STATE оf Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent, v. Donald Michael KEITHLY, Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant. State of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Yvette Davis, Defendant-Respondent. State of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patrick Cowles, Defendant-Respondent. State of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael Smith, Defendant-Respondent.
Nos. 39033, 39034, 39035, 39036
Supreme Court of Idaho
Nov. 26, 2013
314 P.3d 146
Boise, February 2013 Term.
one. According to the State, the only victim impact statement in the updated PSI was that of Shanna Hathman, Fontaine‘s daughter. Although the State‘s description of the letter is not determinative, it is a consideration. Additionally, the content of Birrell‘s letter does not reflect the traditional contents of a victim impact statement. The letter tangentially addresses Fontaine‘s death and the emotional impact on Birrell. However, the main focus of the letter is that Birrell was once threatened by Shackelford, she felt the threat was earnest, and she feared that it would be carried out if Shackelford were to be released. Birrell‘s letter does not offer any opinions or characterizations about the crime or Shackelford, except that he had previously threatened her.
Shackelford fails to explain why threats to kill others “if [they] caused him to be put in prison” would not be relevant evidence at the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. It is certainly proper in the course of the sentencing process for a district court to be advised of and consider the potеntial danger a defendant may pose to others. After all, “protecting society” is the primary objective of a criminal sentence. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011). The district judge properly considered this evidence, which Shackelford had the opportunity to explain or rebut, and we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court‘s judgment of conviction sentencing Shackelford to two consecutive fixed life sentences for the murders of Donna Fontaine and Fred Palahniuk.
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES and HORTON concur.
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd., Boise, for respondent. Paul J. Fitzer argued.
HORTON, Justice.
This appeal relates to the service of four members of the Board of Directors for the Southern Valley County Recreation District (the Recreation District). The Valley County Prosecuting Attorney (the State) brought usurpation actions against Donald Keithly, Yvette Davis, Patrick Cowles, and Michael Smith (the Directors), alleging they usurped their offices as directors of the Recreation District. The State requested they be removed from office and sought a $5,000 fine against each of them. Upon the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that this action was an election contest, rather than a usurpation action, which cannot be brought by the State. The district court also ruled that the Directors’ actions while in office were protected by the de facto officer doсtrine. The State appeals, arguing this was a proper usurpation action and the de facto officer doctrine does not apply. The Directors cross-appeal, arguing they are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Recreation District was formed in 1998 and the original directors were appointed by then-Governor Phil Batt. The Board consists of three directors, each representing a separate subdistrict. The directors are unpaid and serve four year terms beginning January 1 in the year following their election.
Yvette Davis was a member of the Recreation Board from its inception until she was defeated in an election in May of 2011.1 Prior to that election, there had never been a contested election for a рosition on the Recreation Board. When a candidate for subdistrict director runs unopposed, it is not necessary to hold an election. Rather, pursuant to
In the November election in 2006, the Recreation District did not publish a Notice of Election Filing Deadline, which the county clerk must publish between fourteen and seven days before the election. Recognizing the error, the election for subdistriсt 3 was rescheduled to February 6, 2007. Notice was properly given, but the wrong position was listed in the notice. Rather than list “director” of the Recreation Board, the notice listed the position as “president” of the Recreation Board. Davis ran unopposed and was declared elected.
The election errors were not limited to Davis. In 2008, the election for subdistricts 1 and 2 was conducted in November. The Notice of Filing Deadline was timely published in the local newspaper. However, that notice did not specify that seats for both subdistricts 1 and 2 were available. The nоtice simply stated that “declarations of candidacy for the office of Board of Directors of the Southern Valley County Recreation District must be filed ... no later than 5:00 p.m. on the 1st day of September, 2008.” Only two people filed declarations of candidacy, Jim Roberts and Michael Smith. Smith declared for subdistrict 1 and Roberts for subdistrict 2. Pursuant to
Jim Roberts resigned prior to the completion of his term. As previously noted, when there is a vacancy not resulting from the expiration of a term of office, the vacancy is filled by the remaining board members.
The State brought usurpation actions against Davis, Smith, Keithly, and Cowles requesting they be declared usurpers, removed from office, and fined up to $5,000.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court may only review cases in which a judicial determination will have а practical effect on the outcome.” Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 779, 133 P.3d 1240, 1244 (2006). “A district court‘s application of
Our inquiry is: (1) whether the trial judge correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial judge acted within the outer boundаries of his or her discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific available choices; and (3) whether the trial judge reached his or her decision by an exercise of reason.
Hudelson v. Delta Intl. Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005) (citing Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 568, 97 P.3d 428, 435 (2004)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The State‘s appeal must be dismissed as moot.
In Edwards v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 154 Idaho 511, 515, 300 P.3d 43, 47 (2013), we explained the doctrine of mootness:
“An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantiаl controversy that is capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief.” Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851, 119 P.3d 624, 626 (2005). The issue of mootness can be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425, 431, 283 P.3d 742, 748 (2012). “Mootness ... applies when a favorable judicial decision would not result in any relief. This Cоurt may only review cases in which a judicial determination will have a practical effect on the outcome.” Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 779, 133 P.3d 1240, 1244 (2006).
Idaho Code § 6-602 provides that usurpation actions may be brought by a prosecuting attorney (or the attorney general, when the position relates to the state) or аn individual claiming entitlement to hold office. Idaho Code §§ 6-605 and 6-606 provide the remedies available to individual plaintiffs. Idaho Code § 6-608 provides as follows:
When a defendant against whom such action has been brought is adjudged guilty of usurping or intruding into or unlawfully holding any office, franchise or privilege, judgment must be rendered that such defendant be excluded from the office, franchise or privilege, and that he pay the costs of the action. The court may also, in its discretion, in actions to which the people of the state are a party, impose upon the defendant a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, which fine, when collected, must be paid into the treasury of the state.
In this case, no defendant remains in office. Consequently, no defendant may be found to be “usurping or” “unlawfully holding office” which would trigger the district court‘s obligation to “exclude” them from office, impose a fine, or to pay the costs of the action. As the district court is without power to grant affirmative relief against any defendant, this action is moot.
1. Attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 .
The Directors argue that they are entitled to attorney fees incurred before the trial court and on appeal pursuant to
The district court stated that it was “declining to grant attorney‘s fees,” suggesting that it recognized that the decision wаs committed to its discretion. The court stated that it was unable to find that the action was initiated without a reasonable basis in fact or law. This is a recitation of the standard that we have applied to a request for attorney fees under
As to this appeal, although the Directors have prevailed because we dismiss the appeal on grounds of mootness, wе are unable to conclude that this appeal was not reasonably grounded in law or fact. Accordingly, we deny the Directors’ request for an award of attorney fees on appeal.
2. The Directors are not entitled to attorney fees under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) .
The Directors argue that they are entitled to attorney fees under
Here, the Directors are seeking to use Rule 11(a)(1) as an alternative to
Further, “fees will not be awarded under Rule 11.2 unless the Court can conсlude that ‘the appeal was interposed for an improper purpose.‘” Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 330, 297 P.3d 1134, 1147 (2013) (quoting Funes v. Aardema Dairy, 150 Idaho 7, 13, 244 P.3d 151, 157 (2010)). We are unable to discern an improper purpose underlying this appeal. Accordingly, we decline to award attorney fees under I.A.R. 11.2.
IV. CONCLUSION
This appeal is dismissed. No attorney fees or costs arе awarded.
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and W. JONES concur.