STATE OF OHIO v. HARINDER MATHARU
Appellate Case No. 26985
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
October 20, 2017
[Cite as State v. Matharu, 2017-Ohio-8251.]
Triаl Court Case No. 2014-CR-1117 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
Rendered on the 20th day of October, 2017.
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JOHN S. PINARD, Atty. Reg. No. 0085567, 120 West Second Street, Suite 603, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 2} We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the conviction.
I. Facts and Proceedings
{¶ 3} On October 12, 2013, Matharu was involved in an accident when his vehicle went left of center and collided with a vehicle operated by Amanda Looman. After being in a coma for ten days, Looman was pronounced brain dead. An eyewitness to the accident indicated that she observed Matharu’s vehicle approaching behind the witness’s vеhicle traveling at a high rate of speed. The witness further stated that when Matharu attempted to pass her vehicle, he collided with the car driven by Looman. Matharu’s blood alcohol level was more than dоuble the legal limit and he was driving under a suspended license.
{¶ 4} On May 22, 2014, Matharu was indicted on four counts of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of
{¶ 5} During the final pretrial conference conducted on October 19, 2015, Matharu raised the issue of his mental competence to stand trial. He then filed a document entitled “Plea of Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity and Suggestion of Incompetency to Stand Trial.”1 On October 20, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding whether, given Matharu’s suggested incompetency, a сompetency evaluation was required. There was no disagreement that immediately after the collision, Matharu spent 40 days in the hospital, and that he was in a coma for approximately two weeks of that time. Nor was there any disagreement that Matharu had suffered from bleeding in the brain. Defense counsel indicated that Matharu was unable to recall the events of the collision and that he also suffered from short-term memory loss. The State cited State v. Brooks, 25 Ohio St.3d 144, 495 N.E.2d 407 (1986) and State v. Hoffer, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17241, 1999 WL 335136 (May 28, 1999), for the proposition that amnesia, by itself, does not render a defendant incompetent to stand trial.
{¶ 6} Matharu testified that he has trouble remembering things he has previously told people and he forgets the details of books he is reading. Likewise, he stated that if he watches a movie, he sometimes forgets the name of characters. He testified that he sometimes fоrgets the day of the week as well as conversations he has had. He testified that he remembered his counsel meeting with him the week before the hearing, and he was able to recall some long term memories. He testified that he sometimes has to write down information in order to remember it.
{¶ 7} The trial court declined to order a forensic competency evaluation. On
Matharu argues he is incompetent to stand trial due to short-term memory loss and his inability to remember the events surrounding the October 2013 collision. During the October 20, 2015 hearing, Matharu testified that he is able to write down matters of importance if he chooses, which he has done in the past, and that he recognizes his counsel * * *. Matharu remembers meeting with his attorneys at jail and discussing the motion to suppress hearings. He was able to recall that his wife informed him of the status of his injury, a brain hemorrhage, and that he did not have any treatment for this injury. Matharu remembers that his wife worked at Kroger in Springfield, Ohio before Matharu’s collision аnd knew that she currently works there. He was able to recall that he was at Miami Valley Hospital following the collision and some of the treatment provided. Matharu was able to testify that he was employed at a gas station in Springfield, Ohio and that he remembered his friend, Jake, whom he met at the gas station. Further, Matharu understood that a trial was looming.
* * *
Matharu’s testimony indicated that though he has some memory loss, he has a remaining ability to counsel with his lawyers and an understanding to some extent of the legal proceedings in his case.
Further, his short-term memory loss is not a component of competency.
* * *
{¶ 8} The plea hearing was conducted immediately after the competency hearing. A proper Crim.R. 11 colloquy was conducted. Matharu engaged with the court appropriately and denied any problems that would render him unable to voluntаrily and knowingly enter the plea. Matharu entered a plea of no contest to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide (OVI, driving under a suspended license) in violation of
II. Analysis
{¶ 9} Matharu’s sole assignment of error states as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ORDER A COMPETENCY EVALUATION FOR DEFENDANT.
{¶ 10} Matharu contends the trial court erred when it declined to order a competency evaluation. In support, he argues that the trial court cоnfused the issue of his short-term memory loss with the issue of his amnesia of the events surrounding the car crash. He further argues that the trial court improperly stated that “short-term memory is not a component of competency.”
{¶ 11} “Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal defendant who is legally incompetent shall not be subjected to trial.” State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995). If a defendant “lacks the capacity to understand the
{¶ 12} This due process right has been codified at
(B) In a criminal action in a court of common pleas, * * * [the] defense may raise the issue of the defendant‘s competence to stand trial. If thе issue is raised before the trial has commenced, the court shall hold a hearing on the issue as provided in this section. * * *
(C) The court shall conduct the hearing required or authorized under division (B) of this section within thirty days after the issue is raised, unless the defendant has been referred for evaluation in which case the court shall conduct the hearing within ten days after the filing of the report of the evaluation * * *.
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14} The use of thе word “may” in these statutes indicates that the decision
{¶ 15} Thus, we review the decision of the trial court regarding competency evaluations for an abuse of discretion. State v. Curry, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2012-CA-50, 2014-Ohio-3836, ¶ 40; State v. Cook, 2016-Ohio-2823, 64 N.E.3d 350, ¶ 63 (5th Dist.); State v. Patton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-800, 2009-Ohio-1382, ¶ 8. In order to find that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the trial court‘s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 16} In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the test is “‘whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings аgainst him.‘” State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 353, 2014-Ohio-1914, 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 32, citing State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 359, quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), quoting the argument of then Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin. It is with this standard in mind that we review the evidence in this record to determine
{¶ 17} A review of the transcript of the October 20, 2015 hearing shows that Matharu’s responses to questions, both on direct and cross-examination, were сoherent and appropriate. While he did note some issues with his short-term memory, he did not claim that it affected his ability to understand the proceedings against him or his ability to assist counsel with his defense. Indeed, he clеarly was aware of the nature of the proceedings, and noted that he is able to, and does, take notes of things he wants to remember. Further, he was able to remember his attorneys, when he had spent time cоnferring with them, and the topic about which they met.
{¶ 18} We do not agree that the trial court confused the issue of amnesia of the accident with the issue of short-term memory loss. The amnesia was raised by Matharu during the initial hеaring, and the trial court correctly noted that Matharu’s inability to remember the collision does not, by itself, render him incompetent. The trial court then went on to address the short-term memory issues. We do, however, take issue with the trial court’s blanket statement that short-term memory loss is not a component of competency. We can envision numerous scenarios in which such memory loss could effectively negate a criminal defendant’s ability to assist counsel in his defense. But, in this case, on this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to order an evaluation as Matharu’s testimony did not raise a genuine question оf his ability to understand the proceedings or to aid his attorneys.
{¶ 19} Accordingly, Matharu’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} Matharu’s sole assignment of error being overruled, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FROELICH, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
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Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
Andrew T. French
John S. Pinard
Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz