State v. LevisonState v. Levison
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 7, 2021
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristin M. Karkutt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Maxwell Martin, for appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Orniesha Levison apрeals her sentence after she entered a guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter. She argues that her maximum
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶ 3} On September 10, 2020, a Cuyahoga Grand Jury charged Levison and codefendant Brittany Lynn in a nine-count indictment. Levison was charged with four counts: one count of involuntary manslaughter in violation of
{¶ 4} Levison initially pled not guilty to all charges. On January 13, 2021, the parties reached a plea agreement. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Levison agreed to plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter in violation of
{¶ 5} After accepting Levison‘s guilty pleas, the trial court proceeded directly to sentencing. Prior to sentencing Levison, the trial court read a victim impact statement written by Harris. The trial court also reviewed a video of the incident1 and heard from the state, English‘s mother, Levison, the grandmother of Levison‘s son and defense counsel.
{¶ 6} On the involuntary manslaughter count, the trial court sentenced Levison to 36 mоnths in prison and imposed a $250 fine plus three years of mandatory postrelease control and costs. On the criminal damaging and endangering count, the trial court imposed a $250 fine and costs.
{¶ 7} On January 21, 2021, the trial court issued a sentencing journal entry in which it set fоrth Levison‘s sentence and further indicated: “The court considered all required factors of the law. The court finds that prison is consistent with the purpose of
{¶ 8} Levison appealed, raising the following single assignment of error for review:
Appellant‘s sentence is contrary to law and the record does not support the imposition of a maximum sentence.
{¶ 9} Levison argues that her 36-month sentence for involuntary manslaughter should be vacated because it is contrary to law and is not supported by the record. She contends that her sentence is contrary to law because “nothing in the transcript” from the sentencing hearing “reflects actual consideration of the purposes and principles of sentencing or of the seriousness and recidivism factors that every sentencing court is required to consider” prior to sentencing a defendant on a felony and “[i]t cannot be ascertained from the record how a 36-month sentence accomplishes the purposes and principles of sentencing” and “why” a lesser sentence “would not.”
{¶ 10} Levison‘s 36-month sentence was the maximum sentence for her offense under
{¶ 11} We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in
{¶ 12} A sentence is contrary to law if it is outside the statutory range for the offense or if the sentencing court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in
{¶ 13} Pursuant to
{¶ 14} Unless otherwise required by
{¶ 15} Levison does not dispute that her sentence was within the statutory range. Rather, she contends that her sentence was contrary to law because the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing under
{¶ 16} Although the trial court must consider the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in
{¶ 17} A trial court‘s statement in its sentencing journal entry that it considered the required sentencing factors alone is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under
{¶ 18} In this сase, the transcript from the sentencing hearing reflects that the trial court considered the principles and purposes of sentencing and relevant sentencing factors when sentencing Levison. Having viewed the video of the incident, the trial court stated that this was “a crime of violence; that it was barbaric, and it was one of the worst of its kind for purposes of sentencing.” The trial court further explained:
I think the Court has to take into consideration the brutality of this crime as well as the fact that this is a crime of violence.
You also raised that she has no prior criminal history but the Court does take into consideration, after reviewing the tape, listening to her address the Court, watching her actions out there and her involvement in this, I think this is one of the worst circumstances of this type of crime.
Consequently, on the involuntary manslaughter, that‘s a felony of the third degree, the sentence of the Court is 250 and costs, 36 months at the Ohio State Reformatory for Women.
{¶ 20} Levison also contends that her sentence should be vacated because the record does not support the trial court‘s imposition of a maximum sentence given that she was “a first-time offender who evidently played a minor role in a much larger crime сommitted by a co-defendant.” Quoting Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, at ¶ 23, she asserts that “[a]n appellate court may vacate or modify any sentence * * * if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence.”
{¶ 21} In Jones, however, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected that statement in Marcum as “dicta” and made it clear that
{¶ 22} Even if Levison‘s sentence were subject to such a review, we would find no reversible error. Although Levisоn‘s lack of a criminal history was one factor for the trial court to consider in determining an appropriate sentence, there were other factors for the trial court to consider as well. Based on the particular facts and circumstances here, including Levison‘s apparent role in “baiting” the victim to her
{¶ 23} Accordingly, Levison‘s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 24} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that aрpellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR