State v. McDonaldState v. McDonald
Brian K. Harrison, P.O. Box 80, Monroe, Ohio 45050, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
HENDRICKSON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Charles Deonte McDonald, appeals from the Butler County Court of Common Pleas decision denying his motion to suppress and its decision sentencing him to serve seven years in prison following his conviction for felonious assault. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶2} In the early morning hours of November 7, 2008, Johnny Brown, who had been drinking at a local bar, asked his fiancée, Darlene VanWinkle, to walk him home.
{¶3} After filing a motion to suppress, which was denied, and following a two-day jury trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to serve seven years in prison. Appellant now appeals the trial court‘s decision denying his motion to suppress and his seven-year prison sentence, raising two assignments of error.
{¶4} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶5} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN OVERRULING APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE.”
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the photographic and show-up identification procedures used by police were unduly suggestive and produced an unreliable pretrial identification. We disagree.
{¶7} Appellate review of a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 105, 1997-Ohio-355; State v. Anderson (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 688, 691. An appellate court must defer to the trial
{¶8} “The rationale for excluding a tainted pretrial identification is to protect the defendant from misconduct by the state.” State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, ¶19; State v. Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 310. To warrant suppression of identification testimony, appellant bears the burden of establishing that the identification procedure was “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375. In turn, when a witness has been confronted with a suspect before trial, due process requires a court to suppress the witness’ identification of the suspect if (1) the confrontation was unnecessarily suggestive of the suspect‘s guilt, and (2) the identification was unreliable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Robinson, Fayette App. No. CA2009-02-004, 2009-Ohio-4937, ¶11; Gross at ¶19; State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 438. However, because reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony, even if identification procedures were unnecessarily or unduly suggestive, there is no due process violation where the identification itself possesses sufficient aspects of reliability. Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), 432 U.S. 98, 115, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Curtis, 2009-Ohio-6740 at ¶22; State v. Brown, Butler App. No. CA2006-10-247, 2007-Ohio-7070, ¶14; State v. Sawyer (May 17, 1999), Butler App. No. CA98-07-140, 3.
{¶9} When determining the reliability of a witness’ identification, a court
{¶10} After a thorough review of the record, we find that the totality of the circumstances prove VanWinkle‘s positive photographic and show-up identifications of appellant as the man wielding the hammer possessed a sufficient indicia of reliability. VanWinkle, who witnessed the brutal beating, had the opportunity to view the attackers at close range during the commission of the crime, and then, when confronted with four male suspects mere minutes after the incident occurred, was able to positively identify appellant as the man who beat her fiancé with a hammer.1 In addition, when presented with a photo array shortly after witnessing the violent attack, VanWinkle immediately singled out appellant‘s photo and identified him as “the one with the hammer.”2 Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, and after considering all relevant factors, we find no error with the trial court‘s decision finding the reliability of VanWinkle‘s photographic and show-up identifications of appellant “to be pretty plain
{¶11} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶12} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT BASED ON HIS REFUSAL TO IDENTIFY AND TESTIFY AGAINST ALLEGED ACCOMPLICES.”
{¶13} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by basing its sentencing decision on his refusal to identify and testify against any of his alleged accomplices.3 However, contrary to appellant‘s claim, the trial court‘s sentencing decision was not based on his refusal to assist law enforcement in furthering their investigation, but instead, was properly based on a “careful and substantial deliberation to the relevant statutory considerations.”4 State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, ¶20. In fact, before classifying appellant‘s actions as “one of the coldest, cruelest heartless attacks on a person that [it had] ever been aware of,” the trial court explicitly stated that it was “not holding [his] silence against [him] * * *.” Therefore, after a thorough review of the record, which includes the transcript of the two-day jury trial, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing appellant, who had an extensive criminal record, to serve a seven-year prison term for violently beating Brown, the victim, with a hammer. See State v. Blanton,
BRESSLER, P.J., and POWELL, J., concur.