STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT vs. MELINDA MCCAUGHEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
No. 106311
Cоurt of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
August 9, 2018
[Cite as State v. McCaughey, 2018-Ohio-3167.]
Celebrezze, J., E.A. Gallagher, A.J., and Blackmon, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED; Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-17-618146-A; RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 9, 2018
Michael C. O‘Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Gregory M. Paul
Mary M. Frey
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Eric M. Levy
55 Public Square, Suite 1600
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ON RECONSIDERATION1
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the judgment of the trial court that granted defendant-appellee‘s motion for discharge for delay on speedy trial grounds. After a thorough review of the record and law, this court affirms.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} On May 16, 2016, defendant-appellee, Melinda McCaughey (hereinafter “appellee“), was arrested as a result of a traffic stop. Specifically, appellee was arrested for operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol (“OVI“). During the traffic stop, appellee admitted to the arresting officer that she had cocaine in her bra, and appellee handed the narcotics to the officer. Appellee further stated to the arresting officer that the substance was cocaine.
{¶3} As a result of the traffic stop, a complaint was filed on May 21, 2016. Appellee was charged in Cleveland M.C. No. 2016 TRC 018792 with OVI and various minor traffic violаtions. On June 13, 2016, appellee entered a plea of no contest as to the OVI charge, and the state nolled the remaining minor traffic violations. Appellee was not charged at that time with regards to the cocaine.
{¶4} In September 2016, the statе received the results of the laboratory testing on the substance that tested positive for cocaine. On June 15, 2017, appellee was indicted in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-17-618146-A, on one count of drug possession in violation of
{¶5} On July 18, 2017, appellee filed a motion for discharge based on Ohio‘s speedy trial statute
I. The trial court erred when granting defendant‘s motion for discharge for delay in trial and failure to comply with
Crim.R. 5(B) and dismissing this matter with prejudice.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Speedy Trial Violation
{¶7} In its sole assignment of error, the state claims the trial court erred in granting appellee‘s motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds. Specifically, the state argues that appellee‘s speedy trial rights were not violated because the state did not indict appellee on the drug possession count until after the state received the laboratory results. Wе find no merit to the state‘s arguments.
{¶8} Appellate review of a trial court‘s decision on a motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Loder, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 93242 and 93865, 2010-Ohio-3085, ¶ 9, citing State v. Easley 4th Dist. Scioto No. 03CA2910, 2005-Ohio-767. Although we accord due deference to a trial court‘s findings of fact if supрorted by competent, credible evidence, we must determine independently if the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case. Id. When reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, we are required to striсtly construe the relevant statutes against the state. Id., citing Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996).
{¶9} The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial by the state. State v. O‘Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 516 N.E.2d 218 (1987). In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court dеclared that, with regard to fixing a time frame for speedy trials, “the States * * * are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards * * *.” To that end, the Ohio General Assembly enacted
{¶10} Pursuant to
{¶11} The Suprеme Court of Ohio has noted that ‘“[w]hen new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charge and the state knew of such facts at the time of the initial indictment, the time within which trial is to begin on the additional charge is subject to the same statutory limitations period that is applied to the original charge.“’ State v. Baker, 78 Ohio St.3d 108, 111, 676 N.E.2d 883 (1997), quoting State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 68, 538 N.E.2d 1025 (1989). However, “[i]n issuing a subsequent indictment, the state is not subject to the speedy-trial timetable of the initial indictment, when additional criminal charges arise from facts different from the original charges, оr the state did not know of these facts at the time of the initial indictment.” Baker at syllabus.
{¶12} “‘The holding in Baker is disjunctive and specifically sets forth two scenarios, either of which will reset the speedy-trial timetable for charges arising from a subsequent indictment.‘” State v. Mohamed, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-960, 2009-Ohio-6658, ¶ 30, quoting State v. Thomas, 4th Dist. Adams No. 06CA825, 2007-Ohio-5340, ¶ 17. “The key
{¶13} In our review of the record, contrary to the state‘s argument, there were no additional fаcts found in September 2016 when the state received the laboratory results confirming the substance tested positive for cocaine. We note that this case is not similar to traffic stop cases in which laboratory drug testing results that were not known at the time оf the original indictment have been deemed to constitute “additional facts” warranting the triggering of a new speedy trial clock. See State v. Vasquez, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-366, 2014-Ohio-224, ¶ 27-41; State v. Brown, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-292, 2012-Ohio-5903, ¶ 11-13; see also Baker (where subsequent charges resulted from the complex and time-consuming process of checking the defendant‘s financial records and the state could not have known if additional charges were appropriate until that process was completed).
