State v. LewisState v. Lewis
OPINION
Rendered on March 1, 2024
COLIN P. COCHRAN, Attorney for Appellant
JANE A. NAPIER, Attorney for Appellee
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Anthony Dion Lewis appeals from his conviction for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer following a jury trial. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm thе judgment of the trial court.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On November 18, 2022, Lewis was pulled over while driving a Dodge Dakota
{¶ 3} In January 2023, Lewis was indicted for one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer in violation of
{¶ 4} Hepburn testified that he was a home remodeler and had hired Lewis as a
{¶ 5} Lieutenant McConnell also testified at Lewis‘s trial. McConnell stated that he had seen Hepburn‘s truck pass his stationary location and had observed that the driver of the vehicle was not wearing a seatbelt. McConnell then entered the vehicle registration information into the Law Enforcement Automatic Data System (LEADS) and discovered that the registered owner of the vehicle (Hepburn) did not have a valid driver‘s license. Before stopping the vehicle, McConnell noticed the passenger, later identified as Hepburn, making furtive movements and suspected that he was trying to hide something.
{¶ 6} Upon approaching the vehicle and confirming that the driver (Lewis) was driving without a seatbelt, McConnell asked Lewis for his driver‘s license, which Lewis was not cаrrying. Lewis then identified himself by name and Social Security number, and McConnell returned to his patrol car with Lewis‘s personal information and entered it into LEADS. LEADS populated an active arrest warrant and picture for Lewis, and McConnell identified Lewis, with the assistance of an additional more-recent photograph from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (ODRC) database, as the driver of the vehicle and a violator-at-large with an arrest warrant. Lewis had an opportunity to observe Lewis during the time he was standing outside the driver‘s side of the vehicle. From the safety of his patrol car, McConnell shouted for Hepburn and Lewis to show their hands, to throw the vehicle keys out the window, and to exit the vehicle. Instead, Lewis drove away. The traffic stop lasted approximately fivе minutes, ending at around 4:38 p.m.
{¶ 7} McConnell pursued Lewis in a high-speed chase for approximately 15 minutes over 20 miles, but then terminated the pursuit due to safety concerns at around 4:56 p.m. According to McConnell, Hepburn called the police at around 5:38 p.m. to reрort the high-speed chase involving his vehicle. McConnell testified that, with the assistance of the two photographs, he was 100% certain that Lewis had been the driver of the vehicle.
{¶ 8} The jury found Lewis guilty of the one count of failure to comply with an order
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 9} Lewis raises a single assignment of error, claiming his cоnviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 10} A weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more believable or persuasive. State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 12, citing State v. Hufnagel, 2d Dist. Montgomеry No. 15563, 1996 WL 501470, *3 (Sept. 6, 1996). The proper test to apply to a manifest weight of the evidence inquiry is set forth in State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983), which states:
[T]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving сonflicts in the evidence, the jury lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Wilson at ¶ 12-13, citing Martin at 175. “In order to find that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred, an appellate court must cоnclude that a guilty verdict is ‘against,’ that is,
{¶ 11} The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are matters primarily for the trier of fact to resolve. Id. at ¶ 15, citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). In State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684 (Aug. 22, 1997), we explained:
Because the factfinder * * * has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, the cautious exercise of the discretionary power of a court of appeals to find that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires that substantial deferenсe be extended to the factfinder‘s determinations of credibility. The decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.
Id. at *4. Thus, we will not substitute our judgmеnt for that of the trier of fact on the issue of witness credibility unless it is patently apparent that the trier of fact lost its way in arriving at its verdict. See Wilson at ¶ 17, citing State v. Bradley, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 1997-CA-3, 1997 WL 691510, *4 (Oct. 24, 1997).
{¶ 12} The trier of fact is in the best position to consider inconsistencies, along with the witnesses’ manner and demеanor, and determine whether the witnesses’ testimony is credible. State v. Petty, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 11AP-716, 11AP-766, 2012-Ohio-2989, ¶ 38, citing State v. Williams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-35, 2002-Ohio-4503, ¶ 58. Consequently, an appellate court must give great deference to the fact finder‘s
{¶ 13} Additionally, “[t]he fact that the evidence is subject to different interpretations does not render the conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Adams, 2d Dist. Greene Nos. 2013-CA-61 and 2013-CA-62, 2014-Ohio-3432, ¶ 24. “It is well-established that when conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the prosecution testimony.” In re M.J.C., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-05-124, 2015-Ohio-820, ¶ 35.
{¶ 14} Lewis first arguеs that the credibility of Hepburn as a witness was questionable. Lewis points out that Hepburn was a methamphetamine user with a suspended driver‘s license and that he hired employees with criminal records. According to Lewis, Hepburn provided conflicting testimony as to how he and Lewis parted ways after the car chase, specifically claiming that Hepburn testified that Lewis (“Tony“) had abandoned Hepburn in the vehicle while Lewis went to his relative‘s house, that Lewis had dropped Hepburn off at a gas station, that Hepburn had failed to tell police about the stop at the ATM; and that Hepburn had remained in the vehicle with Lewis for four hours after the car chase before contacting the police. Lewis argues that Hepburn had his own
{¶ 15} Lewis also argues that McConnell‘s testimony was questionable. Lewis contends that the entire traffic stop lasted only five minutes and that most of McConnell‘s time during the traffic stop was spent in his police cruiser running the plates of the vehicle, initiating the traffic stop, querying LEADS, and issuing surrender commands from the safety of his cruiser. Lewis argues that McConnell‘s identification оf Lewis as the driver of the vehicle rested solely on McConnell‘s alleged visual observation of the driver during a high-pressure traffic stop in which McConnell was concerned with his own safety. Lewis asserts that McConnell did not get a second look at the driver to confirm his identification of the driver as Lewis.
{¶ 16} We note that the crux of Lewis‘s defense was that the State had “the wrong guy.” However, Lieutenant McConnell testified that, upon stopping the vehicle, the driver, later identified as Lewis, provided his name and Social Security number to McConnell аfter stating that he did not have his wallet. McConnell then entered Lewis‘s information into LEADS, which populated an active arrest warrant and picture for Lewis. McConnell ultimately identified Lewis, with the assistance of an additional more-recent photograph from the ODRC database, as the person he had observed as the driver of the vehicle and a violator-at-large with an arrest warrant; McConnell testified that he was 100% certain that Lewis and the driver of the vehicle were the same person. Furthermore, Hepburn, the passеnger and owner of the vehicle, corroborated McConnell‘s identification of Lewis
{¶ 17} Lewis did not testify аnd did not present an alternative version of events. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimonies are matters for the trier of fact primarily to resolve. Here, the jury had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and to weigh the evidence; it believed the State‘s witnesses. Although Lewis argues that Hepburn‘s and McConnell‘s testimonies at trial were questionable, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on the issue of witness credibility. Additionally, although Lewis contends that Hepburn provided conflicting testimony as tо how he and Lewis parted ways after the car chase, we do not agree. Moreover, a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because conflicting evidence was presented at trial. The jury was free to credit the State‘s evidence.
{¶ 18} As previously stated, the members of a jury are free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it, and disagreement over the credibility of witnesses is not sufficient reason to reverse a judgment. Upon our review of the entire record, we cannot say that the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice or that Lewis‘s conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial.
{¶ 19} Lewis‘s assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 20} Having overruled Lewis‘s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.