State v. LaneState v. Lane
Rendered on the 19th day of November, 2010.
ELIZABETH A. ELLIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0074332, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 61 Greene Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
BYRON K. SHAW, Atty. Reg. No. 0073124, 4800 Belmont Place, Huber Heights, Ohio 45424
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
CHRISTOPHER L. LANE, Greene County Adult Detention Center, 2295 Greene Way Blvd., Xenia, Ohio 45385
Defendant-Appellant
FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} On February 25, 2010, Appellant Lane (Lane) pled guilty to one count of
{¶ 2} Appointed counsel for Lane filed an Anders brief pursuant to Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, stating that he was unable to find any meritorious issues for appeal.... Lane was advised of his counsel‘s Anders brief representations and that he could file a timely pro se brief assigning any errors for review by this court. Lane was further advised that absent such a filing, the appeal will be deemed submitted on its merits. No pro se brief has been received. The case is now before us for our independent review of the record. Penson v. Ohio (1988), 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300.
{¶ 3} Lane‘s appellate counsel has identified one possible Anders Argument for appeal: Appellant‘s Conviction And Sentencing Is Against The Manifest Weight Of The Evidence.
{¶ 4} Lane‘s guilty plea serves as a complete admission of factual guilt and his factual guilt, accordingly, is removed from further consideration. Menna v. New York (1975), 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195; State v. Steele, Montgomery App. No. 23402, 2009-Ohio-6019, at ¶ 5; Crim.R. 11(B)(1). Therefore, [a]s a consequence
{¶ 5} Appellant‘s counsel also states that Lane believes that his sentence of five (5) years intensive probation with Greene Leaf drug treatment was too harsh for the [failure to appear conviction] and should have received the (5) years intensive probation without any drug treatment since this was not a drug case nor was the underlying robbery case involving drugs.
{¶ 6} With regards to felony sentencing, The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences. State v. Rollins, Champaign App. No. 08CA003, 2009-Ohio-899, at ¶ 7 (citing State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, at paragraph 7 of the syllabus). Furthermore, [c]ommunity control is the default penalty for felonies of the fourth and fifth degree, except as those identified as mandatory prison sentences. Foster at ¶ 68. Nevertheless, in exercising its discretion the trial court must consider the statutory policies that apply to every felony offense, including those set out in
{¶ 7} When reviewing felony sentences, an appellate court must first determine whether the sentencing court complied with all of the applicable rules
{¶ 8} Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. AAAA Enters., Inc. v. River Place Cmty. Corp. (1990), 50 Ohio St. 3d 157, 161. It is to be expected that most instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary. A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning that would support that decision. It is not enough that a reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would not have found the reasoning persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would support a contrary result. Id. Finally, [w]hen applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. In re Jane Doe I (1991), 57 Ohio St. 3d 135, 137-38.
{¶ 9} Under
{¶ 10} As noted above, community control sanctions are standard penalties for fourth and fifth degree felonies. Foster at ¶ 68. If a mandatory prison sentence is not required for a felony conviction, trial courts have the discretion to order up to five years of community control sanctions with provisions for random drug testing and treatment.
abuse of discretion, trial courts have broad sentencing discretion when considering community-control sanctions that further these interests. Rollins at ¶ 7.
{¶ 11} In contrast, examples of conditions that are not acceptable under the Jones test include requirements that defendants get conventional haircuts and remain clean shaven, as these types of conditions do not bear any relationship with the criminal charge or conduct involved. See State v. King, 151 Ohio App. 3d 346, 2003-Ohio-208, at ¶¶ 28-29 (citing State v. Alexander (Oct. 6, 2000), Champaign App. No. 2006-CA-6).
{¶ 12} At Lane‘s sentencing hearing, prior to accepting Lane‘s guilty plea, the trial court noted that Lane and his counsel had negotiated a plea agreement with the State. The court then stated the terms of that negotiated agreement, which included the State‘s recommendation that Lane would plead guilty to the failure to appear charge, and that Lane be placed on Community Control with the Greenleaf [sic] Program. Following the court‘s recitation of these terms, the court asked Lane whether he understood these terms to be those that were negotiated before the hearing, and whether Lane both acknowledged and consented to the agreement.
{¶ 13} Next, the trial court stated that it had considered the record along with the report given by the Adult Probation Department; the court also considered the purposes and principles of
{¶ 14} The five years of intensive probation under community control with the six month term of drug testing and treatment were within the statutory limits authorized under Ohio law. The trial court noted that it had considered the record, the Adult Probation Department‘s report, and the principles and purposes of Ohio‘s sentencing guidelines under
{¶ 15} Moreover, Lane and his counsel voluntarily negotiated the terms of his plea agreement, which included participation in the Greene Leaf Program. As indicated above, the trial court specifically asked Lane about his consent to this condition, and noted his affirmative response. Any objection to the Greene Leaf
{¶ 16} Furthermore, we have conducted an independent review of the record aside from Lane‘s assignments of error, and have found no other errors of arguable merit. Accordingly, we agree with his counsel that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.
{¶ 17} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DONOVAN, P.J. and GRADY, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Elizabeth A. Ellis
Byron K. Shaw
Christopher L. Lane
Hon. J. Timothy Campbell