STATE OF OHIO v. RICKY L. LARGE
C.A. CASE NO. 23947
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
January 9, 2015
[Cite as State v. Large, 2015-Ohio-33.]
T.C. NO. 09CRB1690; (Criminal appeal from Municipal Court)
RAYMOND DUNDES, Atty. Reg. No. 0041515, 195 S. Clayton Road, New Lebanon, Ohio 45345
Attorney for
LORI R. CICERO, Atty. Reg. No. 0079508, 500 E. Fifth Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
FROELICH, P.J.
{¶ 1} Ricky L. Large pled no contest to assault, a first-degree misdemeanor, in the Municipal Court of Montgomery County; a charge of aggravated menacing was dismissed. The trial court sentenced Large to 180 days in jail, with credit for 60 days served. Before Large completed serving his jail sentence, the sentence was stayed pending appeal.
{¶ 2} Large appeals from his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred in failing
I. Procedural History
{¶ 3} On August 26, 2009, Large reportedly entered, without permission, the home of his pregnant girlfriend, choked her, and threatened her. That day, Large‘s girlfriend signed complaints for assault and aggravated menacing, both first-degree misdemeanors, but nothing was filed with the court. On August 27, 2009, a prosecutor approved a felony charge of aggravated burglary. On September 4, 2009, Large was arrested on a warrant related only to that felony charge, and he remained in jail while the case was sent to a grand jury.
{¶ 4} On September 24, 2009, the grand jury returned a no true bill. (The record suggests that Large‘s girlfriend informed the grand jury that she “might have exaggerated” the underlying facts of the case.) On September 25, 2009, while still in jail, police officers notified the jail that Large should not be released because he was going to be charged with assault and aggravated menacing based on the complaints signed by Large‘s girlfriend on August 26. The August 26 misdemeanor complaints were filed with the court on September 28, and Large was formally notified of the charges.
{¶ 5} During an October 7, 2009 pretrial conference, defense counsel sought dismissal of the misdemeanor charges on speedy-trial grounds. Counsel argued that Large had been incarcerated for thirty-four days since his September 4, 2009 arrest and that the ninety-day speedy-trial time had expired due to the “in jail” triple-count provision of
{¶ 6} Prior to sentencing, Large sought to withdraw his plea, claiming that he did not admit to choking the complainant, because allegations of choking were not included in the complaint. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for November 18, 2009. At the hearing, Large sought to re-raise the speedy trial issue. The trial court granted defense counsel two weeks to file a written motion, and it continued the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea. On January 14, 2010, the trial court denied Large‘s written request to reconsider the speedy-trial issue, and the hearing on the motion to withdraw Large‘s plea was rescheduled for February 10, 2010. On February 10, Large informed the trial court that he was withdrawing his motion to withdraw his plea, and the trial court proceeded to sentence Large accordingly.
{¶ 7} Large timely appealed, and we appointed counsel. In 2013, we removed initially-appointed counsel, and the case proceeded with new counsel, who has effectuated the preparation and filing of a transcript and filed an appellate brief. The State has not filed a response.
{¶ 8} Large‘s sole assignment of error states:
APPELLANT SHOULD BE DISCHARGED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISCHARGE APPELLANT FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL PURSUANT TO
R.C. 2945.71 -73.
{¶ 10} The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions. State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 68, 538 N.E.2d 1025 (1989). Ohio‘s speedy trial statute,
{¶ 11} A defendant can establish a prima facie case for a speedy trial violation by demonstrating that the trial was held past the time limit set by statute for the crime with which the defendant is charged. State v. Gray, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20980, 2007-Ohio-4549, ¶ 15. “If the defendant can make this showing, the burden shifts to the State to establish that some exception[s] applied to toll the time and to make the trial timely. If the State does not meet its burden, the defendant must be discharged.
{¶ 12} Under
{¶ 13} It is undisputed that Large was arrested on September 4, 2009, and charged with a felony arising out of the incident on August 26, 2009. When the grand jury returned a no true bill on September 24, Large was then charged by complaint with misdemeanors arising out of the same August 26 incident. Large was held in jail on the charges from September 4 until November 4, when he was apparently released and placed on house arrest.
{¶ 14} Large argues that his discharge is mandated by the holding of State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 538 N.E.2d 1025 (1989). There, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that, ““[w]hen new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charge and the state knew of such facts at the time of the initial indictment, the time within which trial is to begin on the additional charge is subject to the same statutory limitations period that is applied to the original charge.“” Adams at 68, quoting State v. Clay, 9 Ohio App.3d 216, 218, 459 N.E.2d 609 (11th Dist.1983). Consistent with Adams, the supreme court has further held that, “[i]n issuing a subsequent indictment, the state is not subject to the speedy-trial timetable of the initial indictment, when additional criminal charges arise from facts different from the original charges, or the state did not know of these facts at the time of the initial indictment.” State v. Baker, 78 Ohio St.3d 108, 676 N.E.2d 883 (1997), syllabus.
{¶ 15} In this case, the two new misdemeanor charges arose from the same facts as the original felony charge, and the facts
{¶ 16} Moreover, we agree with the Twelfth District that, under the circumstances before us,
{¶ 17} Large‘s felony case terminated when the grand jury returned a no true bill. See Alexander at ¶ 25. He was not released, and new misdemeanor charges arising from the same incident were filed. Because the misdemeanor charges were instituted after the felony case terminated,
{¶ 18} From September 5 (the day after Large‘s arrest) until October 7, 2009, when he raised the speedy trial issue with the trial court, Large had been jailed in lieu of bond for 32 calendar days. Counted on a three-to-one basis, Large had been held on the pending charges for 96 speedy trial days, more than the 90-day limit allowed for first-degree misdemeanors. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Large‘s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.
{¶ 19} Large‘s assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 20} Large‘s conviction for assault will be vacated.
DONOVAN, J., concurs.
HALL, J., dissenting:
{¶ 21} On the facts presented, I would hold that the disposition of this case in the trial court did not violate speedy-trial limits.
{¶ 22} Appellant Ricky Large was charged by complaint with a felony, one count of aggravated burglary, in the County Court of Montgomery County (Area
{¶ 23} The majority cites State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St. 3d 67, 538 N.E. 2d 1025 (1989), for the proposition that new or additional charges are subject to the same speedy-trial limitations as the original charge. In Adams, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the rule established in State v. Clay, 9 Ohio App. 3d 216, 218, 459 N.E.2d 609 (11th Dist.1983): ““[W]hen new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charge and the state knew of such facts at the time of the initial indictment, the time within which trial is to begin on the additional charge is subject to the same statutory limitations period that is applied to the original charge.“” Adams at 68, quoting Clay at 218. However, neither of those cases sheds light on the issue in this case.
{¶ 24} In Clay, the defendant was arrested and charged with several felonies. Several months later, the defendant was indicted on additional felony charges related to the same events. Therefore, all of the charges were governed by the speedy-trial time frame applicable to felonies, beginning from the date of arrest, which had been exceeded. In Adams, the defendant was arrested on an OVI charge under
{¶ 25} In my view, the fact pattern here is more akin to State v. Gasnik, 132 Ohio App.3d 612, 725 N.E.2d 1162 (1st Dist.1998). There the defendant was charged on July 13, 1997 with two counts of failure to confine a dog, fourth-degree misdemeanors, and two counts of failure to display dog-registration tags, both minor misdemeanors. Under
{¶ 26} On appeal, the defendant in Gasnik argued that thirty-two days of speedy-trial time elapsed between the filing of the charges and trial. The First District adopted the following rule: “When an original charge is reduced to a lesser charge that carries a shorter speedy-trial time limit, the speedy-trial deadline will be the earlier of (1) the speedy-trial deadline for the original charge, applied from the date of the original charge, or (2) the speedy-trial deadline for the lesser charge, applied from the date that the original
{¶ 27} I also note that the Gasnik rule accommodates
{¶ 28} I recognize that there is some case law to the contrary. In State v. Miller, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2009-01-008, 2009-Ohio-4831, ¶ 22, that court held that the speedy-trial time applicable to a felony cannot be applied where a felony indictment is dismissed and a defendant then is charged with misdemeanors involving the same incident. In City of Oregon v. Kohne, 117 Ohio App.3d 179, 690 N.E.2d 66 (6th Dist.1997), that court held that the time between the defendant‘s bind-over to a grand jury on a felony charge and the grand jury‘s return of a no-bill is chargeable against the speedy-trial deadline for subsequently-filed misdemeanor charges. But I conclude that the Gasnik rule is a better application of the speedy-trial limitations, preventing unnecessary duplicate filings in multiple courts and still protecting the timeliness of disposition. Accordingly, I dissent.
Copies mailed to:
Raymond Dundes
Lori R. Cicero
Hon. James L. Manning