STATE OF OHIO v. LARRY A. McGOWAN
No. 96608
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
December 1, 2011
2011-Ohio-6166
BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Sweeney, P.J., and Keough, J.
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-545227
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Robert A. Gaffney
75 Public Square
Suite 714
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Andrew Rogalski
Norman Schroth
Assistant County Prosecutors
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{1} Defendant-appellant Larry McGowan appeals convictions entered in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant argues that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion in limine, (2) the state of Ohio presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions, and (3) his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
{2} Appellant was indicted on December 21, 2010 and charged with burglary in violation of
{3} It was the state‘s evidence at trial that in the early morning hours of December 15, 2010, Cynthia Lundeen was sleeping in the first-floor office of her home at 2380 Overlook Road, Cleveland Heights, in Cuyahoga County. Lundeen awoke to find an intruder in her home. The intruder was wearing a light-tan jacket, a blue knit cap, and blue gloves. The intruder had Lundeen‘s purse in his possession and left the home before she saw his face. Lundeen testified that in addition to her purse and its contents, two chiffon scarves and a VHS tape were taken from her home.
{4} Lundeen called 911 and officers responded to the scene in less than five minutes. Lundeen‘s home is situated at the corner of Overlook and Edgehill. Cleveland Heights police officer Gregory Pitts set up a perimeter in the area at approximately 2:00 a.m. Officer Pitts observed a male in a tan coat walk from a backyard on Edgehill and down the driveway toward the sidewalk. No other individuals were on the street. Officer Pitts approached the male on the sidewalk and observed him drop a screwdriver into the snow. The male, Larry McGowan, was arrested after Officer Pitts observed what he believed to be the butt of a handgun in appellant‘s pocket but was later learned to be a toy gun. Officer Pitts also found a pair of blue gloves in appellant‘s possession.
{5} There was fresh snow on the ground the morning of December 15, 2010 and Officer Pitts and Cleveland Heights police officer Matthew Lakser followed bootprints from where appellant was arrested to the house from which appellant was observed walking. The officers did not observe any other tracks in the snow. The bootprint trail led the officers behind 2443 Edgehill, where they found Lundeen‘s discarded purse with the contents dumped from it.
{6} Cleveland Heights police officer Matthew Cinadar responded directly to Lundeen‘s residence. Officer Cinadar found bootprint tracks outside Lundeen‘s home and a wet bootprint on the carpet inside of the home. Officer Cinadar identified the intruder‘s point of entry as an unlocked window and found a screen ripped from the casing. Officer Cinadar described the bootprint as distinctive, leaving ridge details in the snow. Officer Cinadar described the distinctive pattern of the bootprint as a U-shape on the bottom of the shoe, a circular gap, and a circular egg shape with more ridges on the top part. Officer Cinadar observed the bootprints near Lundeen‘s home, on the sidewalk, and near 2443 Edgehill. Officer Cinadar examined appellant‘s actual boot and found the prints to be consistent. The State submitted a picture of appellant‘s boot tread and a picture of one of the bootprints found outside Lundeen‘s home for finder of fact‘s own comparison.
{8} Lundeen was escorted from her home to the place where appellant was detained and identified appellant as the man she saw in her house. She concluded that appellant was the intruder she encountered in her home based on his height, physique and clothing, which she observed “within moments of seeing the same thing in my home.”
{9} At trial, Lundeen testified that she did not know exactly how much money she had in her purse at the time it was taken but it would have been, “at least in the area of $350.” Lundeen placed the value of the scarves at roughly $10 each. Lundeen estimated that the non-cash contents of her purse were worth $300. Finally, Lundeen‘s 87-year-old mother‘s credit card was in the purse when it was stolen.
{10} The trial court on March 7, 2011, found appellant guilty of burglary as charged in Count 1, theft of a credit card as charged in Count 3, and possession of criminal tools as charged in Count 4. The trial court specifically noted that the conviction for theft of a credit card was a felony of the fourth degree. With respect to Count 2, the trial court found appellant not guilty of the charge of theft of over $500 but guilty of petty theft under $500, a misdemeanor. Incongruously, the trial court issued a journal entry on the same date, stating in pertinent part, “The Court finds the Defendant guilty of theft; aggravated theft 2913.02A(1) M1 as charged in count(s) 2 of the
{11} On March 28, 2011, the trial court imposed a prison term of two years on Count 1, time served on Count 2, one year on Count 3, and six months on Count 4. The trial court specified that the prison terms would run concurrently. Appellant brought the present appeal, advancing three assignments of error.
{12} Appellant‘s first assignment of error states:
{13} “1. The trial court improperly denied appellant‘s motion in limine regarding bootprint testimony, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.”
{14} Before trial, appellant filed a motion in limine to “prohibit non-expert state witnesses from testifying as to opinions, inferences, impressions, or conclusions drawn from facts that they have observed regarding bootprint evidence.” The trial court denied appellant‘s motion in limine, and testimony was introduced at trial as to the responding police officers’ observations of bootprints found both inside and outside Lundeen‘s home and from the place where appellant was arrested leading back to where Lundeen‘s discarded purse was found.
{15} Evid.R. 701 provides:
{16} “If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (1)
{17} In State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 29, 559 N.E.2d 464, the Ohio Supreme Court held that, “a lay witness may be permitted to express his or her opinion as to the similarity of footprints if it can be shown that his or her conclusions are based on measurements or peculiarities in the prints that are readily recognizable and within the capabilities of a lay witness to observe. This means that the print pattern is sufficiently large and distinct so that no detailed measurements, subtle analysis or scientific determination is needed. In such a situation, the pattern is simply identified as being similar to that customarily made by shoes. In essence, the testimony is ‘more in the nature of description by example than the expression of a conclusion.‘” Id., quoting State v. Hairston, 60 Ohio App.2d 220, 223, 396 N.E.2d 773.
{18} In the case sub judice, we find no violation of the rule established in Jells. The testimony was that at 2:00 a.m. on December 15, 2010, fresh snow was on the ground and no other individuals were encountered in the area. Officer Pitts initially observed appellant exiting a backyard and walking down a sidewalk on Edgehill. Officer Pitts followed the sole set of bootprints visible from where he detained appellant to the back of 2443 Edgehill where he had recovered Lundeen‘s purse. Officer Lasker assisted Officer Pitts in detaining the appellant. Officer Lasker observed that the tread pattern on the bottom of appellant‘s boots matched the tread pattern to the bootprints found leading up
{19} Appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{20} Appellant‘s second assignment of error states:
{21} “2. The verdict in this case was against the sufficiency of the evidence and should be reversed because it violates the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.”
{22} Appellant argues that his convictions for burglary, theft, and possessing criminal tools were not supported by sufficient evidence.
{24} The elements of the offenses for which appellant was convicted are set forth in statute. In regard to burglary,
“(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the following:
“(1) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the structure or in the separately secured or separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense;”
{25}
“(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall do any of the following:
“(1) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another;”
Appellant argues that the State failed to prove that he trespassed on Lundeen‘s property without privilege because at trial Lundeen did not specifically testify that he did not have permission to be in her home.
{26} “Privilege” is defined as “an immunity, license, or right conferred by law, bestowed by express or implied grant, arising out of status, position, office, or relationship, or growing out of necessity.”
{27} Contrary to appellant‘s argument, circumstantial evidence was introduced at trial that he entered Lundeen‘s home without privilege. In fact, Lundeen testified that she awoke to find an individual, unbeknownst to her, in her home “uninvited.” Lundeen further labeled appellant, “an intruder” in her home. Appellant cites no authority for the proposition that a burglary victim must utilize the magic words of “without privilege” in describing a home invasion. Appellant‘s sufficiency challenge to his burglary conviction is without merit.
{28} Appellant argues that his convictions for theft in violation of
{29}
“(A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services in any of the following ways:
“(1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent;
* * *
“(B) (1) Whoever violates this section is guilty of theft.
“(2) Except as otherwise provided in this division or division (B)(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), or (8) of this section, a violation of this section is petty theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree. If the value of the property or services stolen is five hundred dollars or more and is less than five thousand dollars or if the property stolen is any of the property listed in section 2913.71 of the Revised Code, a violation of this section is theft, a felony of the fifth degree. * * * ”1
{30} With respect to Count 2, the trial court found appellant not guilty of the fifth degree felony theft charge in the indictment but guilty of petty theft, a misdemeanor. Appellant‘s argument that there was insufficient evidence that the value of the property stolen was $500 or more to support his conviction of a fifth degree felony charge of theft is misplaced as the trial court did not convict him of that charge. However, as we noted above, the record contains a discrepancy between the trial court‘s oral pronouncement finding appellant not guilty of felony theft and the trial court‘s journal entries, which reference aggravated theft. Given the discrepancy between the trial court‘s oral pronouncements at the conclusion of trial and sentencing and the apparent clerical errors in the court‘s March 7, 2011 and March 28, 2011 journal entries, we remand this case to
{31} Appellant next argues that his conviction in Count 3 for theft of Lundeen‘s mother‘s credit card was not supported by sufficient evidence.
