STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ASHLEY LE MIER, Defendant-Petitioner.
NO. S-1-SC-34830
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Filing Date: April 27, 2017
Donna J. Mowrer, District Judge
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender; B. Douglas Wood III, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner; Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General; Jacqueline Rose Medina, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM for Respondent
NAKAMURA, Justice.
{1} In this case, we clarify the circumstances under which a court may permissibly exclude a witness as a discovery sanction. The district court issued clear, unambiguous, and reasonable discovery orders to ensure that the parties would be prepared to try Defendant Ashley Le Mier‘s case in a timely fashion. The State failed to comply with these orders, and the district court excluded one of the State‘s essential witnesses as a sanction. The State could not proceed to trial without the witness and appealed. The Court of Appeals held that State v. Harper, 2011-NMSC-044, 150 N.M. 745, 266 P.3d 25 precluded imposition of the sanction imposed and, thus, that the district court abused its discretion. State v. Le Mier, No. 33,493, mem. op. ¶¶ 1, 8-9 (N.M. Ct. App. July 22, 2014) (non-precedential). We disagree. Harper poses no obstacle to the sanction imposed. The district court‘s order was an appropriate exercise of its discretionary authority. The Court of Appeals is reversed.
I.
{2} Le Mier unsuccessfully attempted to smuggle illegal substances into the Roosevelt County Detention Center (RCDC) by concealing them within a body cavity. The contraband was discovered during a strip search, Le Mier was charged
{3} The discovery phase of the proceedings lasted eighteen months. During this time, the State filed five different witness lists. Initially, eleven witnesses were enumerated, then twelve, and finally nine. Sergeant Divine Alcanzo—the corrections officer who supervised the strip search during which the contraband was discovered—appeared on all five witness lists.
{4} Le Mier‘s substitute counsel, Margaret Strickland, entered her appearance in June 2013, a year after Le Mier‘s arraignment. At that time, the State had filed its second witness list, and Strickland made good faith efforts to contact the witnesses enumerated on that witness list. Strickland could not, however, reach several of the witnesses at the addresses provided—including Alcanzo, whose address was listed as the RCDC. Strickland alerted the court to her difficulties at the hearing on her motion to continue trial in August 2013.
{6} Shortly after the hearing, the court entered a written order directing the State to file an updated witness list with correct addresses for all witnesses and provided a date by which this was to be accomplished. The State filed a third witness list by the date specified by the court. The third witness list gave an Amarillo, Texas address for Alcanzo. But as before, Strickland could not reach Alcanzo at that address despite her good faith efforts and similarly could not reach several other witnesses enumerated in the third witness list at the addresses provided by the State.
{7} Strickland again alerted the court to the difficulties she was having locating and communicating with the State‘s witnesses by filing a motion to exclude witnesses and by alerting the court to the problem at a September 2013 pretrial conference. The court remained optimistic that the parties could settle the witness address issues and
{8} A short time after the pretrial conference, the State filed a fourth witness list, which gave yet another Amarillo, Texas address for Alcanzo. Once again, Strickland was unable to reach Alcanzo at that address despite her good faith efforts and was also unable to reach several other witnesses enumerated in the State‘s fourth witness list at the addresses provided.
{9} In early October 2013, only a few days after the State filed its fourth witness list, the court held a hearing on Strickland‘s motion to exclude. At that hearing, the State acknowledged that it too had not been able to contact or communicate with most of the witnesses whom Strickland had been unable to contact. With this concession, the district court became aware that the State had made insufficient efforts to confirm the accuracy of the addresses provided, and had done this despite the fact that the court had ordered the State to provide Strickland correct addresses for all witnesses. The court informed the State that it was unfair to require Strickland to track down and communicate with witnesses the State had not itself located and who might not even testify at trial. Hoping to finally put the witness address issues to rest, the court once again ordered the State to provide Strickland correct addresses for all witnesses and again specified a date by which this was to be completed. The court took the
{10} Less than a week after the hearing on the motion to exclude, the State filed its fifth witness list. And roughly two weeks later, at docket call in mid-October 2013, the State claimed that it still had difficulty locating witnesses, including Alcanzo, and requested a trial continuance. The State also had not yet facilitated the phone conversation between Strickland and Alcanzo and explained to the district court that it understood that it was required to facilitate the phone conversation only if it could locate Alcanzo. The court informed the State that its understanding was mistaken and bluntly instructed the State that it had to locate any witnesses it intended to call at trial and proceed with its case. Nevertheless, the court granted the State‘s
{11} A status conference was held in early December 2013, and at the outset of the conference the court emphasized that the December 30, 2013, trial setting was “firm.” The State informed the court that it had finally confirmed Alcanzo‘s address and promised that it would facilitate the phone conversation between Strickland and Alcanzo right away. The State did not follow through on its promise. Rather, it emailed Alcanzo‘s phone number to Strickland several days after the status conference. Strickland‘s office staff called that number several times, left messages, but received no response. At some point, an unknown female caller telephoned Strickland‘s office but refused to identify herself, uttered expletives, and promptly terminated the phone call.
{12} Ten days before the final trial setting, Strickland filed an amended motion to exclude witnesses. In that motion, she protested that the State still had neither facilitated the phone conversation between her and Alcanzo nor provided accurate addresses for all witnesses. Accordingly, she requested that Alcanzo and the two
{13} A final hearing on Strickland‘s motion and amended motion to exclude witnesses was conducted on December 23, 2013, one week before what both parties knew was the final trial setting. The court asked the State why it still had not facilitated the phone conversation between Strickland and Alcanzo, and this time the State replied that it believed it had complied with the court‘s order to facilitate the communication by providing Strickland with Alcanzo‘s phone number. With respect to the two other witnesses, the State informed the court that it too had not been in touch with one of those witnesses and agreed not to call that individual at trial. And as to the other witness, the State indicated that it had a phone number where he could be reached.
{14} Plainly frustrated, the court considered requiring the State to procure Alcanzo that very afternoon so that Strickland could interview her, but discussion with Strickland proved that this was not a viable option. Accordingly, the court granted Le Mier‘s request to exclude Alcanzo. The court also excluded one of the other two witnesses whom Strickland had been unable to reach. In a subsequently filed written order, the court concluded that the State had been culpable in failing to comply with
II.
{15} In Harper, we embraced a pragmatic approach to guide courts in assessing whether the sanction of witness exclusion is appropriate. 2011-NMSC-044, ¶ 15. Harper instructs our courts to assess (1) the culpability of the offending party, (2) the prejudice to the adversely affected party, and (3) the availability of lesser sanctions. Id. The present case and others like it persuade us that our intentions in Harper have not been understood. See State v. Ramos, No. 33,969, mem. op. ¶ 7 (N.M. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015) (non-precedential) (agreeing that the state‘s refusal to file a mandatory response to a dispositive pleading was both “troubling” and “inappropriate,” but nevertheless reversing the district court‘s decision to dismiss the charges against the defendant on grounds that Harper permits such a sanction only where the state‘s conduct is tantamount to a willful refusal to participate in discovery such that the defendant is deprived of her ability to present a defense); State v. Maldonado, No. 33,403, mem. op. ¶¶ 1-4 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2014) (non-precedential) (reversing the district court‘s decision to exclude three state witnesses who failed to appear at their designated witness interviews and, thus, were not interviewed within the time
{16} Harper did not establish a rigid and mechanical analytic framework. Nor did Harper embrace standards so rigorous that courts may impose witness exclusion only in response to discovery violations that are egregious, blatant, and an affront to their authority. Such a framework and such limitations would be unworkable in light of the fact that our courts’ authority to exclude witnesses is discretionary, Mathis v. State, 1991-NMSC-091, ¶ 13, 112 N.M. 744, 819 P.2d 1302, and courts must be able to avail themselves of, and impose, meaningful sanctions where discovery orders are not obeyed and a party‘s conduct injects needless delay into the proceedings. See State ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp. Dep‘t v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 11, 120 N.M. 1, 896 P.2d 1148.
