State v. LutherState v. Luther
OPINION
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Daniel Luther (“Luther“), appeals the December 3, 2003 judgment entry of the Ashtabula County Court denying his Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw a guilty plea. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the court below.
{¶ 2} On December 18, 1987, Luther pled guilty to three counts of rape in violation of
{¶ 3} Luther raises the following assignments of error:
{¶ 4} “[1.] The trial court abused its discretion by not reviewing the record to determine [whether] Luther‘s plea of guilty was in fact knowingly and intelligently given and entered into. In violation of the
{¶ 5} “[2.] The trial court was totally without statutory subject-matter jurisdiction in the matter of State v. Luther as a matter of law. In violation of
{¶ 6} “[3.] The trial court was totally lack[ing] statutory jurisdiction of the accuser and the accused, therefore there is no binding agreement between Luther and the State of Ohio. As Luther was not served with personal service, (
{¶ 7} Ohio Criminal Rule 32.1 provides: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” The phrase “manifest injustice” has been “variously defined,” however, “it is clear that under such standard, a postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264 (citations omitted); cf. State v. Laster, 2nd Dist. No. 19387, 2003-Ohio-1564, at ¶ 8 (“`manifest injustice’ * * * comprehends a fundamental flaw in the path of justice so extraordinary that the defendant could not have sought redress from the resulting prejudice through another form of application reasonably available to him or her“) (citation omitted); State v. Sneed, 8th Dist No. 80902, 2002-Ohio-6502, at ¶ 13 (a “clear or openly unjust act“) (citation omitted); State v. Lintner, 7th Dist. No. 732, 2001-Ohio-3360, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4267, at *7 (“an extraordinary and fundamental flaw in the plea proceeding“) (citation omitted).
{¶ 8} The burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice is on the movant. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, paragraph one of the syllabus. “A motion made pursuant to Crim. R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the good faith, credibility and weight of the movant‘s assertions in support of the motion are matters to be resolved by that court.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 9} In Luther‘s first assignment of error, he argues that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179 (“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.“). Luther claims that, at the time he entered his plea, he was made aware of his right to confront witnesses but not of his right to confront his accusers. Cf.
{¶ 10} We reject the argument that one‘s right to confront their accusers is distinct from their right to confront the witnesses against them.
{¶ 11} In Luther‘s third assignment of error, he argues that “there [was] no lawful statutory accuser.” Therefore, as Luther argues in his second assignment of error, the trial court did not possess the authority or jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea. In support of these arguments, Luther points out that there is no complaint against him in the record as provided for in Crim.R. 3. These arguments reflect a misunderstanding of Ohio criminal process.
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} Minor criminal prosecutions may be initiated by complaint as provided in Crim.R. 3. Felonies, such as rape, may only be initiated by indictment of the grand jury.
{¶ 14} The indictments against Luther adequately informed him of the charges against him and of the essential elements of rape as contained in
{¶ 15} The answer to Luther‘s argument that there was no “lawful statutory accuser” is that the grand jury, which handed down the indictments against him, was Luther‘s statutory accuser. “The grand jury, in its inquest of crimes and offenses, and in its finding and presentation of indictments to the court of common pleas * * * acts as the formal and constitutional accuser of crime and those it believes to be probably guilty thereof.” State ex rel. Doerfler v. Price (1920), 101 Ohio St. 50, at paragraph one of the syllabus. The preference for the grand jury as the formal accuser in felony cases, as opposed to the complaint of the victim or arresting officer, is founded on the “the theory that [the grand jury] was one of the most substantial and serviceable guaranties against official tyranny, malicious prosecution, and ill-advised and expensive trials, which might generally be avoided if the formal accusation of crime were first made by one‘s peers, as represented by the grand jury.” Id. at 54.
{¶ 16} In denying Luther‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court found that Luther had set forth “no operative facts, which, if true, would constitute a manifest injustice.” Having reviewed the process by which Luther was charged and the circumstances in which his plea was entered, the trial court acted within its discretion by denying Luther‘s motion.
{¶ 17} Luther‘s assignments of error are without merit. The decision of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
O‘Ne