{32}
“Regardless of the value of the property involved and regardless of whether the offender previously has been convicted of a theft offense, a violation of section 2913.02 or 2913.51 of the Revised Code is a felony of the fifth degree if the property involved is any of the following:
“(A) A credit card;”
{33} Appellant argues that even if he did break into Lundeen‘s home and steal her mother‘s credit card in her purse, the fact that he discarded the purse and credit card several houses away establishes that he did not intend to deprive Lundeen or her mother of the property.
{34}
“(1) Withhold property of another permanently, or for a period that appropriates a substantial portion of its value or use, or with purpose to restore it only upon payment of a reward or other consideration;
“(2) Dispose of property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it;
“(3) Accept, use, or appropriate money, property, or services, with purpose not to give proper consideration in return for the money, property, or services, and without reasonable justification or excuse for not giving proper consideration.”
{36} “Intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime.” State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 266, 2002-Ohio-796, 762 N.E.2d 940. Because intent dwells in the mind of the accused, an intent to act can be proven from the surrounding facts and circumstances. State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484-485, 2001-Ohio-4, 739 N.E.2d 749. Appellant‘s apparent argument that he only intended to retain only the cash from Lundeen‘s purse is undercut by the fact that the evidence at trial showed that he removed from Lundeen‘s home not simply the purse and the cash it contained but also two scarves and a VHS tape. This court has previously interpreted the theft statute to require the state to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, defendant‘s intent to deprive “at the time” the property was taken. Brooklyn v. Fouche, Cuyahoga App. No. 85510, 2006-Ohio-169, at ¶ 37. The fact that appellant changed his mind after the theft and, for whatever reason, abandoned the scarves, VHS tape, and the credit card in Lundeen‘s purse is irrelevant. Furthermore, the scarves, VHS tape and credit card were abandoned throughout Lundeen‘s neighborhood with the credit card and purse abandoned on another‘s property. There is no indication from the record that Lundeen was likely to
{37} We do note, however, that the trial court incorrectly found appellant‘s conviction for theft of a credit card to be a felony of the fourth degree.
{38} Finally, appellant argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that he possessed criminal tools in violation of
{39}
“(A) No person shall possess or have under the person‘s control any substance, device, instrument, or article, with purpose to use it criminally.
(B) Each of the following constitutes prima-facie evidence of criminal purpose:
* * *
(2) Possession or control of any substance, device, instrument, or article designed
or specially adapted for criminal use;
(3) Possession or control of any substance, device, instrument, or article commonly used for criminal purposes, under circumstances indicating the item is intended for criminal use.”
{40} The evidence at trial was that when approached by Officer Pitts, appellant dropped a screwdriver into the snow. Officer Cinadar identified an open window with a screen that had been ripped out as appellant‘s point of entry into Lundeen‘s home. Further, Officer Pitts, while initially stopping appellant, observed what appeared to be a gun on his person. The gun possessed a sufficiently realistic appearance such that Officer Pitts believed it to be a real gun. Photographs of the toy gun introduced into evidence by the state support this conclusion. It can be reasonably inferred from the facts that appellant possessed this toy gun for the purpose of aiding his burglary of an occupied home. Contrary to appellant‘s argument, the state introduced circumstantial evidence that appellant possessed these items with an intent to use them criminally.
{41} Appellant‘s second assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part.
{42} Appellant‘s third assignment of error states:
{43} “3. The verdict in this case was against the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reversed because it violates the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.”
{45} The weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus. The power to reverse a judgment of conviction as against the manifest weight must be exercised with caution and in only the rare case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717.
{46} In challenging his convictions as against the manifest weight of the evidence, appellant refers us to the arguments he presented in his second assignment of error, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. After reviewing the entire record, weighing all of the evidence and considering the credibility of witnesses, we find that this was not the exceptional case where the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
{47} Appellant‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{48} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We vacate solely appellant‘s sentence on Count 3 to theft, a felony of the fourth degree, and remand to the trial court for proper resentencing under
It is ordered that the parties bear their own costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR