STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PATTY MEADOWS
No. 400PA17
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
Filed 7 December 2018
806 S.E.2d 682 | 812 S.E.2d 847
BEASLEY, Justice.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 806 S.E.2d 682 (2017), finding no error after appeal from judgments entered on 7 and 8 April 2016 by Judge Gary M. Gavenus in Superior Court, Madison County upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty following a trial before Judge R. Gregory Horne. Heard in the Suprеme Court on 2 October 2018.
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Daniel Snipes Johnson, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Michael E. Casterline for defendant-appellant.
This case requires the Court to consider whether Rule 10(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure precludes appellate review of sentencing arguments not raised before the sentencing court. We conclude that defendant waived her Eighth Amendment arguments by failing to raise them before the sentencing court; defendant‘s nonconstitutional sentencing issues were preserved for appellate review despite hеr failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection, but are nonetheless meritless. Accordingly, we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. As to defendant‘s ineffective assistance claim, we hold that discretionary review was improvidently allowed.
Following a jury trial, defendant Patty Meadows was convicted of one count each of trafficking opium by sale, trafficking opium by delivery, and trafficking opium by possession. All three counts arose from the same transaction, in which defendant sold seventy-five oxycodone pills to a confidential informаnt. At trial, after the close of all evidence, defendant sought emergency medical treatment, which prevented her attendance at closing arguments and the jury charge. After deliberating for less than an hour, the jury returned its verdict of guilty on all counts in defendant‘s absence. Noting that a defеndant‘s presence is required for sentencing, Judge R. Gregory Horne continued the matter to the following day. The next day, defense counsel produced a doctor‘s note indicating that defendant was medically unable to be present in court at that time. Judge Horne entered a written safekeeping order directing the Sheriff of Madison County to “place the defendant . . . in the custody of the Warden of Central Prison, Wake County, Raleigh, North Carolina for safekeeping pursuant to
Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) by sentencing defendant, Judge Gavenus improperly overruled Judge Horne‘s safekeeping order; (3) Judge Gavenus abused his discretion in imposing consecutive sentences on an elderly first offender for a single drug transaction; and (4) defendant‘s sentences are grossly disproportionate to her offenses in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals found no error in defendant‘s convictions and sentences, concluding that defendant failed to preserve arguments related to her sentencing as required by Rule 10(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure and that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. State v. Meadows, ___ N.C. App. ___, 806 S.E.2d 682, 686-96 (2017). Defendant petitioned for discretionary review of each issue,
Defendant‘s arguments relate mostly to the sentence imposed by Judge Gavenus. As she argued before the Court of Appeals, defendant challenges her sentence as an abuse of discretion, an illegal overruling of one superior court judge by another, and a violation of the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
Despite her failure to voice any objection to her sentence or the sentencing proceedings in the trial court, defendant contends she is entitled to raise these аrguments on appeal. Before the Court of Appeals, defendant relied on a line of cases decided by that court holding that the issue preservation requirements of Rule 10(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply to errors occurring during a sentencing hearing. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that Rule 10(a)(1) applies to sentencing hearings; accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that defendant had waived her sentencing arguments. Meadows, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 806 S.E.2d at 689-96. Before this Court, defendant now argues that sentencing issues are statutorily preservеd by
Under the Constitution of North Carolina, this Court possesses “exclusive authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division.”
In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context. . . . Any such issue that was properly preserved for reviеw by action of counsel taken during the course of proceedings in the trial tribunal by objection noted or which by rule or law was deemed preserved or taken without any such action, including, but not limited to, whether the judgment is supported by the verdict or by the findings of fact and conclusions of law, whether the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and whether a criminal charge is sufficient in law, may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal.
This Court addressed one such scenario in State v. Canady, 330 N.C. 398, 410 S.E.2d 875 (1991). There, the defendant raised for the first time on appeal an alleged error in the trial court‘s finding of an aggravating factor to support an incrеased sentence. Id. at 400, 410 S.E.2d at 877. We held that Rule 10(b)(1), the text of which is now found in Rule 10(a)(1),1 did not apply to the case because the rule is “directed to matters which occur at trial and upon which the trial court must be given an
opportunity to rule in order to preserve the question for appeal.” Id. at 401, 410 S.E.2d at 878.
