State of Ohio v. Harrison S. Lofton IV
Case No: 11CA16
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PICKAWAY COUNTY
May 18, 2012
[Cite as State v. Lofton, 2012-Ohio-2274.]
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Harrison S. Lofton IV, Toledo, Ohio, pro se, Appellant.
Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecutor, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee.
Kline, J.:
{1} Harrison S. Lofton IV (hereinafter “Lofton“) аppeals the judgment of the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his motion for resentencing. On appeal, Lofton claims that the trial court erred in imposing postrelease control. As a result, Lofton argues that he is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing. Because Lofton was convicted of an unclassified felony, we agree that the trial court erred in imposing postrelease control. We disagree, however, that Lofton is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
{2} Aftеr pleading guilty, Lofton was convicted of murder with a firearm specification. The trial court imposed fifteen years to life for the murder count, one year
{3} On June 9, 2011, Lofton filed a Motion fоr Resentencing. Lofton argued that the trial court erred by failing to “inform the defendant that he could be returned to prison for up to one-half his originally stated term for violating his post-release control[.]” Id. As a result, Lofton claimed that his “sentence is void, requiring [the trial court] to convey him back before it to be resentenced.” Id.
{4} In а June 13, 2011 Decision and Entry, the trial court denied Lofton‘s Motion for Resentencing.
{5} Lofton appeals and asserts the following two assignments of error: I. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO FOLLOW statutory mandates on sentencing; to wit: properly notifying the defendant of Pоst Release Control guidelines and violations at his/her sentencing hearing.” And, II. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING defendant-appellant‘s motion for Resentencing, filed with the Court of Common Pleas of Pickaway County, on or about June 9, of 2011.”
II.
{6} We will review Lofton‘s assignmеnts of error together. Essentially, Lofton claims that the trial court erred in imposing postrelease contrоl. As a result, Lofton argues that he is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing.
{7} To resolve Lofton‘s appeal, we must interpret and apply the statutes related to postrelease control and parolе. Thus, our review is de novo. See State v. Jenkins, 4th Dist. No. 10CA3389, 2011-Ohio-6924, ¶ 9.
{8} Here, Lofton was convicted of murder, “which is an unclassified felony to which the post-release control statute does not apply.” State v. Silguero, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-274, 2011-Ohio-6293, ¶ 8, citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 36; State v. Gripper, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1186, 2011-Ohio-3656, ¶ 10. “Instead of postrelease control, when аn offender convicted of an unclassified felony is released from prison he or she is subject to parole.” State v. Evans, 8th Dist. No. 95692, 2011-Ohio-2153, ¶ 7, citing Clark at ¶ 36;
{9} When confronted with a similar issue, the Tenth Appellate District held the following:
In the case sub judice, the trial court included post-release control language in appellant‘s sentence even though appellant was convicted of murder, an unclassified felony. Pursuant to [State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332], and also Evans and [State v. Lawrence, 2d Dist. No. 24513, 2011-Ohio-5813], it is clear that this does not render appellant‘s entire sentence void,
nor does it require a de novo sentencing hearing. Silguero at ¶ 16.
{10} We agree with thе Tenth Appellate District and apply the reasoning of Silguero to the present case. “The Fischer court held that when postrelease control is not properly imposed only the postrelease control part of the sentence is void, not the entire sentence.” Evans at ¶ 10. And although “a trial court is required to notify a defendant that he or she will be subject to post-release control, there is no similar requirement that a trial court notify a defendant about parole supervision.” Silguero at ¶ 15, citing Lawrence at ¶ 8. Therefore, Lofton is not entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing. Silguero at ¶ 16. Instead, the proper remedy is “is to remand the matter for the trial court to correct the sentencing entry to eliminate the postrеlease control language.” Evans at ¶ 9.
{11} Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred by imposing postrelease cоntrol as part of Lofton‘s sentence. But the trial court‘s error does not entitle Lofton to a de novo sеntencing hearing. Therefore, we affirm the trial court‘s June 13, 2011 Decision and Entry. However, we also remand this matter аnd instruct the trial court to correct the January 18, 2006 Entry of Sentence on Change of Plea by removing all references to postrelease control.
CAUSE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
{12} Although the majority concludes our decision “affirms” the trial court‘s judgmеnt (in toto), see ¶¶1 and 11, I believe we are affirming in part and reversing and remanding in part. Our decision concludes the trial court erred in imposing postrelease control and it remands with instructions to correct this error. Therefore, I cannot concur in a judgment that simply “affirms” the trial court‘s judgment.
It is ordered that THIS CAUSE BE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS and that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordеred that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Aрpellate Procedure. Exceptions.
McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Harsha, J.: Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part with Opinion.
For the Court
BY: __________________________
Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.