THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT.
No. 95-880
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
July 30, 1996
76 Ohio St.3d 290 | 1996-Ohio-408
Submitted February 7, 1996. APPEAL from Court of Appeals for Athens County, No. 94CA1626.
- The doctrine of issue preclusion does not preclude the relitigation in a criminal proceeding of an issue that was previously determined at an administrative-license-suspension hearing.
- A trial court’s determination of an administrative-license-suspension appeal is an order entered in a special proceeding and is final pursuant to
R.C. 2505.02 . (Columbus v. Adams [1984], 10 Ohio St.3d 57, 10 OBR 348, 461 N.E.2d 887, overruled.)
Garry E. Hunter, Director of Law, and George P. McCarthy, Athens City Prosecutor, for appellee.
John P. Lavelle, for appellant.
W. Andrew Hasselbach, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
{¶ 1} On December 11, 1993, Sergeant Scholl and Trooper Rutherford of the Ohio State Highway Patrol observed a car, traveling eastbound at a high rate of speed, cross over a double yellow line on an undivided roadway and pass a slower vehicle. Only Sergeant Scholl observed the driver of the speeding vehicle. By the time the patrolmen caught up with the vehicle, it had already been parked on the side of the street and the driver and passenger had exited the vehicle and were entering a bar as the patrolmen approached them. Smelling alcohol on Williams’s person, Sergeant Scholl administered field sobriety tests to Williams and determined that he was under the influence of alcohol. Williams was placed under arrest by Trooper Rutherford and taken to the Athens Post of the Ohio State Highway Patrol where, after unsuccessfully attempting to contact his attorney, Williams consented to a breath-alcohol test. Williams tested at .137 grams of alcohol by weight per two-hundred-ten liters of breath. Williams was subsequently charged with violations of
{¶ 2} On December 13, Williams served notice that he was appealing the administrative license suspension. An ALS hearing was scheduled for December 16, but was continued until December 17. At the ALS appeal, Trooper Rutherford testified that he never actually saw who was driving the speeding car, and that Williams never admitted to being the driver. Provided with only Trooper Rutherford’s testimony, the trial court found that there was no reasonable basis to stop or detain Williams and terminated the license suspension.
{¶ 3} On January 31, 1994, Williams filed his first motion to suppress, arguing that the trial court’s judgment regarding the ALS appeal was res judicata on Williams’s drunk-driving charges. At the motion hearing on February 10, Sergeant Scholl was present and testified that he did have the opportunity to observe the driver of the speeding car and identified him as Williams. Evidently, based on this new testimony the trial court found that the patrolmen did have reasonable grounds to stop Williams, and denied the motion to suppress.1
{¶ 5} This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
{¶ 6} This case presents the court with the question of whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigating, in the criminal proceeding for a charge of drunk driving, an issue that was previously ruled on at the administrative-license-suspension hearing.
{¶ 7} This is one of three cases we decide today that require us to determine the constitutionality and application of
{¶ 8} Pursuant to
“If the person appeals the suspension at his initial appearance, the scope of the appeal is limited to determining whether one or more of the following conditions have not been met:
“(a) Whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable ground to believe the arrested person was operating a vehicle * * * while under the influence * * * or with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the blood, breath, or urine and whether the arrested person was in fact placed under arrest;
“(b) Whether the law enforcement officer requested the arrested person to submit to the chemical test * * *; “(c) Whether the arresting officer informed the arrested person of the consequences of refusing to be tested or of submitting to the test;
“(d) Whichever of the following is applicable:
“(i) Whether the arrested person refused to submit to the chemical test requested by the officer;
“(ii) Whether the chemical test results indicate that [the arrestee’s blood, breath, or urine contain alcohol in excess of the statutory limits].”
R.C. 4511.191(H)(1)(a) through (d).
{¶ 9} While the court may grant a continuance to either the arrestee or the BMV, the continuance neither stays the ALS nor delays the initial appearance for the underlying drunk-driving charge.
{¶ 10} At this appeal, the BMV is generally represented by the prosecuting attorney.
{¶ 11} Williams argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should apply to prevent the trial court from denying his first motion to suppress. Williams contends that since the court decided during his ALS appeal hearing that Trooper Rutherford and Sergeant Scholl lacked reasonable grounds to stop him, the trial court should be bound by this determination and should have granted his motion to suppress the use of his chemical test results in his criminal drunk-driving trial. We disagree.
{¶ 12} The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or, more correctly, issue preclusion, precludes further action on an identical issue that has been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment as part of a prior action among the same parties or those in privity with those parties. Hicks v. De La Cruz (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 71, 74, 6 O.O.3d 274, 276, 369 N.E.2d 776, 777; Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 2 OBR 732, 443 N.E.2d 978, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 13} It cannot be disputed that
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} Unquestionably, the suspension of the use and possession of a driver’s license affects a substantial property interest. Williams v. Dollison (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 297, 16 O.O.3d 350, 405 N.E.2d 714; Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172; Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90. For purposes of determining whether a court has issued a final appealable order, the putting in jeopardy of this property interest implicates a substantial right. Bell, 402 U.S. at 539, 91 S.Ct. at 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d at 94 (Although a driver’s license may be considered a privilege, the right to due process limits the state’s power “to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege.’” [Citations omitted.]). Therefore, the only question remaining is whether the procedures in
{¶ 17} The final threshold requirement of issue preclusion is mutuality of, or privity between, the parties in the prior and subsequent actions. Thus, for issue preclusion to apply, the parties involved in the administrative-license-suspension appeal must be the same or in privity with the parties involved in the criminal proceeding on the drunk-driving charge. The state argues essentially that privity does not exist between the parties because it is the BMV whose interest is represented at the ALS appeal and it is the state whose interest is represented at the criminal proceeding. We find this argument to be unpersuasive. The state acts through its various agencies and entities, and the Bureau of Motor Vehicles is an agency of the state. We conclude that the state of Ohio is the real party in interest in both proceedings and the requirement of privity as an element of issue preclusion is satisfied.
“Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:
“***
“(3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts ***;
“***; or
“(5) There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue (a) because of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the public interest or the interests of persons not themselves parties in the initial action, (b) because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or (c) because the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} This court has previously recognized such exceptions to the principles of issue preclusion when we held that preclusion applies “unless [a party] lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the first action, or unless other circumstances justify according him an opportunity to relitigate that issue.” (Emphasis added.) Hicks, 52 Ohio St.2d at 74, 6 O.O.3d at 276, 369 N.E.2d at 778, citing Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (Tent. Draft No. 4 [1977]), Section 68, at page 1, and (Tent. Draft No. 2 [1975]), Section 88, at pages 89-90. In finding an exception to the general rule of issue preclusion, we observe several factors.
{¶ 20} First, administrative-license-suspension proceedings under
{¶ 22} Accordingly, we hold that the doctrine of issue preclusion does not preclude the relitigation in a criminal proceeding of an issue that was previously determined at an administrative-license-suspension hearing.
{¶ 23} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DOUGLAS, PATTON, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, KARPINSKI and COOK, JJ., concur.
JOHN T. PATTON, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for WRIGHT, J.
DIANE KARPINSKI, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for PFEIFER, J.