State v. KingState v. King
CRIMINAL LAW - WAIVER - ABRUQUAH CLAIM
The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the rule announced in Abruquah v. State, 483 Md. 637 (2023), which barred unqualified firearms identification testimony on the record presented in that case, was a case-specific determination and not a categorical rule. Here, Respondent waived his challenge to the reliability of the firearms identification methodology. Even had his challenge been merely unpreserved, as opposed to waived, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that admission of the unqualified firearms identification testimony was not plain error.
Case No.: CT191113X
Argued: April 7, 2026
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND
No. 42
September Term, 2025
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
KYEEM ANTONIO KING
Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough, JJ.
Opinion by Killough, J.
Filed: July 27, 2026
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
2026.07.27 00‘04- 10:17:18
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
This appeal is a companion to State v. Thornton & Dunbar, No. 46, Sept. Term 2025, which we decided earlier this term. Both cases concern the admissibility of unqualified firearms identification testimony following our decisiоn in Abruquah v. State, 483 Md. 637 (2023). As we held in Thornton, Abruquah did not announce a per se rule barring such testimony. It was a case-specific determination under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020), tied to the evidentiary record developed at the hearing in that case. State v. Thornton, No. 46, Sept. Term, 2025, 2026 WL 1846743, at *8 (Md. June 26, 2026). A defendant who wishes to challenge the reliability of the State‘s firearms identification evidence must do so through a proper pretrial motion under
This case presents the principle in an even starker posture than in Thornton. There, the defendants failed to challenge the firearms expert‘s methodology or to otherwise object to his trial testimony linking the firearms to the recovered ballistics evidence. Here, the Defense did more than fail to object. It affirmatively told the trial court that its concern was “nоt with the science.” On this record, Respondent‘s claim fails for two additional and independent reasons. First, the Defense waived any challenge to the reliability of the firearms methodology by disclaiming it on the record. Second, the claim was preserved and so was subject to plain error review, which it could not meet
While King‘s appeal was pending, this Court decided Abruquah v. State, 483 Md. 637 (2023), holding that the prevailing ballistics methodology as presented in the Daubert-Rochkind hearing held in that case cannot support an unqualified opinion that ammunition evidence was fired from a specific firearm. King raised an Abruquah claim for the first time in his reply brief to the Appellate Court. In the alternative, King argued that the circuit court committed plain error under Abruquah in admitting the unqualified firearms testimony. The Appellate Court reversed King‘s conviction, reasoning that “[b]ecause the firearms conclusion in this case matched the testimony held to be improper in Abruquah, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony.” King v. State, No. 1779, Sept. Term, 2022, 2025 WL 1720003, at *8 (Md. App. Ct. June 20, 2025). The State appealed the reversal to this Court.
We granted certiorari to answer the following question:
Did the Appellate Court err by holding that Abruquah v. State, 483 Md. 637 (2023), required firearm identification to be excluded when the trial occurred before Abruquah, the issue was not preserved for appellate review, and the State, as the proponent, had no opportunity to litigate the evidence‘s reliability in a Daubert-Rochkind hearing?
For the reasons detailed below, we hold that the Defense waived any challenge to the reliability of the firearms identification methodology and that even if the challenge was not waived, it does not satisfy plain error review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
II. FACTS
A. The Crime and Subsequent Investigation
On the morning of June 1, 2019, police officers observed a grey Honda Accord in the middle of a parking lot with its headlights on and rear doors open. Upon closer investigation, police found two gunshot victims, Davion Brandon and Antonio Taitano-Walker, in the front seats of the car. Medical forensic evidence confirmed the cause of death of both victims as multiple gunshot wounds. Brandon sustained twelve gunshot wounds, most of which were shot from behind. Some of the bullet wounds Brandon sustained showed signs of stippling, implying that the bullets were fired at close range. Taitano-Walker sustained five gunshot wounds to the back and had $2,500.00 in cash on his person.
Near the Accord, police found a black Glock 19 Gen5 9mm semi-automatic handgun. Though there were no fingerprints recovered from the gun, it contained 9mm
Police also recovered Respondent‘s cellphone in the backseat of the Accord. The phone contained a picture of a black Glock 19 Gen5 9mm, and it appeared to depict the same gun as the one found at the crime scene. A few days before the shooting, Respondent had sent this picture to Taitano-Walkеr along with a text mentioning a debt the victim owed King.
Surveillance footage from a nearby tobacco store showed both victims in Taitano-Walker‘s car. The footage also showed Respondent and two other individuals in the backseat of the car. During an investigative interview about two weeks after the shooting, King admitted he was in the back of the car when the shooting occurred and that he left his phone there but said that one of the other individuals in the car shot the victims. However, police later elicited testimony from a rideshare driver that contradicted respondent‘s narrative. The rideshare driver stated that the person whom King accused of shooting the victims was in a nearby rideshare vehicle when the shooting occurred.
On October 24, 2019, a Prince George‘s County grand jury indicted King on two counts of murder in the second degree, two counts of use of a firearms in a violent crime, one count of carrying a handgun in a vehicle, and one count of carrying a loaded handgun in a vehicle.
B. Pre-Trial Discovery and the Lack of a Pre-Trial Daubert Hearing
King‘s initial trial date was set for July 27, 2021, but was continued until April 25, 2022. Discovery ensued in the year leading up to the initial trial date. On February 5,
Numerous exchanges took place between the State and the Defense during the discovery period. Notably, on July 8, 2021, the Defense filed a Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for Sanctions, requesting “complete expert disclosure, in compliance with the rules of evidence, including expert witness contact information, source documents and CVs.” The State produced the CV for Smith, the firearms examiner, as well as that of the DNA examiner on July 13, 2021. In the course of the same exchange, the State directly asked the Defense the following clarification question: “Are you requesting the bench notes for the DNA and FEU [Firearms Examination Unit] examination?” The Defense responded, “While we would like to have the supporting documentation for the DNA, what we were most interested in was the supporting
On July 16, 2021, the State sought to continue the July 27, 2021, trial date. The Defense filed an Opposition to Continuance and Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Speedy Trial Violations in which it requested “DNA source documents and bench notes.” On July 21, 2021, the circuit court continued the case and set a date for a status update regarding all discovery requests. On September 18, 2021, the parties appeared before the circuit court for a status conference, and the hearing sheet from that conferenсe indicated that discovery was “essentially completed.”
On April 21, 2022, four days before the trial, the Defense requested to exclude the firearms examiner‘s testimony. The Defense contended that there were outstanding discovery issues with respect to the State‘s various expert witnesses, including the firearms examiner, Mr. Smith. The Defense specifically asked for missing bench notes1 and source documents for the State‘s firearms expert. The Defense argued that, even if the bench notes were produced that same day, King would suffer “great” prejudice, because, given the impending trial, it would provide the Defense little time to prepare their own counter expert witness. As such, in the Defense‘s view, exclusion of the State‘s firearms expert witness was “the better and more appropriate remedy.” In the alternative, the Defense requested “the immediate disclosure” of the missing bench notes.
C. The Trial and the Lack of a Daubert Motion
On April 25, 2022, the first day of trial, the Defense renewed its motion to exclude the firearms expert testimony. In doing so, Defense counsel provided the following reason:
[DEFENSE]: We‘ve received the bench notes . . . And we reviewed them with the standard operating procedures of the Firearms Examination Unit of Prince George‘s County Police Department. And so we found with our forensic‘s [sic] department several inconsistencies between the standard operating procedures and the actual procedures that were applied in this case, and based on that, we believe that we have a Daubert challenge that we would not have known about without the bench notes because it wasn‘t revealed until we looked at the supporting documentation . . . [Also,] [c]urrently there are two cases on remand from the appellate court . . . that found that it was reversible error that the Defense was not allowed to have a Daubert hearing as to firearms examination in particular - and those cases are . . . - Abruquah v. State, 471 Md. 249; and William v. State, 251 Md. App. 523 . . . There are questions as tо the reliability of firearms examination in general, and as applied in this case based on the way in which the examiner conducted his investigation or his examination.
When the circuit court asked why the Defense failed to ask for a continuance on the day it received the bench notes, the Defense responded as follows:
[DEFENSE]: [We] put it to [the circuit court] exactly as I put it . . . just now, that we believe the appropriate remedy was an exclusion, but . . . we didn‘t say we didn‘t want a continuance or anything like that . . . and so as a middle ground, [the circuit court] said send [the Defense] the [bench notes] . . . . However, there were as-applied issues that we did discover. . . . So the standard operating procedures require that the firearms examiner take multiple test fires and then compare those test fires to one another to see what the individual characteristics will be between the test-fired casings, and the found casings that are part of evidence, and then to compare the consistent, individual characteristics between the test-fired casings and then turn around and compare them to the found evidentiary casings. Here that was not done. . . . So for that reason, not only do, of course, we have issues with the field of firearms examination in general as applied in this case, we don‘t believe that the expert followed that, and so we would need to consult with our own expert . . . because we don‘t know what our expert would say, but if they came to the conclusion that these procedures were not followed appropriately or that the opinion is not reliable and should not be
credited, then we would need to call them as a witness. And we‘re foreclosed from doing that at this point in time.
When the trial court asked why the Defense did not have a counter firearms expert witness prepared to testify on behalf of Respondent, the Defense explained:
[DEFENSE]: [T]he issues that arose with the firearms examiner report were not revealed until we got the bench notes. On the face of the report itself, it doesn‘t reveal any of these issues. It‘s only when you see the bench notes and you see kind of where the examiner is showing his work in how he reached these conclusions and then comparing it to the standard operating procedures, that we knew that he did not follow the standard operating procedures. And it‘s the as-applied issues in this case that we would be challenging. Before that there was no way for us to know we did make the request.
The Defense reiterated its inability to secure an expert witness on such a tight timeline, prompting a clarifying question from the bench regarding the true basis of the motion to exclude:
[THE COURT]: So your issue is not with the science, it‘s with the person [who] didn‘t follow the procedures.
[DEFENSE]: Yes. The importance of that, however, could be best be flushed out by an expert and then - it‘s more than that, though, Your Honor. There is the as-applied issue in this casе, which we can attempt to make, you know, a cross-examination based on learning an area of science over the weekend with the as-applied issue. There‘s also a general issue, my understanding from this study, called PCAST, which called into question the reliability of firearms examination as a practice in general.
The circuit court then inquired into why the Defense was unable to bring in forensic unit attorneys to cross-examine the State‘s firearms witness. The Defense reiterated the time constraints:
[DEFENSE]: So my understanding is . . . [the forensic unit attorneys] consult with an expert in order to prepare for cross-examination. They
have not retained or consulted with an expert in this case for cross-examination. And then there‘s also the right to the Daubert hearing . . . so Daubert has two prongs. There is the field of study that you can challenge, but there is also the as-applied issues, and in order to challenge the State‘s expert, the Defense would need an expert in order to testify at the Daubert, . . . and the right to consult with that expert, not just the cross-examination of that expert at the Daubert hearing. So there is the cross-examination at trial in front of the jury, and then there is the pretrial issue of admissibility and reliability under Daubert, which we have not been able to address because we did not have the bench notes. Without the bench notes we could not have at least challenged the issues on the - the as-applied issues in this case in the Daubert context. And as I said before, the Courts are finding that that‘s an issue where it is requested. We will file a request for a Daubert hearing at this point in time for Mr. King, however . . . we would not be prepared to proceed on one based on the fact that we have [not] consulted with an expert because we received the discovery on Friday afternoon.
Despite their statement to the court, the Defense never filеd a request for a Daubert hearing. The court ultimately denied the Defense‘s motion in limine to exclude the State‘s firearms examiner testimony and explicitly found that “the field is not at issue” but rather “the issue [the] Defense says is as-applied.” It found that the Defense was “capable of impeaching the witness with regard to . . . failing to follow the standard operating procedures, and that can go to the weight of the evidence for the jury.” Following the ruling, the Defense reiterated its intention to file a Daubert motion:
[DEFENSE]: Okay. Your Honor . . . for the record, the Defense either has filed today or will be filing today . . . a motion in limine to exclude firearms identification evidence as unreliable [under] Rochkind, which is the Daubert status, to the as-applied issues, as well as to the general issues. I will provide courtesy copies to the Court.
The Defense never filed a Daubert motion. On April 27, 2022, the day the State‘s firearms examiner took the stand, the Defense noted its objection once more:
[DEFENSE]: So for Mr. Smith, the Defense had previously made an objection as to his use of the firearms examiner and stated our intention for a Daubert hearing because we had received the discovery untimely, and since we could not because of time restraints, we‘re just renewing the objection for the record, Your Honor. And we incorporate all previous arguments.
[THE COURT]: There‘s been no change in circumstances. The motion is denied.
The State‘s firearms expert witness testified that “the 13 fired 9mm cartridge cases were identified as having been fired in the GLOCK semi-automatic pistol submitted.” He also “identified” eight of the fired bullets that were submitted as “having been fired in the submitted GLOCK pistol.” The Defense did not make a contemporaneous objection to this testimony.
In addition to the firearms expert witness, the State also presented to the jury testimony from Samuel Sullivan, whom King met while they were both detained at the Prince George‘s County Detention Center. Sullivan testified that Respondent bragged to him about shooting the victims and taking a large amount of cash. Sullivan also recounted details about the shooting that King allegedly shared with him, including that King shot the victims from the backseat of a Honda Accord using a Glock 19 9mm firearms and that Respondent left his cellphone in the backseat of the Accord when attempting to flee the scene.
The trial concluded on April 29, 2022. On May 4, 2022, King was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, two counts of use of a firearm in a crime of violence, transporting a handgun in a vehicle, illegal possession of a regulated firearm, and wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun. King was subsequently sentenced to two consecutive
D. Appellate Proceedings
King initially based his appeal on seven claims of error. In the time between when King filed his opening brief and his reply brief in the Appellate Court, this Court decided Abruquah v. State, 483 Md. 637 (2023). We held that the AFTE [Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners] theory of firearms identification could support an opinion that ammunition evidence was “consistent with” having been fired from a particular firearm but could not support an unqualified opinion that the ammunition was fired from the specific firearm. Abruquah, 483 Md. at 694-95. We, however, expressly limited our holding in Abruquah to the record before us in that case. Id. at 696. Relying on this decision, King advanced a new Abruquah claim in his reply brief. At oral argument, the State argued that King failed to raise a challenge to the reliability of firearms identification in the circuit court and thereby waived the claim.
In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Court ruled for King. King, 2025 WL 1720003, at *8. It noted that, while “[b]ad faith or a willful violation of discovery by the State can justify the exclusion of evidence[,]” there was “no bad faith on the part of the State” that would merit exclusion of the firearms expert testimony here. Id. at *6. Moreover, the intermediate appellate court acknowledged the State‘s preservation argument with respect to the Abruquah claim and King‘s repeated statement in front of the
The Appellate Court held that the trial court “properly denied the request . . . for a Daubert hearing” at the time it made the admissibility determination but concluded that this Court‘s intervening decision in Abruquah had changed the analysis. Id. at *7-8. Thus, given that the firearms expert‘s testimony “was a similar unqualified conclusion to what was held to be improper in Abruquah[,]” the Appellate Court concluded that “the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony.” Id. at *8. It then went on to find that this error was not harmless, because, not unlike Abruquah where the firearms expert “was the only direct evidence before the jury linking Mr. Abruquah‘s gun to the crime[,]” id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), “[s]imilarly here, there was only circumstantial evidence connecting [King] to the shooting[,]” Id. Having found that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the State‘s firearms expert testimony and that this error was not harmless, the Appellate Court reversed and remanded King‘s case for a new trial. Id.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A threshold question in this case is which standard of review applies, a determination that turns entirely on whether King preserved his challenge to the firearms identification testimony. When a defendant preserves a challenge to the admissibility of evidence by raising it in the trial court, an appellate court reviews the trial court‘s ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Robertson, 463 Md. 342, 351 (2019). We review any
When a defendant fails to preserve a challenge, the analysis changes. Ordinarily, an unpreserved claim is reviewable, if at all, only for plain error. Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 587 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);
As we explain below, King‘s challenge to the firearms expert‘s testimony fails at the first prong of the harmless error analysis because it was not merely unpreserved; it was waived. As we will explain, it fails at other prongs as well. Whether a litigant has preserved a claim, and the related question of whether a litigant has complied with the requirements of
A. The Respondent Waived Any Challenge to the Reliability of the Firearms Methodology
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. State v. Rich, 415 Md. 567, 580 (2010). In Abruquah, we held that the record before us “weighs against admission of testimony of a ‘match’ between a particular firearm and a particular crime scene bullet” and vacated Abruquah‘s conviction. 483 Md. at 691. Here, King waived a similar Abruquah claim when he affirmatively limited the basis of his objection to the State‘s firearms expert testimony to an “as-applied” issue, failed to file a timely Daubert motion under
1. Respondent affirmatively waived any potential Abruquah clаim.
The record shows that King affirmatively waived his objection to the reliability of the firearms expert‘s testimony. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Rich, 415 Md. at 580. On multiple occasions, King repeatedly stated that his objection to the State‘s firearms expert testimony was based on an “as-applied” challenge.
Soon after receiving the firearms examiner‘s bench notes, the Defense renewed its motion to exclude the State‘s firearms expert testimony based on having found “several inconsistencies between the standard operating procedures and the actual procedures that were applied in this case.” The Defense then reiterated that the bench notes revealed “as-applied issues,” which stemmed from the firearms examiner not having followed “the
Relying on this record, the circuit court appropriately fоund that the issue “is as-applied.” We review a trial court‘s findings of fact for clear error. Hailes v. State, 442 Md. 488, 499 (2015). Here, time and time again, King explicitly based his objection to the State‘s firearms examiner on an “as-applied” challenge. When the court declared that King‘s issue was “not with the science” but rather “with the person [that] didn‘t follow the procedures,” the Defense responded in the affirmative. Based on these assertions, the trial court reasonably found that “the field is not at issue.” This factual finding is supported by the record, and we must honor it.
Additionally, none of the other arguments King made preserve the Abruquah issue. In bringing the “as-applied” challenge to the court‘s attention, King mentioned the existence of studies “which called into question the reliability of firearms examination as
This reasoning holds added weight where, as here, King had access to the firearms examiner‘s expert report “months prior” to the initial July 2021 trial date, and the report explicitly described the bullets recovered from the crime scene and the bodies of the victims as “having been fired” from the black Glock found at the crime scene. It also “identified” the fired cartridge cases police recovered to that same gun. This matching tеchnology was the very basis of the litigation in Abruquah, a fact we made clear when we initially remanded that case in October 2020. Abruquah v. State, 471 Md. 249, 250 (2020) (remanding with instruction to the circuit court “to consider whether, in light of this Court‘s decision in Rochkind v. Stevenson, . . . the Circuit Court would reach a different conclusion concerning the admission of firearms and toolmark identification testimony“).
King cannot argue that the report reveals no issues on its face, and, in the same breath, argue that the absence of the firearms examiner‘s bench notes prevented him from raising “the pretrial issue of admissibility and reliability” earlier than the eve of the trial in April 2022. The explicit findings of the expert report, along with our Abruquah decision from 2020 and the studies that call into question the reliability of firearms matching
King‘s retroactivity argument fares no better. Even though King raised the Abruquah issue for the first time in his reply brief before the Appellate Court, he argues that our holding should apply to his case. Abruquah, 483 Md. at 698. In accordance with our case law, “new interpretations of constitutional provisions, statutes[,] or rules . . . appl[y] to the case before us and all other pending cases where the relevant question has been preserved for appellate review.” Hackney v. State, 459 Md. 108, 119 (2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Defense knew about the firearms examiner‘s findings at least nine months ahead of trial. The Defеnse also knew that under Rochkind a new standard of evidentiary admissibility had been announced and that “everything old is new again with respect to some scientific and technical evidentiary matters long considered settled.” Rochkind, 471 Md. at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Defense was also aware that we remanded the initial Abruquah case before us with instructions to the circuit court to consider whether it “would reach a different conclusion concerning the admission of firearms and toolmark identification testimony[.]” Abruquah, 471 Md. at 250. Moreover, as Petitioner points out, the studies that led to our holding in Abruquah, namely the 2008 report of the National Research Council of the
2. Respondent opposed a Daubert hearing and never filed a Daubert motion pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-252.
Moreover, King failed to preserve his Abruquah claim in accordance with
(d)(3) Any Other Motion. Any other Defense, objection, or request capable of determination before trial without trial of the general issue, shall be raised by motion filed at any time before trial.
(e) Content. A motion filed pursuant to this Rule shall be in writing unless the court otherwise directs, shall state the grounds upon which it is made, and shall set forth the relief sought. . . . Every motion shall be accompanied by a statement of points and citation of authorities.
Here, the Defense never filed a Daubert motion pursuant to
Nor did the circuit court grant the Defense leave under
Because the Defense never filed a motion pursuant to
The record reflects that the Defense not only refrained from requesting a Daubert hearing, but also on several occasions affirmatively declined to pursue one. Becаuse no such motion was ever made, King‘s reliability challenge was not preserved for appellate review. To maintain the predictable and orderly administration of justice that the rule is designed to safeguard, appellate review must be confined to the specific issues and motions that were actually presented to the trial court.
B. Even if the Claim Were Merely Unpreserved, the Appellate Court Applied the Incorrect Standard of Review
King‘s unpreserved contention of error in admitting the firearms examiner‘s testimony was subject to plain error review. State v. Thornton, No. 46, Sept. Term, 2025, 2026 WL 1846743, at *6 (Md. June 26, 2026);
But even if this Court were to treat the claim as merely unpreserved rather than intentionally waived, King could not satisfy other plain error prongs. King argues that the Appellate Court “did not need” to analyze the case for plain error and “could not have done so, since the error could not have been obvious to the trial court” before this Court decided Abruquah. (citing State v. Rich, 415 Md. 567, 578 (2010)). That argument is wrong for two reasons. One is that King does not have any path to appellate review other than plain error. If he cannot satisfy the four prongs of plain error review, that means he cannot prevail on his claim, not that he gets to pick another test. The second reason King‘s argument is wrong is that it fundamentally inverts the applicable framework. That the asserted error was not clear or obvious does not mean plain error review was unavailable; rather, it is the precise reason King‘s claim fails on the merits.
The requirement that an error be “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute” is the second prerequisite of plain-error review, Beckwitt, 477 Md. at 464, and King, quoting that very requirement, concedes he cannot meet it. A defendant who concedes that the asserted error was not clear or obvious has conceded that he cannot obtain plain-error relief. He has not shown that some more forgiving standard governs in its place. An unpreserved claim is reviewed for plain error, and where the error was not clear or obvious, the claim fails on that review. It does not morph into review for abuse of discretion. To the extent King contends the Appellate Court could have reached the merits
C. The Admission of the Testimony Was Not Plain Error
Even applying the plain error standard that should have governed, King‘s claim fails. The admission of the firearms examiner‘s unqualified opinion was not clear or obvious error, which is dispositive under Beckwitt, 477 Md. at 464. At the time of King‘s trial in April and May 2022, no Maryland appellate court had ruled on the admissibility of conclusive firearms identification testimony under the Daubert-Rochkind standard. Rochkind had replaced Frye-Reed two years earlier, cautioning that “everything old is new again[.]” 471 Md. at 38. And in October 2020, a year and a half before King‘s trial, this Court vacated and remanded Abruquah‘s case with an instruction to the circuit court “to consider whether, in light of this Court‘s decision in Rochkind v. Stevenson, . . . the Circuit Court would reach a different conclusion concerning the admission of firearms and toolmark identification testimony[.]” Abruquah, 471 Md. at 250. The very question at issue here was being actively litigated and publicly debated. The law was unsettled, not settled. An error that occurs in an unsettled area of law, where reasonable minds can disagree, cannot be characterized as clear or obvious. Beckwitt, 477 Md. at 464.
Nor was the alleged error clear or obvious at the time of appeal, as Respondent concedes in his briefing - “the error could not have been obvious to the trial court[] before the Abruquah opinion had been issued.” Moreover, as we explain at greater length in our companion case, Thornton, 2026 WL 1846743, at *8-9, Abruquah was a case-specific Daubert determination, not a per se prohibition on unqualified firearms identification
D. There Was No Daubert Ruling to Review
The trial court‘s ruling could not be reviewed for abuse of discretion because it was subject to plain error review. That ruling also could not be reviewed for abuse of discretion because there was no exercise of discretion to review. The trial court here was never askеd to make a Daubert ruling on the reliability of the AFTE methodology. It was asked to resolve a discovery dispute about bench notes, and it did so. When the court inquired into the basis for the Defense‘s objection, Defense counsel confirmed that the issue was “not
The Abruquah record was developed through a four-day hearing with extensive expert testimony and multiple scientific studies. Nothing comparable exists here. As we explained in Thornton, Daubert determinations are inherently record-dependent, and the absence of any record bearing on the reliability of the AFTE methodology leaves an apрellate court without a factual foundation to conduct the analysis Daubert requires. See Thornton, 2026 WL 1846743, at *10 (discussing Cortés-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular De Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 1997)). A reviewing court cannot superimpose a Daubert ruling on a record that contains none.
V. CONCLUSION
Respondent waived any challenge to the reliability of the firearms identification methodology by disclaiming on the record any objection to “the science” and confining its objection to an as-applied dispute about the examiner‘s compliance with standard operating procedures. Respondent compounded that waiver by failing to file the written Daubert motion that
Even if this claim were treated as merely unpreserved rather than intentionally waived, Respondent‘s contentions were subject to plain error and cannot meet that
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. We remand the case to the Appellate Court for that court to address the claims of error raised by Respondent that the Appellate Court did not reach in its original opinion.
JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.