State v. MartinState v. Martin
Scott R. Gordon for Appellant
Matthew K. Fox for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Colton R. Martin (“Martin”), appeals the September 5, 2014 judgment entry of the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On April 4, 2013, the Merсer County Grand Jury indicted Martin on two counts: Count One of sexual battery in violation of
{¶3} On August 22, 2013, Martin appeared for arraignment and entered pleas of not guilty. (Doc. No. 35).
{¶4} On March 19, 2014, Martin withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered a guilty plea, under a written plea agreement, to Count Two. (Doc. Nos. 59, 60, 64). In exchange for his change of plea, the State agreed to dismiss Count One and make no recommendations at sentencing. (Doc. No. 60, 61). Thе trial court accepted Martin’s guilty plea, found him guilty on Count Two, dismissed Count One, and ordered a presentence investigation. (Doc. No. 64).
{¶5} On May 12, 2014, Martin filed a “Motion to Dismiss Indictment/Complaint.” (Doc. No. 71). On June 17, 2014, the trial court concluded that “Megan’s Law,” and not thе “Adam Walsh Act,” applied to the
{¶6} On September 5, 2014, the trial court classified Martin as a sexually oriented offender. (Doc. No. 83). That same day, the trial cоurt notified Martin of his registration requirements—that is, Martin was ordered to register annually for a period of ten years after his initial registration. (Doc. No. 84). Also on that day, the trial court sentenced Martin to community-control sanctions. (Doc. No. 87). The trial court filed its sentencing entry on September 11, 2014. (Id.).
{¶7} On September 25, 2014, Martin filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 97).
{¶8} Martin raises four assignments of error for our review. We will address Martin’s first and third assignments of error together, followed by his second assignment of error and thеn his fourth assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. I
The Trial Court erred in defining the offense to which Defendant/Appellant pleaded to [sic] as a “sexually-oriented offense that is not registration-exempt.”
Assignment of Error No. III
The Trial Court abused its discretion in classifying Defendant/Appellant as a Sexually Oriented Offender, and ordering Defendant/Appellant to register in accordance with
{¶10} Martin is asking us to ascertain whether the trial court applied the correct law to the facts of his case. We review questions of law de novo. See State v. Romeo, 8th Dist. Portage No. 2007-P-0066, 2008-Ohio-1499, ¶ 9, citing Trans Rail Am., Inc. v. Hubbard Twp., 172 Ohio App.3d 499, 2007-Ohio-3478, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.), citing Long Beach Assn. v. Jones, 82 Ohio St.3d 574, 576 (1998) and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147 (1992). “‘Under a de novo standard of review, the appellatе court reviews the judgment
{¶11} As an initial matter, we note that the parties do not dispute that the statutory scheme for the classification and registration of sex offenders in effect at the time Martin committed the offense, and thus applicable to him, was Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law. Likewise, we apply statutes as they existed at the time of the offense. See, e.g., State v. Sheriff, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-11-14, 2012-Ohio-656, ¶ 15, citing State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374.
{¶12} Martin’s arguments are baseless. The Revised Code removes anyоne over 21 years of age from juvenile-court jurisdiction, regardless of the date on which the person allegedly committed the offense. State v. Adams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-83, 2012-Ohio-5088, ¶ 14, citing State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, ¶ 14. Because Martin was not apprehended until after he reached 21 years of age,
If a person under eighteen years of age allegedly commits an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult and if the person is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until after the person attains twenty-one years of age, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to hear or determine any portion of the case charging the person with committing that act. In those circumstances, divisions (A) and (B) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code do not apply regarding the act, and the case charging the person with committing the act shall be a criminal prosecution commenced and heard in the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense as if the person had been eighteen yeаrs of age or older when the person committed the act. All proceedings pertaining to the act shall be within the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the offense, and that court has all the authority and duties in the case that it has in other criminal сases in that court.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶13} While Martin committed the offense when he was 14 or 15, he was not apprehended until he was 22.2 Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to dispose of all proceedings pertaining to Martin’s offense.
{¶14} Under Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law, “anyone convicted of a sexually oriented offense [was to] be classified as a sexually oriented offender and be subject to annuаl reporting requirements for a period of ten years.” State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, ¶ 29.
{¶15} Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law, entitled Martin to a hearing for the trial court to “determine whether he should be classified as a sexual predator, a habitual sex offender or a habitual child-victim offender, or a sexually oriented offender.” Id. at ¶ 17. See also
The judge who is to impose sentence on a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense shall conduct a hеaring to determine whether the offender is a sexual predator if any of the following circumstances apply:
(i) Regardless of when the sexually oriented offense was committed, the offender is to be sentenced on or after January 1, 1997, for a sеxually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense and that is not a sexually violent offense.
(Emphasis added.) Martin pleaded guilty to and was convicted of a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense and not a sexually violent offense.
{¶16}
“Sexually oriented offense” means any of the following:
(2) An act committed by a person under eighteen years of age that is any of the following:
(a) Subject to division (D)(2)(i) of this section, regardless of the age of the victim of the violation, a violation of section 2907.02, 2907.03, 2907.05, or 2907.07 of the Revised Code.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶17} The offense to which Martin pleaded guilty and was convicted is nоt a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense.
“Presumptive rеgistration-exempt sexually oriented offense” means any of the following sexually oriented offenses described in division
(P)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of this section, when the offense is committed by a person who previously has not been convicted of, pleаded guilty to, or adjudicated a delinquent child for committing any sexually oriented offense described in division (P)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of this section, any other sexually oriented offense, or any child-victim oriented offense and when the victim or intended victim of the offеnse is eighteen years of age or older.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶18} Martin’s offense cannot be considered a presumрtive registration-exempt sexually oriented offense because his victim was under the age of 18. Therefore, Martin was not convicted of a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense. Accordingly, the trial court was required to hold a registrаtion hearing to determine his offender status. Because the trial court had jurisdiction to dispose of all proceedings pertaining to Martin’s offense, his argument that it was unnecessary for the trial court to consider whether he committed a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense is erroneous. Instead, the trial court properly considered whether he committed a registration-exempt sexually oriented
{¶19} Accordingly, Martin’s first and third assignments of error are overruled.
Assignment of Error No. II
The Trial Court erred in stating that Defendant/Appellant “previously was adjudicated a delinquent сhild…pursuant to Chapter 2152. [sic] of the Revised Code, or the offender has a history of criminal convictions.”
{¶20} In his second assignment of error, Martin argues that the trial court erred in finding that Martin was previously adjudicated a delinquent child.
{¶21} Again, because Martin is asking us to ascertain whether the trial court applied the correct law to the facts of his case, we will review his argument under this assignment of error de novo. Romeo, 2008-Ohio-1499, at ¶ 9.
{¶22} Martin erroneously cites
“Delinquent child” includes any of the following:
(1) Any child, except a juvenile traffic offender, who violates any law of this state or the United States, or any ordinance of a political
subdivision of the state, that would be an offense if committed by an adult.
{¶23} Martin was adjudicated a delinquent child on September 10, 2002 for inducing panic, a fourth-degree felony. (PSI at 3). Accordingly, Martin’s second assignment of error is without merit and overruled.
Assignment of Error No. IV
The Trial Court erred in ordering Community Control Sanctions on Defendant/Appellant.
{¶24} In his fourth assignment of error, Martin argues that the trial court erred in imposing community-control sanctions against him because its finding that he was previously adjudicated a delinquent child was improper. Because we determined in addressing Martin’s second assignment of error that he was previously adjudicated a delinquent child, his argument under this assignment of error is baseless and overruled.
{¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.