{¶14} To the extent that the state argues that the instant case is similar to this court‘s decision in State v. Wangul, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79393, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 564 (Feb. 14, 2002), we disagree. In Wangul, the defendant was arrested on July 31, 2001, after officers had received a complaint that Wangul was growing marijuana plants in his backyard. Officers responded to Wangul‘s home and observed marijuana plants in his backyard. Officers then seized the marijuana plants and arrested Wangul on an unrelated outstanding felony arrest warrant for grand theft charges. At the time of the arrest, no charges were brought against Wangul regarding the marijuana plants.
{¶15} Officers thereafter sent the marijuana plants to the lab to be weighed in ordеr to
{¶16} We find the instant case to be distinguishable from Wangul. In Wangul, the weight of the marijuana was unknown when officers discovered the marijuana plants. The weight of the marijuana plants was necessary to determine whether Wangul would be charged with a misdemeanor or felony level offense. Therefore, the new and additionаl facts in Wangul was the actual weight of the marijuana — a fact that was not known at the time the officers seized the plants — not the lab results confirming that the suspected marijuana plants were indeed marijuana.
{¶17} In the instant case, appellee admitted the suspected drug was cocaine, and therefore, there were no new facts when the state received the lab results. Further, in Wangul, the subsequent indictment was wholly dependent upon the lab analysis as to the weight of the marijuana, which was not available to the state when officers discovered the marijuana plants. See Mohamed, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-960, 2009-Ohio-6658, at ¶ 42.
{¶18} The instant case is more similar to this court‘s ruling in State v. Rutkowski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86289, 2006-Ohio-1087. In Rutkowski, the defendant‘s vehicle was searched after a traffic stop and the arresting officers discovered baggies of marijuana and a baggie of suspected ecstasy pills. Initially, the defendant was charged with the marijuana but
{¶19} On appeal, we reversed the trial court‘s judgment and defendant‘s conviction. We noted that:
[n]o additional pieces of evidence were discovered by the police in regard to this case. The pills that [the lab] confirmed positive for ecstasy were discovered by the police at the same time as the evidence used against [the defendant] in his first conviction. Furthermore, [the defendant] admitted to having ecstasy prior to his first conviction. For some reason, however, the state did not secure [thе lab report] until January 2004. Even then, the state waited almost a year after receiving that information to bring a second indictment against appellant. These facts do not arise to a level to allow appellant‘s speedy trial rights to be ignored, and any charges to be made pursuant to any suspected drugs confiscated on the day of appellant‘s arrest should have culminated in a speedy trial from the date of that arrest.
{¶20} In the instant case, our review of the record reflects that the subsеquent drug possession charge arose from facts that related to the original charge and involved the same facts. As in Rutkowski, these same facts were known at the time the OVI complaint was brought in municipal court in May 2016. The state argues that appelleе‘s speedy trial time started to run when the laboratory test results were returned to the state in September 2016. The state further argues that only in September 2016 did the state become aware that the substance in appellee‘s
{¶21} Furthermore, in Rutkowski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86289, 2006-Ohio-1087, this court noted that the defendant stated at the municipal court level at some point “prior to his first conviction,” that the pills were indeed ecstasy. In the instant case, appellee stated to the аctual arresting officer that the substance in her bra was cocaine. Thus, these circumstances in the instant case are even more incurable than the circumstances we noted in Rutkowski.
{¶22} As we noted above, once the statutory limit has expired, the defеndant has established a prima facie case for dismissal and the burden then shifts to the state to demonstrate that time was tolled in some fashion pursuant to
{¶23} Accordingly, the speedy trial clock for the underlying сharges herein did arise on appellee‘s arrest on May 16, 2016, and appellee‘s statutory speedy trial rights were violated.2
We find the trial court did not err in dismissing the case on speedy trial grounds. The state‘s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶24} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of said appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court tо carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR