STATE OF OHIO v. LLOYD JEFFERSON
C.A. CASE NO. 26022
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
June 13, 2014
[Cite as State v. Jefferson, 2014-Ohio-2555.]
T.C. NO. 10CR812/2; (Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court)
Rendered on the 13th day of June, 2014.
MICHELE D. PHIPPS, Atty. Reg. No. 0069829, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
MICHAEL HALLOCK JR., Atty. Reg. No. 0084630, P. O. Box 292017, Dayton, Ohio 45429 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
FROELICH, P.J.
{¶ 1} Lloyd Jefferson appeals from the trial court‘s judgment overruling his motions for resentencing and to withdraw his guilty plea. For the following reasons, the
{¶ 2} In November 2011, Jefferson was convicted on his guilty pleas to one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of kidnapping, and two counts of felonious assault. The charges related to his conduct against four adults and one child. In exchange for the pleas, an additional aggravated burglary count, three counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of kidnapping, three counts of felonious assault, and several firearm specifications were dismissed. The trial court sentenced Jefferson to an agreed sentence of a mandatory seven years in prison on each count, to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutive to prison terms imposed in another county and in federal court. Jefferson did not appeal his conviction.
{¶ 3} In September 2013, Jefferson filed a “motion for resentencing based on void judgment and motion to withdraw guilty plea guilty [sic] pursuant to
{¶ 4} On November 13, 2013, the trial court overruled Jefferson‘s motions. The court concluded that Jefferson‘s judgment entry was not void, but it scheduled a limited
{¶ 5} Jefferson appeals from the denial of his motions, raising two assignments of error.
{¶ 6} Jefferson‘s first assignment of error states: “The trial court failed to merge defendant-appellant‘s * * * offenses prior to accepting his guilty plea.” Jefferson argues that several of his offenses were allied offenses of similar import, and that the trial court should have determined whether these offenses merged prior to accepting his pleas. Jefferson further claims that res judicata does not bar this issue because the trial court‘s failure to merge his offenses constituted plain error.
{¶ 7} “Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, a valid final judgment on the merits bars all subsequent actions based on any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” State v. Collins, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25612, 2013-Ohio-3645, ¶ 9, citing Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995). Res judicata applies to any defense that was raised or could have been raised in a criminal defendant‘s prior direct appeal from his conviction. Id., citing State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967).
{¶ 8} The failure to merge allied offenses does not render a judgment void, but
{¶ 9} In 2011, Jefferson pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of kidnapping, and two counts of felonious assault, and the trial court issued a judgment entry sentencing him to an agreed seven years in prison on each count, to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to sentences in other cases. Jefferson did not appeal that judgment, and it became final.
{¶ 10} Jefferson did not include an affidavit or any other evidence from outside the record to support his claim that the trial court should have merged his offenses. Rather, he appears to rely on the record before the court. Because Jefferson does not rely on evidence outside the record and he failed to raise the merger issue in a direct appeal, res judicata bars his claim that the trial court erred in failing to merge his offenses. See State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25711, 2013-Ohio-4946, ¶ 7.
{¶ 11} Jefferson argues that res judicata should not apply because the trial court‘s failure to merge his offenses constitutes plain error. In order to constitute plain error, the error must be an obvious defect in the trial proceedings, and the error must have affected substantial rights. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 2002-Ohio-68, 759 N.E.2d 1240. Under the plain error doctrine, errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed on appeal although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.
{¶ 12} Even if we were to address the issue of merger, we would not find that Jefferson‘s arguments have merit.
{¶ 13} In addition, based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that Jefferson‘s offenses should have been merged. The State represents that Jefferson‘s criminal behavior involved four adults and one child, and the record does not detail the facts underlying each offense. Jefferson acknowledges in his brief that “the record in this case lacks sufficient detail regarding merger of Jefferson‘s offenses.” Accordingly, on this record, we cannot conclude that Jefferson‘s offenses should have been merged as allied offenses of similar import.
{¶ 15} Jefferson‘s second assignment of error states: “The trial court failed to allow Jefferson to withdraw his plea upon failing to merge his offenses.”
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} Withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing is permitted only in the most extraordinary cases. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977). A defendant who files a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice.
{¶ 19} “A trial court may show that a guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily by complying with
{¶ 20} In State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the requirement of
[T]he term “the maximum penalty” which is required to be explained is also to be understood as referring to a single penalty. In the context of “the plea” to “the charge,” the reasonable interpretation of the text is that “the maximum penalty” is for the single crime for which “the plea” is offered. It would seem to be beyond a reasonable interpretation to suggest that the rule refers
cumulatively to the total of all sentences received for all charges which a criminal defendant may answer in a single proceeding.
{¶ 21} We find no obligation under
{¶ 22} Furthermore, Jefferson has not demonstrated that he has suffered a manifest injustice as a result of the trial court‘s alleged failure to inform him of the maximum penalty upon merger of allied offenses (if any). At the beginning of the plea hearing, the parties agreed that Jefferson would receive a mandatory seven-year sentence on eight counts, to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to other cases for which Jefferson had approximately three years left to serve. The seven-year sentence was less than the maximum penalty for each of the offenses. In addition, in exchange for the pleas, an additional aggravated burglary count, three counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of kidnapping, three counts of felonious assault, and several firearm specifications were dismissed. Moreover, the offenses to which Jefferson pled involved multiple victims, and he has not established that any of them should have merged.
{¶ 23} Jefferson‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 24} The trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed.
Copies mailed to:
Michele D. Phipps
Michael Hallock Jr.
Hon. Mary Katherine Huffman