirements of
{¶31} In light of the foregoing, we find no error in the trial court‘s decision to accept appellant‘s guilty plea to rape and gross sexual imposition as such a plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, because we find no error in the trial court‘s
{¶32} Judgment affirmed.
POWELL, P.J., and HUTZEL, J., concur.