STATE OF OHIO v. MICHAEL J. LEIFHEIT
Appellate Case No. 2019-CA-78
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, CLARK COUNTY
Rendered on the 30th day of October, 2020.
[Cite as State v. Leifheit, 2020-Ohio-5106.]
WELBAUM, J.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JEFFREY D. SLYMAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0010098, 211 Kenbrook Drive, Suite 5, Vandalia, Ohio 45377
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On May 12, 2017, Leifheit pled guilty to operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”) in violation of
{¶ 3} On June 20, 2017, the matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Leifheit to pay a fine of $375 and court costs. The trial court also ordered Leifheit to serve 13 days in jail, with ten days suspended, and three days credited for Leifheit’s completing a three-day intervention program. The trial court also suspended Leifheit’s operator’s license for one year.
{¶ 4} Two days after sentencing, the trial court issued a second entry granting Leifheit limited driving privileges from June 22, 2017 to October 16, 2017. Like the first entry, the second entry only permitted Leifheit to drive for work-related purposes. The second entry, however, did not make any reference to Leifheit’s CDL suspension.
{¶ 5} Approximately two years later, on May 31, 2019, Leifheit filed a letter he wrote to the trial court regarding his CDL. In the letter, Leifheit advised the trial court that he had recently attempted to renew his CDL at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”),
{¶ 6} The trial court treated Leifheit’s letters as a motion to renew his operator’s license and CDL. Following a hearing on the matter, on June 24, 2019, the trial court issued an order permitting Leifheit to renew his operator’s license. However, with regard to Leifheit’s CDL, the trial court found that Leifheit “has an indefinite suspension regarding his CDL and that said disqualification shall remain even while [Leifheit] is renewing said operator’s license.”
{¶ 7} After the trial court declined to issue an order to renew Leifheit’s CDL, on August 12, 2019, Leifheit filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In support of his motion, Leifheit argued that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty to the 2017 OVI offense because at the time he entered his plea, he was unaware that an OVI conviction could cause his CDL to be suspended indefinitely. Leifheit argued that the trial court should have notified him of the adverse effect his guilty plea could have on his CDL by giving the following admonishment at the plea hearing:
For those of you that have a commercial driver’s license, convictions of certain offenses may have an adverse effect on your ability to maintain your commercial driver’s license—even if you were not in a commercial vehicle at the time of the incident. Before you enter a plea you may wish to seek legal advice as to the consequences of a conviction on your
commercial driver’s license.
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea – Exhibit B.
{¶ 8} Leifheit also argued that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered due to his trial counsel’s providing ineffective assistance. Specifically, Leifheit claimed that his trial counsel failed to advise him of the adverse effects his guilty plea could have on his ability to maintain his CDL. Leifheit claimed this failure prejudiced him since his CDL was suspended indefinitely and was required for his employment.
{¶ 9} Leifheit offered no sworn testimony, affidavits, or other evidence in support of the claims in his motion. Instead, Leifheit simply attached a February 2019 notice from the BMV advising that his CDL was expiring on May 31, 2019, and a copy of the judicial admonishment that Leifheit claimed the trial court should have given at his plea hearing. See Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea- Exhibits A and B.
{¶ 10} On October 23, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Leifheit’s motion to withdraw guilty plea. During the hearing, the trial court confirmed that Leifheit had two prior OVI convictions, one from 2005 and one from 2011. Leifheit advised the trial court that he only recalled the 2011 conviction, but that he had no reason to doubt the court’s records indicating that he was also convicted in 2005. Although Leifheit told the trial court that he had no idea his prior OVI convictions would impact his CDL, Leifheit’s trial counsel later clarified that there was “no question that [Leifheit] knew that there was an impact on his CDL license.” Motion Hearing Tr. (Oct. 23, 2019), p. 7. Rather, Leifheit’s counsel explained that it was not until Leifheit received the trial court’s June 24, 2019 entry denying the motion to renew his CDL that Leifheit became aware of the indefinite
{¶ 11} Following the hearing, the trial court denied Leifheit’s motion to withdraw guilty plea. In so holding, the trial court found that Leifheit was not credible based on the statements he made regarding his prior OVI convictions. The trial court also found that Leifheit’s claim regarding his prior counsel’s failure to advise him of the possibility that his CDL could be indefinitely suspended was insufficient by itself to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 12} With regard to the judicial admonishment, the trial court found that even if it had given the admonishment attached to Leifheit’s motion, it would not have cured Leifheit’s complaint since the admonishment did not provide notice of an indefinite CDL suspension. Lastly, the trial court found that Leifheit failed to explain the 27-month delay in filing the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and that this undue delay mitigated against granting the motion.
{¶ 13} Leifheit now appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to withdraw guilty plea, raising a single assignment of error for review.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 14} Under his assignment of error, Leifheit contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw guilty plea because he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty to the OVI offense at issue. Leifheit claims that his guilty plea
Crim.R. 32.1 – Standard of Review
{¶ 15} Under Crim.R. 32.1, a trial court may “permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea after imposition of sentence only to correct a manifest injustice.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26354, 2015-Ohio-1584, ¶ 16; Crim.R. 32.1. (Other citations omitted.) “ ‘A “manifest injustice” comprehends a fundamental flaw in the path of justice so extraordinary that the defendant could not have sought redress from the resulting prejudice through another form of application reasonably available to him or her.’ ” State v. Brooks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23385, 2010-Ohio-1682, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Hartzell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17499, 1999 WL 957746, *2 (Aug. 20, 1999). Therefore, “[w]ithdrawal of a plea after sentencing is permitted only in the most extraordinary cases.” State v. Ray, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2019-CA-31, 2020-Ohio-4769, ¶ 13, citing State v. Jefferson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26022, 2014-Ohio-2555, ¶ 17, citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977).
{¶ 16} “[A] defendant ordinarily may establish a manifest injustice within the context of Crim.R. 32.1 by showing that he did not enter the guilty plea in a knowing,
{¶ 17} “ ‘A motion made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the good faith, credibility, and weight of the movant’s assertions in support of the motion are matters to be resolved by that court.’ ” State v. Hawke, 2d Dist. Greene Nos. 2019-CA-24 and 2019-CA-25, 2020-Ohio-511, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Yapp, 2015-Ohio-1654, 32 N.E.3d 996, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing Smith at paragraph two of the syllabus. “ ‘Consequently, an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s denial of a post[-]sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Id., quoting Yapp at ¶ 9. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is “unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
{¶ 18} In an attempt to establish manifest injustice, Leifheit first argues that his guilty plea to the OVI offense at issue was less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court failed to advise him at the plea hearing that the resulting OVI conviction could adversely affect his ability to maintain a CDL. According to Leifheit, such notification was necessary for purposes of advising him of the effect of his guilty plea as required by Traf.R. 10(D) and Crim.R. 11(E). We find no merit to Leifheit’s claim.
{¶ 19} Traf.R. 10 governs pleas in traffic cases and section (D) of that rule provides the following:
In misdemeanor cases involving petty offenses, except those processed in a traffic violations bureau, the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest and shall not accept such pleas without first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty.
Traf.R. 10(D). See also Crim.R. 11(E).
{¶ 20} Pursuant to Traf.R. 10(D), the trial court is only required to inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea before accepting it. State v. MacConnell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21109, 2006-Ohio-1973, ¶ 10. “The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that a trial court need only advise a defendant of the information contained in Traf.R. 10(B) to satisfy Traf.R. 10(D)’s requirement of ‘informing the defendant of the effect of the plea.’ ” State v. Clark, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2007-CA-33, 2008-Ohio-1977, ¶ 25, quoting State v. Darden, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2005-CA-109, 2006-Ohio-2908, ¶ 16, citing State v. Watkins, 99 Ohio St.3d 12, 2003-Ohio-2419, 788 N.E.2d 635, ¶ 28.
{¶ 22} In this case, it is undisputed that Leifheit’s OVI was a misdemeanor, petty offense. See Traf.R. 2(D);
{¶ 23} As a further matter, the record on appeal contains no transcript of the plea hearing. “It is well-established that ‘an appellate court cannot determine whether manifest injustice occurred at a plea hearing, where the defendant fails to provide a
{¶ 24} Because there is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court failed to give the required advisement at the plea hearing, we do not find that the trial court engaged in any conduct that rendered Leifheit’s guilty plea less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Consequently, we find no manifest injustice in that regard.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 25} Leifheit next contends that his guilty plea was less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary due to his trial counsel’s providing ineffective assistance. Specifically, Leifheit claims that his trial counsel failed to advise him that pleading guilty to the OVI offense at issue could result in an indefinite suspension of his CDL. Leifheit claims that this failure prejudiced him because his CDL was indefinitely suspended following his plea, which caused him to lose his employment. We again find no merit to Leifheit’s claim.
{¶ 26} It is well established that “[i]neffective assistance of counsel can provide a basis for seeking a post-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea.” State v. Griffin, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-123, 2016-Ohio-229, ¶ 15, citing Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26354, 2015-Ohio-1584 at ¶ 17. “When the alleged error underlying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that
{¶ 27} In attempting to establish deficient performance on the part of his trial counsel, Leifheit merely provided a bare, unsworn assertion that his trial counsel failed to advise him of the possibility that his CDL could be suspended indefinitely as a result of pleading guilty to the OVI offense at issue. We addressed a similar situation in State v. Laster, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19387, 2003-Ohio-1564. In Laster, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, arguing that he was “misled into a plea of guilty upon erroneous advice of counsel.” Id. at ¶ 8. We explained that, if true, this “would possibly render [defendant’s] plea less than knowing and voluntary and, therefore, he would be allowed to change his plea.” Id. However, because there was nothing in the record supporting the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim, we found that the trial court correctly overruled the motion to withdraw. Id. In this regard, we stated the following:
[W]here nothing in the record supports a defendant’s claim that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made other than his own self-serving affidavit or statement, the record is insufficient to overcome the presumption that the plea was voluntary. An argument grounded on matters outside the record can only be addressed by a post[-]conviction relief motion.
(Citations omitted.) Id. Accord State v. Armstrong, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27138, 2017-Ohio-474, ¶ 17; State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2018-CA-27, 2019-Ohio-1259, ¶ 10.
{¶ 29} For all the foregoing reasons, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Leifheit’s motion to withdraw guilty plea. Accordingly, Leifheit’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 30} Having overruled Leifheit’s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial
DONOVAN, J. and FROELICH, J., concur.
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Matthew B. DiBartola
Jeffrey D. Slyman
Hon. Denise L. Moody