STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. JENNIFER MARTINEZ, Defendant-Respondent.
NO. S-1-SC-35116
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
January 4, 2018
Karen L. Townsend, District Judge
Opinion Number: ________ ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Martha Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General
Kenneth H.
Steven H. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Petitioner
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
C. David Henderson, Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Respondent
OPINION
VIGIL, Justice.
{1} Our resolution of this appeal turns on the standard of review that applies to a district court‘s findings of fact concerning a motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, we defer to the district court‘s findings if supported by substantial evidence. See State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856.
{2} Bloomfield Police Sergeant George Rascon pulled over Defendant Jennifer Martinez for failing to stop at a stop sign and, as a result, the police obtained evidence that led to Defendant‘s arrest and conviction for driving while intoxicated. In a motion to suppress evidence, Defendant argued that the video from the officer‘s on-board camera, or “dash-cam,” demonstrated that Defendant made a legal stop at the intersection and that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull her over. At an evidentiary hearing, the officer testified that Defendant went past the stop sign before coming to a complete stop, blocking the intersection. The district court viewed the dash-cam video and concluded that the officer had reasоnable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop, even though the video demonstrated that the alleged traffic violation was not as blatant as described by the officer.
{3} The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the officer was not credible and that the video evidence was too ambiguous to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. State v. Martinez, 2015-NMCA-051, ¶ 1, 348 P.3d 1022, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-005. Wе hold that the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of review, which requires the appellate court to defer to the district court‘s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence and to view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
I. BACKGROUND
{4} Defendant was charged in magistrate court with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (second offense), see
{5} Defendant appealed dе novo to the district court and renewed her motion to suppress. See
{6} After hearing the officer‘s testimony and watching the dash-cam video, the district court denied Defendant‘s motion to suppress. The district court judge explained her ruling as follows:
[A]fter hearing Sergeant Rascon‘s testimony I was certainly confused as to why [Defendant] would file a motion to suppress
because he made it sound very clear why ... he stopped and that there was reasonable suspicion. But I think it just goes to show you really need to review the video in every case. And in this case, after reviewing the video, I truly find the truth somewhere in between both positions. I certainly didn‘t see Sergeant Rascon‘s testimony that ... she stopped in the middle of the intersection; I dоn‘t think that was the case. However, I do think she ... seemed to be going quickly, she seemed to have slammed on her brakes, and she seems to have slammed on her brakes further into the intersection than I think is allowable, creating the reasonable suspicion for Sergeant Rascon to . . . stop [Defendant]. So therefore I will deny Defendant‘s motion to suppress, although I will grant that it was certainly a closer call than I thought it was going to be at first. But I still think Sergeant Rascon did have reasonable suspicion to stop her.
{7} The Court of Appeals reversed. Martinez, 2015-NMCA-051. The Court of Appeals inferred from the judge‘s remarks that “the district court found that the officer was not credible.” Id. ¶ 12. The Court of Appeals concluded that “the district court was left with no facts other than the video on which to conclude that the stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion.” Id. The Court of Appeals then conducted an independent review of the dash-cam video and found that the video evidence was too ambiguous by itself to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. We granted certiorari under
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
{8} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023, ¶ 9, 150 N.M. 137, 257 P.3d 957. “First, we look for substantial evidence to support the [district] court‘s factual finding, with deference to the district court‘s review of the testimony and other evidence presented.” State v. Yazzie, 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 15, 376 P.3d 858 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We then review the application of the law to those facts, making a de novo determination of the constitutional reasonableness of the search or seizure.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. The Court of Appeals Erred by Failing to Afford Proper Deference to the District Court‘s Findings of Fact
{9} The State argues that the Court of Appeals erred by failing to view the facts in the manner most favorable to the State, which prevailed in the district court. Defendant asks us to affirm the Court of Appeals, arguing that the objective evidence from the dash-cam demonstrates that the traffic stop was unconstitutional.
{10} Defendant relies on both the
{11} In this case, the district court concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to pull Defendant over for violating
Except when directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal, every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stoр before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, in the event there is no crosswalk, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection.
There was neither a crosswalk nor a stop line at the intersection of Sycamore and North Third, so
{12} Defendant asserts that the dash-cam video does not show a violation of
{13} The parties disagree about the extent to which the district court found the officer credible and relied on his testimony in finding that the traffic stop was supported by
{14} When acting as the fact-finder at a suppression hearing, the district сourt must evaluate the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to which the evidence is entitled. See State v. Gonzales, 1997-NMSC-050, ¶ 18, 124 N.M. 171, 947 P.2d 128 (“Determining credibility and weighing evidence are tasks entrusted to the trial court sitting as fact-finder.“). The district court may exercise “discretion to credit portions of a witness’ testimony even though it finds other portions dubious.” United States v. Whalen, 82 F.3d 528, 532 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Anyone who has ever tried a case or presided as a judge at a trial knows that witnesses are prone to fudge, to fumble, to misspeak, to misstate, to exaggerate. If any such pratfall warranted disbelieving a witness‘s entire testimony, few trials would get all the way to judgment.“). On appeal, we defer to the district court‘s evaluation of witness credibility. See Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6 (“As a reviewing court we do not sit as a trier of fact; the district court is in thе best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.“). An appellate court is “unable to view the witness‘s demeanor or . . . manner of speech, and therefore [is] not in a position to evaluate many of the aspects of witness credibility that the trier of fact may evaluate.” State v. Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 37, 146 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216. If the district court does not make exрlicit credibility findings, “we will indulge in all reasonable presumptions in support of the district court‘s ruling.” See Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{15} In this case, the district court did not make an explicit finding regarding the officer‘s credibility but did find that “the truth [fell] somewhere in between [the officer‘s and Defendant‘s] positions.” The district court further found that the officer “did have reasonable suspicion to stop” Defendant for a traffiс violation. “Factfinding frequently involves selecting which inferences to draw.” Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An appellate court must indulge in “[a]ll reasonable inferences in support of the district court‘s decision” and disregard “all inferences or evidence to the contrary.” Id. (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The fаct that another district court could have drawn different inferences on the same facts does not mean this district court‘s findings were not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Applying the appropriate standard of review, we presume that the district court credited the officer‘s perception that Defendant violated
{16} Defendant relies on cases from other jurisdictions to argue that the officer‘s testimony should not weigh into our reasonable suspicion calculus because the dash-cam video contradicted the officer‘s testimony. See, e.g., State v. Canty, 736 S.E.2d 532, 536-37 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (finding no reasonable suspicion, in part because a video disproved an officer‘s assertion that the defendant‘s vehicle crossed the fog line); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 331-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (declining to defer to the district court‘s findings, in part because
{17} The cases Defendant cites are distinguishable from this case. Here, the facts were not indisputably established, and the dash-cam video did not squarely contradict the officer‘s testimony. Due to poor lighting and the аngle of the dash-cam, the video does not show whether Defendant violated
{18} We hold that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the district court‘s ruling, includes sufficient evidence to support the district court‘s finding that the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to stop Defendant for violating
III. CONCLUSION
{19} Having considered the totality of the circumstances and given appropriate deference to the district court‘s factual findings, we affirm the district court‘s determination that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{20} IT IS SO ORDERED.
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice
WE CONCUR:
JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Chief Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice