State of Ohio v. David A. Lantz
Court of Appeals No. F-18-011
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT FULTON COUNTY
Decided: August 16, 2019
[Cite as State v. Lantz, 2019-Ohio-3307.]
Trial Court No. 18CR87
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
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Scott A. Haselman, Fulton County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Sarah R. Anjum, for appellant.
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MAYLE, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, David A. Lantz, appeals the October 16, 2018 judgment of the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas, solely with respect to the court‘s imposition of certain costs. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} David Lantz entered a plea of guilty and was convicted of five counts of pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor, along with specifications for two previous convictions, and one count of pandering obscenity involving a minor. At his October 12, 2018 sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total prison term of 12 years, 5 years’ postrelease control, and “the costs of this action,” and it classified Lantz a Tier II sex offender. Lantz‘s sentence was memorialized in a judgment entry journalized on October 16, 2018. With respect to costs, the sentencing entry indicated that Lantz was to pay “all prosecution costs, and any fees permitted pursuant to
{¶ 3} Lantz appealed, and assigns the following error for our review:
- The trial court erred when it ordered the imposition of new costs and fees in its Sentencing Judgment Entry outside of Appellant‘s presence and never determined Appellant‘s present and future ability to pay such costs and fees as required by
R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) .- The trial court erred when it failed to notify Appellant on the record and in open court that it imposed costs of prosecution, and costs pursuant to
2929.18(A)(4) [.] - The trial court erred when it imposed the costs of the action because the trial court never made a finding on the record that Appellant has the present or future ability to pay these fees and costs.
- The trial court erred when it failed to notify Appellant on the record and in open court that it imposed costs of prosecution, and costs pursuant to
{¶ 4} At Lantz‘s sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered him “to pay the costs of this action.” In its sentencing entry, however, the trial court ordered Lantz “to pay all prosecution costs, and any fees permitted pursuant to
{¶ 5} The state argues that “prosecution costs” are synonymous with and encompass “all court costs and those costs and fees authorized by the terms of
A. Although not imposed by the trial court, court-appointed counsel fees appear to have been assessed.
{¶ 6} We begin by noting our agreement with the state that the court‘s sentencing entry does not purport to impose court-appointed counsel fees, supervisions costs, or confinement costs. Nonetheless, our review of the certified case docket indicates that appointed-counsel fees of $894 appear to have been assessed as costs to Lantz. Specifically, the record contains a “costs due notice” dated October 22, 2018, advising Lantz to pay costs and fees of $1,447.47; it contains a judgment entry filed October 16, 2018 approving appointed counsel fees totaling $894. The costs billed from May 22, 2018, when the indictment was filed, through the date of the “costs due notice” total $1,447.47 if the $894 in appointed counsel fees are included; otherwise they total $553.47. So while we agree with the state that the court did not impose the cost of court-appointed counsel fees, we observe that such costs appear to have been assessed in the October 22, 2018 costs-due notice.
B. “Costs of this action” means mandatory costs, which would include prosecution costs and fees permitted under R.C. 2929.18(A)(4) .
{¶ 7} Turning to the propriety of the costs explicitly imposed in the sentencing entry—prosecution costs and fees permitted under
{¶ 8} “Under both the federal and Ohio Constitutions and
{¶ 9} A violation of
{¶ 10} Accordingly, Lantz must show both that his sentence was unclear because of a discrepancy between what was stated at the sentencing hearing and what was contained in the judgment entry, and that he was prejudiced as a result.
1. Prosecution costs.
{¶ 12} With respect to prosecution costs,
{¶ 13} Given that the imposition of prosecution costs is mandatory, Lantz was properly put on notice at sentencing of his obligation to pay these costs when the court told him that it was imposing the “costs of this action.” Moreover, even if the trial court had neglected to make any mention of costs at the sentencing hearing and then imposed
{¶ 14} Here, we conclude that the “costs of this action” included mandatory prosecution costs. And even if this was unclear to Lantz,
2. Fees under R.C. 2929.18(A)(4) .
{¶ 15} As to fees imposed under
{¶ 16} As to the court‘s purported failure to specify which fees or costs it deemed permitted,
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} As to the absence of any specific reference to
{¶ 19} Similarly,
{¶ 20} And
If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense and the court specifically is required, pursuant to section
2743.70 [and]2949.091 * * * of the Revised Code * * * to impose a specified sum of money as costs in the case in addition to any other costs that the court is required or permitted by law to impose in the case, the court shall not waive the payment of the specified additional court costs that the section of the Revised Code specifically requires the court to impose unless the court
determines that the offender is indigent and the court waives the payment of all court costs imposed upon the offender. (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 21} These statutes demonstrate that the fees “permitted by”
{¶ 22} Lantz also argues that under
{¶ 23} Under
{¶ 24} When read in pari materia, these Revised Code provisions make clear that the costs constituting a “state fine or costs” are mandatory costs that must be imposed regardless of the offender‘s ability to pay. The imposition of these costs is permissive only to the extent that the court may waive payment on the basis of indigency. Here, Lantz made no attempt to seek waiver of payment based on indigency despite being informed at sentencing that the trial court was imposing the “costs of this action.”
{¶ 25} Accordingly, to the extent that Lantz assigns error in the trial court‘s imposition of prosecution costs and fees permitted under
III. Conclusion
{¶ 26} We find Lantz‘s assignment of error not well-taken. We affirm the October 16, 2018 judgment of the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas to the extent that it ordered payment of prosecution costs and fees permitted under
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Arlene Singer, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, P.J.
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J. CONCUR.
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.