STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. JONATHAN L. LAMKE, Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL NO. C-110725
TRIAL NOS. C-11TRC-33401A, C-11TRC-33401B, C-11TRC-33401C
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
March 15, 2013
[Cite as State v. Lamke, 2013-Ohio-925.]
CUNNINGHAM, Judge.
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 15, 2013
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Brafford & Phillips and Suellen M. Brafford, for Defendant-Appellee.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
O P I N I O N.
{¶1} The state of Ohio appeals from the judgment of the Hamilton County Municipal Court granting Jonathan Lamke‘s motion, pursuant to
{¶2} Because in granting Lamke‘s motion the trial court erroneously relied upon subdivision (D)(4) of
I. Background Facts
{¶3} On July 2, 2011, Lamke was arrested in Hamilton County for OVI, in violation of
{¶5} After a bench trial, the court acquitted Lamke on all counts, including the OVI violation. The court also set aside Lamke‘s administrative license suspension, which was based on his alleged refusal of a chemical test, with a waiver of the reinstatement fee. Lamke then moved again for the immediate release of the motorcycle, and, additionally, requested an order under
{¶6} At the hearing on his motion, Lamke agreed to pay the entire removal fee and the storage fee through July 4, 2011, but he maintained that the county was responsible for the storage fees incurred after July 5, 2011, and until the release of his motorcycle. The trial court granted Lamke‘s motion, citing
II. The Assignment of Error
{¶7} In one assignment of error, the state argues that the trial court erred by ordering Hamilton County to pay fees incurred for the storage of Lamke‘s motorcycle because the impoundment of the motorcycle was “authorized.” According to the state, the trial court misinterpreted
III. Standard of Review
{¶8} The state‘s arguments involve the interpretation and application of
{¶9} A court‘s primary purpose in interpreting or construing a statute is to give effect to the intention of the legislature, “as gathered from the provisions enacted, by the application of well[-]settled rules of interpretation.” Henry v. Cent. Nat. Bank, 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 (1968), paragraph two of the syllabus. To that end, we must first review the language the legislature used. State v. Edwards, 5th Dist. No. 2012-CA-12, 2012-Ohio-5142, ¶ 16.
IV. R.C. 4511.195
{¶10} Generally,
{¶11} The current version of
{¶12}
If a vehicle and its license plates are seized under division (B) of this section and are not returned or released to the arrested person pursuant to division (C) of this section, the vehicle and its license plates shall be retained until the final disposition of the charge in question. Upon the final disposition of that charge, the court shall do whichever of the following is applicable:
(1) If the arrested person is convicted of or pleads guilty to the [OVI offense] * * *, the court shall impose sentence upon the person as provided by law or ordinance and shall order the immobilization of the vehicle the person was operating at the time of the offense * * * and the impoundment of its license plates * * * or the criminal forfeiture of the vehicle * * *, whichever is applicable.
(2) If the arrested person is found not guilty of * * * [the OVI offense], the court shall order that the vehicle and its license plates immediately be released to the arrested person.
(3) If the charge * * * is dismissed for any reason, the court shall order that the vehicle and its license plates immediately be released to the arrested person.
(4) If the impoundment of the vehicle was not authorized under this section, the court shall order that the vehicle and its license plates be returned immediately to the arrested person or, if the arrested person is not the vehicle owner, to the vehicle owner, and shall order that the state or political subdivision of the law enforcement agency served by the law enforcement officer who seized the vehicle pay all expenses and charges incurred in its removal and storage.
{¶13} Although subdivision (D)(2) requires the court to order the immediate release of the vehicle to the arrestee upon an acquittal, it does not specifically address who is responsible for the expense and charges incurred in the removal of the vehicle in the event of an acquittal.
A. The State‘s Interpretation
{¶14} The state reads subdivision (D)(4) of
{¶15} The state then concludes that because Lamke was the registered owner of the motorcycle, he was properly arrested for OVI, and he had a prior OVI violation within six years of his arrest, the seizure and impoundment of the
{¶16} But the state‘s interpretation of subdivision (D)(4) does not take into consideration that the General Assembly did not use language limiting the trial court‘s imposition of the expenses for the impoundment of the vehicle on the government—it merely specifies when the court must impose the charges on the government. As the Fifth Appellate District recently held, subdivision (D)(4) reveals the General Assembly‘s “specific[] inten[t] to prohibit charging the accused impound fees and costs when impoundment of the vehicle was not authorized by statute.” State v. Edwards, 5th Dist. No. 2012-CA-12, 2012-Ohio-5142, ¶ 19.
B. Lamke‘s Interpretation
{¶17} Lamke reads subdivision (D)(4) to require the trial court to charge the government the expenses for the impoundment of the vehicle because he was eventually acquitted of the OVI offense. In support, Lamke cites this court‘s decision in State v. Schulte, 154 Ohio App.3d 367, 2003-Ohio-3826, 797 N.E.2d 517 (1st Dist.).
{¶18} Schulte involved whether the trial court properly denied the city‘s motion to intervene that had been filed subsequent to the granting of the defendant‘s motion for reimbursement of storage fees, following the seizure of his vehicle under a prior version of
{¶19} This court‘s discussion of the current version of
{¶21} In this case, Lamke does not argue that the seizure and impoundment of the vehicle was contrary to those pretrial seizure and retention provisions. Thus, subdivision (D)(4) did not apply, and the trial court‘s reliance on (D)(4) in ordering the government to pay was erroneous.
C. R.C. 4511.195(F)
{¶22} Both parties have ignored subdivision (F)(1) of
{¶23} It is a well-settled rule of statutory interpretation that “words in a statute do not exist in a vacuum. We must presume that in enacting a statute, the General Assembly intended for the entire statute to be effective.” D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 19, citing
{¶25} Our reading of
D. Remand
{¶26} In this case, the trial court determined that the continued retention of Lamke‘s motorcycle was not “authorized” as contemplated in
{¶27} As a result, we hold that trial court applied an erroneous standard when it granted Lamke‘s motion requesting the court to order the county to pay the
E. Specificity in the Court‘s Payment Order
{¶28} The state also argues that the trial court erred by ordering “Hamilton County” to pay the storage fees without designating which agency within Hamilton County is responsible for those fees. Because we are reversing the part of the trial court‘s order requiring Hamilton County to pay the challenged fees, this issue is moot, and we decline to address it.
V. Conclusion
{¶29} We hold that the trial court erred when it ordered Hamilton County to pay the impound fees relating to the storage of Lamke‘s vehicle under the mandatory provision for the ordering of fees under
Judgment reversed in part and cause remanded.
HILDEBRANDT, P.J., and DINKELACKER, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.