The Canady оpinion has inspired a string of decisions in the Court of Appeals holding that Rule 10(a)(1) categorically does not apply to errors committed during a sentencing hearing. See State v. Pettigrew, 204 N.C. App. 248, 258, 693 S.E.2d 698, 704-05, appeal dismissed, 364 N.C. 439, 706 S.E.2d 467 (2010); State v. Curmon, 171 N.C. App. 697, 703-04, 615 S.E.2d 417, 422-23 (2005); State v. Hargett, 157 N.C. App. 90, 92-93, 577 S.E.2d 703, 705 (2003). To derive such a categorical rule from Canady, however, one must ignore the opinion‘s rationale. In that case, we considered the purpose of Rule 10(а)(1): “to require a party to call the court‘s attention to a matter upon which he or she wants a ruling before he or she can assign error to the matter on appeal.” Canady, 330 N.C. at 401, 410 S.E.2d at 878. Thus, we noted that the
Here, defendant requested that all three sentences be consolidated, which would have resulted in a sentence of seventy to ninety-three months’ imprisonment. Defense counsel argued in support of the requested sentence, noting defendant‘s advanced age, poor health, and previously clean criminal record. After hearing arguments, Judge Gavenus consolidated only two of the three sentences, resulting in a 140-month minimum term of imprisonment. As in Canady, the sentencing court “knew or should have known” defendant sought the minimum possible sentence. Accordingly, defendant need not have voiced a contemporaneous objection to preserve her nonconstitutional sentencing issues for appellate review.
Defendant‘s sentencing issues are also preserved by statute. In
Mumford, 364 N.C. 394, 403, 699 S.E.2d 911, 917 (2010), the Court explained that a statutory provision governing the preservation of issues for purposes of appellate review is unconstitutional only if it conflicts with a “specific provision[ ] of our appellate rules rather than the general rule stated in Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a).” Because no such conflict existed, the Court upheld subdivision 15A-1446(d)(18). Accordingly, defendant‘s nonconstitutional sentencing arguments are preserved by statute.
Nonetheless, although it was error for the Court of Appeals to decline to address defendant‘s sentencing argumеnts, defendant is not entitled to relief on appeal because those arguments are meritless.
Defendant‘s argument that Judge Gavenus “overruled” Judge Horne‘s safekeeping order by sentencing her is unavailing. First, a judge other than the trial judge may conduct a defendant‘s sentencing hearing. State v. Sauls, 291 N.C. 253, 263-64, 230 S.E.2d 390, 396 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916, 53 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1977). Furthermorе, neither the order nor Judge Horne‘s oral remarks indicated that he wished to retain jurisdiction over the matter or to delay sentencing. The order merely
stated that defendant was to be held in custody “until such time as [she] is needed to face the charges held against [her] in Court or
Defendant‘s argument that Judge Gavenus abused his discretion in sentencing her is similarly meritless. A sentence “within the statutory limit will be presumed regular and valid,” unless “the record discloses that the court considered irrelevant and improper matter[s] in determining the severity of the sentencе.” State v. Johnson, 320 N.C. 746, 753, 360 S.E.2d 676, 681 (1987) (citing and quoting State v. Boone, 293 N.C. 702, 712, 239 S.E.2d 459, 465 (1977)). Defendant here states that Judge Gavenus must have been influenced by defendant‘s decision to take her case to trial because there is no other explanation for the harshness of the imposed sentence. Defendant‘s conclusory accusation lacks any support in the record. Because there is no reason to believe Judge Gavenus was influenced by irrelevant or
improper considerations, the within-limits sentence imposed here is presumed proper.
Although defendant‘s nonconstitutional sentencing issues are preserved without contempоraneous objection consistent with Canady and
For the reasons stated, we hold that defеndant waived her Eighth Amendment argument by failing to raise it before the sentencing court. Moreover, with regard to defendant‘s nonconstitutional sentencing arguments, we conclude that they were
preserved for appellate review, but are meritless. Finally, we hold that discretionary review was improvidently allowed as to defendant‘s ineffective assistance claim.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED IN PART; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED IN PART.