State v. LawsonState v. Lawson
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 22, 2022
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-15-592484-B
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brandon A. Piteo and Kristen Hatcher, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Jonathan Sidney, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
{¶ 1} Appellant-defendant Pamela Lawson filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea several years after her conviction for aggravated murder was affirmed by this court. She claimed the guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because of her trial counsel‘s defective performance during the plea proceeding. The trial court found it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion. We agree and affirm the trial court‘s decision.
Background
{¶ 2} In 2015, Lawson was indicted for aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and endangering children. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pleaded guilty to aggravated murder with a three-year firearm specification and received a prison sentence of 33 years to life. On appeal, she raised a single assignment of error challenging her sentence as being contrary to law. This court affirmed the trial court‘s judgment in State v. Lawson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103699, 2016-Ohio-7607.
{¶ 3} As summarized by this court, the circumstances of the case involved Lawson recruiting codefendant Lekev Spivey to kill Lawson‘s former boyfriend, who was shot by Spivey in the residence the victim shared with Lawson, her two daughters, and the victim‘s six-year-old disabled daughter, in the presence of all of them.
{¶ 4} In 2016, Lawson filed a postconviction petition. She alleged that she suffered bipolar disorder and past sexual abuse and, therefore, there should have
{¶ 5} In 2021, Lawson filed the instant motion to withdraw the guilty plea. She attached to the motion only her own affidavit. She claimed her plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary due to trial counsel‘s ineffective assistance. In the affidavit, she stated that counsel provided her “bad advice,” did not communicate with her about various aspects of the plea, and engaged in no negotiation on her behalf; she also stated that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and PTSD in 2005 and had sought mental health help in 2011, and that a mental health evaluation would have proved her state of mind at the time of the plea.
{¶ 6} The trial court denied Lawson‘s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, citing its lack of jurisdiction to consider the motion after the court of appeals affirmed her conviction on direct appeal. Lawson raises a single assignment of error, claiming that the trial court erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 7} We review a trial court‘s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Romero, 156 Ohio St.3d 468, 2019-Ohio-1839,
{¶ 8} As Lawson acknowledges in her brief on appeal, this court has consistently held that, pursuant to State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 378 N.E.2d 162 (1978), a trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain a defendant‘s motion to withdraw the plea under
{¶ 9} The holding of Special Prosecutors has been consistently applied by this and other appellate courts. “[O]nce the convictions have been affirmed on appeal, the trial court no longer may entertain a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea under
{¶ 10} Lawson, however, asks this court to “clarify the present state of its jurisprudence” on this issue in light of State v. Davis, 131 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d 516, a death penalty case decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio 11 years ago. In that case, appellant filed a motion for a new trial under
{¶ 11} In the wake of Davis, the appellate courts were confronted with the question of whether Davis, which concerns a motion for new trial, could be applied to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Several districts, including this district, found the word “posttrial” significant and determined Davis only applied to a motion for
{¶ 12} Following the well-established case law precedents, therefore, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Lawson‘s motion on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to consider her
{¶ 13} West involved highly unique circumstances. The appellant in that case was convicted of sexual battery, and was also adjudicated as a sex offender, which required him to register for ten years in Ohio. After his release from prison, appellant relocated to Florida and learned that his sexual battery conviction subjected him to a lifetime registration requirement in Florida. He then filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, claiming his plea was not knowing because his trial counsel failed to advise him of Florida‘s lifetime sex-offender registration
{¶ 14} The First District addressed the trial court‘s jurisdiction over appellant‘s motion to withdraw the guilty plea under these circumstances. Citing Davis‘s holding that “the lower court does have jurisdiction, when the issue presented by the motion [for a new trial] could not have been raised in the direct appeal because it depends for its resolution upon evidence outside the record in that appeal,” id. at ¶ 10, the First District framed the issue on appeal as “whether, in the wake of Davis, [131 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d 516,] a court has jurisdiction to entertain a
{¶ 15} Appellant in West, 2017-Ohio-5596, 93 N.E.3d 1221, also raised a claim of actual innocence in his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, attaching to his motion an affidavit from the victim averring that appellant had never molested him. The court construed the claim as alleging that the guilty plea was not voluntary because appellant felt compelled to accept the plea agreement offering reduced charges for fear that the victim would falsely testify against him at trial and he would be convicted of more serious offenses. The First District determined that the trial court abused its discretion in not holding a hearing to assess the claim.
{¶ 16} This case is distinguishable from West due to the unique circumstances present in that case, where appellant could not have raised in his direct appeal the issue of Florida‘s stricter registration requirement or the claim of actual innocence predicated on the victim‘s recanting affidavit. Here, Lawson‘s claim that her plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent due to counsel‘s allegedly defective performance during the plea proceeding could have been raised in her direct appeal. As such, the instant case does not present an occasion for us to consider whether to adopt the holding from West. The holding that once the convictions have been affirmed on appeal, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to
{¶ 17} We note that, even if we were to apply Davis to a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over such a motion, there must be evidence that is “newly discovered” and “the specific issue has not been decided upon direct appeal.” Davis, 131 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d 516, at ¶ 37. Here, Lawson did not submit any “newly discovered” evidence — she only attached her own affidavit alleging counsel‘s defective assistance, and her failure to raise that issue on direct appeal is why the issue has not been decided upon
{¶ 18} Finally, we observe that even if, for argument‘s sake, the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain Lawson‘s motion, her claim that her plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary due to counsel‘s allegedly defective performance could have been raised on direct appeal and is, therefore, barred by the principle of res judicata.
{¶ 19} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
Notes
Lauharn involves a different procedural posture. During the pendency of his direct appeal, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea claiming his trial counsel provided erroneous advice about his sentence. The trial court denied the motion and appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging he was under the influence of certain medications at the time of the plea and his counsel failed to report it to the trial court. The Second District held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motions during the pendency of the direct appeal. The court then noted in passing that, pursuant to Davis, the trial court would have jurisdiction to address the motions after the direct appeal was concluded. The Davis issue was neither analyzed nor dispositive in these cases, and we decline to rely on them as guiding precedents.