{17} As a reviewing court, we cannot attempt to precisely delineate how trial courts are to exercise their discretionary authority in the varied cases over which they must preside. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414 (1988) (“[A] comprehensive set of standards to guide the exercise of discretion in every possible case” is “neither necessary nor appropriate.“). Similarly, we cannot second-guess our courts’
{18} More critically, trial courts shoulder the significant and important responsibility of ensuring the efficient administration of justice in the matters over which they preside, and it is our obligation to support them in fulfilling this responsibility. The judiciary, like the other co-equal branches of our state government, ultimately serves the people of New Mexico. No one is well served—not defendants, not victims, not prosecutors, not courts, and certainly not the citizens of New Mexico—by a system of justice where cases needlessly languish in
{19} Where discovery violations inject needless delay into the proceedings, courts may impose meaningful sanctions to effectuate their inherent power and promote efficient judicial administration. See Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 11 (recognizing that district courts “have inherent power to impose a variety of sanctions . . . to regulate their docket, promote judicial efficiency, and . . . command the obedience of litigants and their attorneys . . . . ” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also State v. Stills, 1998-NMSC-009, ¶¶ 43-44, 125 N.M. 66, 957 P.2d 51 (affirming the district court‘s decision to preclude witness testimony as a sanction for defense
{20} Courts must evaluate the considerations identified in Harper—culpability, prejudice, and lesser sanctions—when deciding whether to exclude a witness and must explain their decision to exclude or not to exclude a witness within the framework articulated in Harper, but it is not the case that witness exclusion is justified only if all of the Harper considerations weigh in favor of exclusion. As one court explained, “[o]n occasion the district court may need to suppress evidence that did not comply with discovery orders to maintain the integrity and schedule of the court even though the defendant may not be prejudiced.” See United States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir. 1988). What is embodied in this observation is a view we have always embraced: Whether it is proper to exclude a witness is not a simple
{21} When exercising their discretionary power, our courts must be ever mindful of the fact that witness exclusion is a severe sanction and one that should be utilized as a sanction of last resort. See Harper, 2011-NMSC-044, ¶ 21. Witness exclusion may harm the community‘s interest by detrimentally affecting the prosecution‘s ability to see an offender brought to justice and, conversely, can thwart the accused‘s opportunity to demonstrate innocence. See 5 LaFave, supra, § 20.6(b), at 594 (observing that the exclusion of the prosecution‘s evidence adversely affects “the interests of the community, the party represented by the prosecutor“); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused § 465, at 210 (2016) (“[E]xclusion of exculpatory evidence implicates the defendant‘s constitutional right to defend himself or herself.“). For these reasons, our courts do not possess unfettered discretionary authority to impose witness exclusion; but, nor is that discretion so limited that it amounts to no discretion at all.
III.
{23} In this case, a basic discovery rule was flagrantly violated: “Unless a shorter period of time is ordered by the court, within ten (10) days after arraignment . . . the state shall disclose or make available to the defendant: . . . a written list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which the prosecutor intends to call at the trial . . . .”
{24} The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the State culpable.
{25} Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court‘s conclusion that the State‘s failure to comply with the court‘s discovery orders gave rise to prejudice. When a court orders a party to provide discovery within a given time frame, failure to comply with that order causes prejudice both to the opposing party and to the court.
{26} The district court was also prejudiced in two ways. The State‘s inability to provide Strickland correct witness addresses required the court to dedicate its time and resources to a needless and wasteful cause: ensuring compliance with basic
{27} Lastly, we are persuaded that witness exclusion was the least severe sanction in light of the circumstances of this case. We reach this conclusion for the following three reasons. First, the district court was not obligated to consider every conceivable lesser sanction before imposing witness exclusion. To require this would be to significantly impinge upon and curtail the court‘s broad discretionary authority to fashion appropriate sanctions for discovery violations. See State v. Martinez, 1998-NMCA-022, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 721, 954 P.2d 1198 (observing that the district court possesses a “breadth of discretion” to fashion sanctions). Rather, the court was only
{28} Second, the court gave the State multiple and varying opportunities to cure its discovery violations and imposed exclusion only after progressive sanctions failed to produce the desired effect. From the time she first entered her appearance, Strickland repeatedly asked for correct addresses for all witnesses including Alcanzo. The court ordered the State—twice by written order and numerous times orally at hearings—to provide correct addresses for all witnesses. Yet, the State did not comply with these orders and did not provide Strickland with Alcanzo‘s correct address until late in the proceedings. As discovery dragged on and it became clear to the court that the State was having difficulty identifying Alcanzo‘s correct address, the court quite sensibly pursued an alternative strategy and ordered the State to facilitate a phone conversation between Strickland and Alcanzo. The State also did not comply with this order. Additionally, the court granted the State‘s continuance request and rescheduled trial to permit the State more time to locate Alcanzo and other witnesses. These facts demonstrate that the court gave the State ample opportunity to comply with reasonable and clear orders and imposed exclusion only after implementing progressively more stringent requirements that were designed to
{29} Third, we are persuaded that, by electing to exclude Alcanzo, the district court responded to the specific violation at issue with a sanction tailored to fit that violation. Moreover, the sanction imposed simultaneously ensured that the court‘s authority to efficiently administer the law and ensure compliance with its orders was vindicated. We reiterate that our courts need not stand idly by and tolerate dilatory conduct by the parties. Rather, our courts are encouraged to ensure the timely adjudication of cases, to proactively manage their dockets, and to utilize appropriate sanctions to vindicate the public‘s interest in the swift administration of justice. It is clear that the district court was effectuating these very interests when it excluded Alcanzo and we will not second-guess the court‘s judgment that exclusion was the most effective and least severe way to achieve the desired ends.
IV.
{30} The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Alcanzo from testifying at Le Mier‘s trial. The Court of Appeals’ opinion is reversed, and the
{31} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice
WE CONCUR:
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice