STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. RODNEY LOMAX, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
No. 98125
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
September 13, 2012
[Cite as State v. Lomax, 2012-Ohio-4167.]
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case Nos. CR-543073, CR-549126, and CR-549974
BEFORE: Kilbane, J., Rocco, P.J., and Keough, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 13, 2012
Paul Mancino, Jr.
75 Public Square
Suite 1016
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2098
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Mahmoud Awadallah
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center - 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Rodney Lomax (“Lomax“), appeals from his guilty plea in three separate cases. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
{¶2} In November 2010, Lomax was charged in Case No. CR-543073 with four counts of aggravated burglary, five counts of kidnapping, four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted murder, one count of felonious assault, two counts of rape, one count of having a weapon while under disability, and one count of theft. Each of these counts, except the having a weapon while under disability charge, carried one and three-yeаr firearm specifications, and one of the kidnapping charges additionally carried a sexual motivation specification. In April 2011, Lomax was charged in Case No. CR-549126 with drug possession, drug trafficking, and possessing criminal tools, with each count carrying various forfeiture specifications. In May 2011, Lomax was charged in Case No. CR-549974 with two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of felonious assault, two counts of theft, and one count of having a weapon while under disability. Each of these counts, except the having a weapon while under disability charge, carried a one- and three-year firearm specifications.
{¶4} Lomax now appeals, raising the following three assignments of error for review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
[Lomax] was denied due process of law when the court accepted pleas of guilty without informing [him] of the effect of pleas of guilty.
[Lomax] was denied due process of law when the court failed to inform [him] as to the nature of the amended charges to which he was entering pleas of guilty.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE
[Lomax] was denied due process of law and his Sixth Amendment rights when [he] wаs sentenced based on judicial factfinding.
Guilty Plea
{¶5} In the first and second assignments of error, Lomax challenges the validity of his guilty pleas.
{¶6} Before accepting a guilty plea in a felony case,
{¶7} A trial court must strictly comply with the
{¶8} “[A] defendant must show prejudiсe before a plea will be vacated for a trial court‘s error involving
{¶9} In the instant case, the trial court‘s compliance with
{¶10} A review of the plea colloquy reveals that the trial court did not inform Lomax that his guilty pleа was a complete admission of guilt. Because the right to be informed that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt is a nonconstitutional right,
{¶11} We note that the Ohio Supreme Court considered the same argument now made by Lomax, in Griggs, and held that “a defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted his guilt. In such circumstances, a court‘s failure to inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea as required by
{¶12} Here, the totality of the circumstances indicate that Lomax understood he was admitting his guilt by pleading guilty. The trial court informed Lomax of his constitutional rights and Lomax indicated that he understood those rights. Lomax also understood that he would be waiving his constitutional rights by entering pleas of guilty in each case, and he did not assert thаt he was innocent of the crimes. Thus, the record sufficiently demonstrates that Lomax understood that by entering pleas of guilty, he admitted to committing aggravated robbery and drug trafficking.
{¶13} Lomax next argues that his guilty pleas are invalid because thе trial court failed to inform him of the nature of the charges against him. The right to be informed
{¶14} This court has consistently held that “‘courts are not required to explain the elements of each offense, or to specifically ask the defendant whether he understands the charges, unless the tоtality of the circumstances shows that the defendant does not understand the charges.‘” State v. Whitfield, 8th Dist. No. 81247, 2003-Ohio-1504, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Cobb, 8th Dist. No. 76950, 2001-Ohio-4132; State v. Carpenter, 8th Dist. No. 81571, 2003-Ohio-3019; State v. Parker, 8th Dist. No. 82687, 2004-Ohio-2976; State v. Clay, 8th Dist. No. 89763, 2008-Ohio-1415; State v. Martin, 8th Dist. Nos. 92600 and 92601, 2010-Ohio-244. Here, nothing in the record indicates that Lomax did not understand the charges to which he pled guilty. The plea colloquy demonstrates the trial court identified each charge to which Lomax was pleading guilty and explained the maximum penalty involved. The state also explained to the court the plea bargain reached by the parties, outlining each individual count and spеcifying the degree of the offense for each count. In addition, Lomax has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced in any way by his pleas. He does not claim that he would not have pleaded guilty if the trial court had defined each element of the offenses. Without a showing of prejudice, Lomax‘s argument fails. Clay at ¶ 15.
{¶15} Accordingly, we find that Lomax‘s guilty pleas were taken in compliance with
Sentence
{¶17} In the third assignment of error, Lomax argues he was denied his Sixth Amendment rights when the trial court imposed a maximum, consecutive sentence in Case No. CR-543073 when the trial court based the sentence on facts not alleged in the indictment nor admitted by Lomax аt the time of his plea. Specifically, he refers to the trial court‘s comments that “[d]ue to the egregious facts and issues in this case, I believe it is appropriate to provide the maximum sentence of ten years.”
{¶18} This court has applied a two-step approach when reviewing a felony sentence in accordance with State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 4.
In applying [State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470,] to the existing statutes, appellate courts must apply a two-step approach. First, they must examine the sentencing court‘s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the trial court‘s decision shall be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
{¶19} In Foster, the Ohio Supreme Court held that trial courts “have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing mаximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.” Id. at ¶ 100. The Kalish court declared that although Foster eliminated mandatory judicial fact-finding, it left
{¶20}
{¶21} The record in this case demonstrates that the trial court considеred the applicable factors and principles contained in
[a]fter consideration of [the PSI, the file, the sentencing memorandum that was provided by the State of Ohio] and the statements that are made, seriousness of the offense, the recidivism factors, and the need for deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and restitution, I think there‘s no question in my mind that a prison sentence is appropriate.
Accordingly the third assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR