State v. LoweState v. Lowe
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Sadler, Dorrian, T. Bryant
SADLER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Louis N. Lowe, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin Cоunty Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On June 21, 2007, a Franklin County Grand Jury indictеd appellant on one count of aggravated murder with a firearm specification and one count of having a weapon undеr disability. On May 15, 2009, appellant entered a plea of guilty to murder, in violation of
{¶ 3} Appellant did not file a direct appeal from that judgment. Appellant, however, did seek postconviction relief pursuant to
{¶ 4} Thereafter, on April 1, 2014, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 5} Appellant‘s assignments of error are as follows:
[I.] The Trial Court failed during the change of plea hearing to inform Appellant of the right to confront his accusers and to have his attorney cross еxamine them, and the right to testify on his behalf.
[II.] The Trial Court erred and abused its discretion when it denied Appellant‘s Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea as being barrеd by res judicata.
[III.] The Trial Court erred when it denied Appellant‘s Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea after a review of the record (transcripts), thus Appеllant was not informed about Post Release Control or the consequence for a violation of Post Release Control rendering guilty рlea void, thus not entering in a knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently manner.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} A motion made pursuant to
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. First and Second Assignments of Error
{¶ 8} The arguments made by appellant in his first and second assignments of error are closely related. Accordingly, we will consider appellant‘s first and second assignments of error together.
{¶ 9} In appellant‘s first assignment of error, appellant claims the trial сourt erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea inasmuch as the trial court failed to inform him that he was waiving certain constitutional rights by pleаding guilty. More specifically, appellant claims that the sentencing judge failed to orally inform him that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver оf his right to confront his accusers and his right to testify in his own defense. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred when it ruled that res judicata barred each of the claims raised in appellant‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶ 10} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceеding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could hаve been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. This court
{¶ 11} When a trial judge fails to explain the constitutional rights set forth in
B. Third Assignment of Error
{¶ 12} In his third assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea inasmuch as the sentencing judge failed to personally inform him that he was subject to a mandatory term of post-release control.1 Our review of the May 19, 2009 sentencing entry reveals that the sentencing court did nоt impose a term of post-release control.
{¶ 13} An individual sentenced for murder is not subject to post-release control becаuse that crime is an unclassified felony to which the post-release control statute does not apply. See State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶ 10;
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 14} Having overruled appellant‘s three assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
DORRIAN and T. BRYANT, JJ., concur.
T. BRYANT, J., retired, formerly of the Third Appellate District, assigned to active duty under authority of the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 6(C).