State v. MichaelState v. Michael
Andrew R. Bucher for Appellant
John R. Payne for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Blaine Michael (“Michael“) brings this appeal from the judgment of the Lima Municipal Court of Allen County, Ohio, finding him guilty of operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence (OVI). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
{¶2} On April 8, 2013, Michael was charged with two counts of OVI: (1) operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence in violation of
{¶3} On June 28, 2013, Michael filed a motion to suppress, requesting suppression of multiple items of evidence, including results of the field sobriety tests, breath alcohol content test, observations and opinions of the police officer, and statements taken from or made by Michael. (R. at 16.) He requested a hearing on the motion.
{¶4} The suppression hearing took place on September 16, 2013. Defense counsel explained that Michael was “significantly limiting” the scope of his
{¶5} Following the trial court‘s denial of his motion to suppress, Michael entered a plea of no contest and was found guilty of operation of vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in his breath, in violation of
{¶6} Michael asserts onе assignment of error for our review.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THE OFFICER HAD COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMNTS [sic] OF OAC 3701-53-08.
{¶7} On appeal Michael alleges that his breath test results should have been excluded due to the fact that Deputy Clayton was not qualified to perform the test.1 He relies on
Individuals desiring to function as operators who apply for or are issued an operаtor access card under paragraph (C) of rule 3701-53-09 of the Administrative Code, shall be subject to a proficiency examination once per calendar year conducted at the director‘s discretion.2
(Emphasis added.)
{¶8} The evidence submitted in the trial court showed that Deputy Clayton‘s then-most-recent proficiency examination was completed on February 16, 2012. (Tr., Ex. C.) Michael asserts that, because more than twelve months had passed since that examination as of the date of his breath test on April 7, 2013, Deputy Clayton‘s operator access card was invalid. He concludes that as a result of the expired operator access card, Deputy Clayton was not qualified to perform the test.
{¶9} This logic is based on other sections of the Ohio Administrative Code. In particular,
{¶10} The State rejects Michael‘s contention that failure to comply with the once-per-calendar-year-proficiency-exam requirement automatically disqualifies an operator from performing breath tests on the Intoxilyzer 8000. (App‘ee Br. at 11-12 (arguing that under
{¶11} Therefore, the sole issue before us is whether, in denying Michael‘s motion to suppress, the trial court properly found that Deputy Clayton satisfied the proficiency examination requirement of
Standard of Review
{¶12} An appellate review of the trial court‘s decision on a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8; State v. Norman, 136 Ohio App.3d 46, 51, 735 N.E.2d 953 (3d Dist.1999). We will accept the trial court‘s factual findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence because the “evaluation of evidence and the credibility of witnesses” at the suppression hearing are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992); Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8; Norman, 136 Ohio App.3d at 51. But we must independently determine, without deference to the trial court, whether these factual findings satisfy the legal standard as a matter of law, because “the application of the law to the trial court‘s findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review.” Norman, 136 Ohio App.3d at 52; Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8.
Interpretation of the Term “Calendar Year”
{¶14} At the time Michael filеd his motion to suppress, the relevant sections of the Ohio Adm.Code did not define the term “calendar year.”4 When a term in a statute or a regulation is not defined, the courts attempt to interpret the term and “arrive at the legislative intent.” Iams v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 174 Ohio App.3d 537, 2007-Ohio-6709, 883 N.E.2d 466 (3d Dist.), ¶ 35, citing Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 39, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001), superseded by statute on other grounds. If thе language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written. Id. But if the language is subject to multiple interpretations, it is ambiguous and courts turn to the legislative intent to ascertain its meaning. Id.; State v. Siferd, 151 Ohio App.3d 103, 2002-Ohio-6801, 783
{¶15} Courts use the same rules of construction for interpreting statutes and administrative regulations. See McFee v. Nursing Care Mgt. of Am., Inc., 126 Ohio St.3d 183, 2010-Ohio-2744, 931 N.E.2d 1069, ¶ 27. It is a well-settled law in Ohio that words in a statute or a regulation “should be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning, and be given the meaning ordinarily attributed to them unless a different intention appears in the statute.” Gareau, 18 Ohio St.2d at 64; accord State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti, 130 Ohio St.3d 208, 2011-Ohio-5351, 957 N.E.2d 13, ¶ 18, quoting Morning View Care Ctr.–Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 148 Ohio App.3d 518, 2002-Ohio-2878, 774 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 36 (” ‘The intеrpretation of statutes and administrative rules should follow the principle that neither is to be construed in any way other than as the words demand.’ “).
{¶17} We find that the Ohio Supreme Court‘s definition better fits the legislative intent than the definition adopted in the split decision5 of the Eighth
District Court of Appeals in Muczyk, 111 Ohio App.3d 167. We offer several reasons for this conclusion. First, in 1969, the Ohio Supreme Court faced with a controversy “around the meaning of the phrase ‘calendar year’ as used in Section 3513.191, Revised Code,” noted that the word “year” is general and “susсeptible of different meanings,” while the term “calendar year” is more specific and has “a definite and common meaning as to the beginning and ending of the 365-day period which constitutes a year.” Gareau, 18 Ohio St.2d at 64-65. As if agreeing with the ambiguity in the word “year,” the legislature enacted
{¶18} Second, the use of the term “calendar year” throughout the Revised Code unambiguously indicates that the term has an ordinary and natural meaning, which is the period from January 1 to December 31 of any given year. Without defining it specificаlly, the legislature follows the term “calendar year” with a number corresponding to the 365 or 366-day period of the Gregorian calendar. See, e.g.,
{¶19} Third, the definition adopted by us is consistent with the most recent amendment in the Ohio Administrative Code. Section 3701-53-04, which concerns requiremеnts for “Instrument checks, controls and certifications” of the machines used for alcohol and drug testing, recently defined a “calendar year” as “the period of twelve consecutive months, as indicated in section 1.44 of the Revised Code, beginning on the first day of January, and ending on the thirty-first day of December.” Although Michael correctly asserts that this definition was not in place at the time of his breath test and should not be used to determine Deputy Clayton‘s compliance with the proficiency exam requirement, this recent amendment reveals the legislative purpose behind the Ohio Administrative Code‘s requirement that certain things be done every calendar year. Therefore, even if we do not use the recent amendment to define “calendar year” in
{¶20} Fourth, other chapters of the Ohio Administrative Code define “calendar year” as “January first through December thirty-first of a given year.” See
{¶21} We thus hold that “calendar year,” as used in
Application to the Current Case
{¶22} As a consequence of our interpretation of the term “calendar year,” we hold that the Ohio Administrative Code‘s direсtive that requires operators of the Intoxilyzer 8000 to “be subject to a proficiency examination once per calendar year” was not violated in this case. See
{¶23} Because no other basis for suppression was raisеd on appeal, this holding is dispositive of the case and we do not reach the argument raised by the parties over whether the April 7, 2013 valid test on Michael satisfies the
{¶24} This opinion in no way addresses validity of Division (D) of the Ohio Administrative Code Section 3701-53-08 or the requirements for operation of the Intoxilyzer 8000. The narrow holding here concerns the definition of the term “calendar year” in
{¶25} Assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶26} Having reviewed the arguments, the briefs, and the record in this case, we find no error prejudicial to Appellant in the particulars assigned and argued. The judgment of the Lima Municipal Court of Allеn County, Ohio, is therefore affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, J., concurs.
ROGERS, J., concurs in Judgment Only.
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