State v. LewisState v. Lewis
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 13, 2022
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Friedman, Gilbert, and Gerhardstein and Mary Catherine Corrigan, for appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Justin P. Lewis (“Lewis“) appeals the trial court‘s denial of his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Lewis asks this
{¶ 2} Lewis was indicted in Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-17-624178 and CR-18-626972-B on several offenses. Lewis pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking, a second-degree felony, in violation of
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} Lewis filed an appeal in State v. Lewis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107552, 2019-Ohio-1994 (”Lewis I“), and argued that “[t]he trial court erred when it did not determine that the defendant understood he was waiving certain constitutionally guaranteed trial rights by pleading guilty * * *.” Id. at ¶ 4. The court held that “the trial court substantially complied with its obligations under
{¶ 4} In response to Lewis‘s argument regarding the trial court‘s failure to inform him that he was waiving certain rights by entering a plea of guilty, the court in Lewis II held that
“[r]es judicata prevents this court from once again determining whether Lewis was prejudiced through his plea of guilty. State v. Tate, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81682, 2004-Ohio-973.” Id. at ¶ 9. Additionally, the court held “that circumstances do not render the application of the doctrine of res judicata unjust. Lewis has failed to establish any prejudice * * *.”
{¶ 5} Specifically, under the second assignment of error in Lewis II, Lewis argued that his appellate counsel failed to argue during his appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to argue that law enforcement enhanced the offense by improperly accumulating the amount of drugs confiscated. Id. at ¶ 11. The court in Lewis II determined that “Lewis has failed to establish with any specificity how he was prejudiced by the conduct of trial court counsel.” Id. at ¶ 12. Further the court stated, “The mere recitation of a proposed assignment of error, without demonstration of the error and resulting prejudice, does not establish a proposed assignment of error in support of the
The trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant‘s postsentence motion to withdraw plea without holding a hearing.
II. Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 7} “We review a trial court‘s decision to deny a defendant‘s postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Simmons, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109786, 2021-Ohio-1656, ¶ 19. “We likewise review a trial court‘s decision whether to hold a hearing on a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶ 8} “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
B. Law and Analysis
{¶ 9} A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by
{¶ 10} Lewis filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea more than two years after he pleaded guilty and was sentenced. The trial court denied his motion, and Lewis argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without holding a hearing. “A trial court is not required to hold a hearing on every postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea” Simmons, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109786, 2021-Ohio-1656, at ¶ 20, unless the defendant establishes that a manifest injustice as occurred. “In a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the defendant bears the burden of establishing the existence of ‘manifest injustice.‘” Id. at ¶ 18, quoting State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. “Manifest injustice is ‘a clear or openly unjust act,‘” “that is evidenced by ‘an extraordinary and fundamental flaw in the plea proceeding.‘” Id., quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, 699 N.E.2d 83 (1998); State v. McElroy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 104639, 104640, and 104641, 2017-Ohio-1049, ¶ 30.
{¶ 11} However, “a trial court has no jurisdiction to consider a defendant‘s motion to withdraw his or her guilty pleas under
{¶ 12} The Ohio Supreme Court explained in State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Belmont Cty. Court of Common Pleas Judges, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97-98, 378 N.E.2d 162 (1978).
Crim.R. 32.1 does not vest jurisdiction in the trial court to maintain and determine a motion to withdraw the guilty plea subsequent to an appeal and an affirmance by the appellate court. WhileCrim.R. 32.1 apparently enlarges the power of the trial court over its judgments without respect to the running of the court term, it does not confer upon the trial court the power to vacate a judgment which has been affirmed by the appellate court, for this action would affect the decision of the reviewing court, which is not within the power of the trial court to do.
{¶ 13} Thus, after this court affirmed Lewis‘s convictions in Lewis I,
{¶ 14} Lewis‘s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 15} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, A.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR